Italian Campaigns

"1915-8. ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS - At the outbreak of the World War the Italian general staff had no worked-out plan for an offensive campaign against Austria-Hungary. The omission was not due to the fact of the Triple Alliance, for the prospect of war on the N.E. front had always been faced, but to the relative military position of the two countries. The Habsburg Empire had a great superiority over Italy in organized and potential man-power and in material, but the controlling factor which seemed to deny the possibility of Italian offensive action was the frontier drawn in 1866. The Trentino salient, thrust down like a great wedge to within a few miles of the Lombardo-Venetian plains, dominated the strategical situation. Nor was the hampering influence of the frontier confined to a practical veto upon attack. Its length in relation to Italian military strength, and above all the fact that the threat of the Trentino came so far west in the long line, meant that Italy's defensive frontiers were far from being coterminous with her political boundaries. The first possible line of defence was held to be the Tagliamento, with its fortified bridgeheads at Osoppo, Codroipo and Latisana; plans had been drawn up with the Piave as the main line of resistance, though with the intention of meeting the enemy in the plain E. of the river; but there was much to be said for the contention that the true military frontier of Italy was still the line of the Mincio and the Po.

The plans and studies of peacetime had been based upon the supposition of a duel between Italy and Austria-Hungary, and the outlook changed in view of the general conflagration. The prospect of a break with Austria-Hungary was at once considered by the Italian general staff, and by Aug. 21 1914 a scheme of offensive operations had been outlined. This plan was based upon the supposition of Italy's entry into the war within a month and upon the consent of the Italian Government to provide at once for the requirements put forward by Gen. Cadorna, chief of the general staff. As neither condition was fulfilled, the plan need not be discussed, and it was in fact withdrawn by Cadorna a month later. The preparations of the winter and spring and the march of events on the French and Russian fronts determined the plan of operations which it was hoped to carry out upon Italy's entry into the war.

Gen. Cadorna, who took command of the Italian armies on the declaration of war, had worked out his scheme on the idea that Italy's object should be to hold on the N. and push towards the E. He had not sufficient strength to attack in both sectors. This decision, however, did not imply a passive defensive on the mountain front. On the contrary, the choice of the eastern sector for the main offensive demanded an active defensive, or rather a limited offensive, on the mountain front, and especially in the Trentino. If the operations towards the E. were to be developed with reasonable security it was absolutely essential to improve the position in the Trentino, to reduce, at least, the threat to Italian communications caused by the great salient. The long frontier may be divided into three sectors: (1) the Trentino salient; (2) the great barrier of the Cadore and Carnic Alps; (3) the eastern frontier from Pontebba to the sea. In the first of these sectors the Austrians had an overwhelming advantage in the natural lie of the terrain and the use which had been made of it. The salient was well protected on the flanks; on the W. by the great Alpine mass that is broken only by two feasible passes, the Stelvio and the Tonale, and on the E. by the mountains N. of Asiago and the great rocks of the western Dolomites, a wall that had only two gaps, the narrow valley of the Brenta and the road that runs from Feltre by Fiera di Primiero and the Passo di Rolle. The Austrians were in this position, that they could defend the salient with a comparatively small number of troops thanks to the immense natural strength of the positions they occupied and the system of fortifications which had been prepared, while within their mountain walls and behind these fortifications they could concentrate forces for an attack through the comparatively narrow mountainous zone which lay between the frontier and the plains. Three classic military routes led into Italy, through the Guidicaria, Lagarina and Sugana valleys, and other roads had opened up the difficult country between the Adige and the Brenta. East of the Trentino, from the Marmolada through the Alps of Cadore and Carnia as far as Pontebba, operations on an important scale were almost equally difficult for both sides, in face of the natural advantages that lay with the defensive. The Italians had a greater depth of mountainous zone to back their first lines, but the Austrians, with the Pusterthal and the Gailthal, were very much better off for lateral communications. The third sector of the front, from Pontebba to the sea, was less unfavourable to an Italian attack, but here also the conditions were very difficult. Between Pontebba and the Isonzo great mountains blocked the way, while the upper and middle reaches of the Isonzo flow through a wild, mountainous country with few roads. South of Tolmino indeed the mountain masses decrease in height and steepness, but the country still has the aspect of a giant ridge and furrow. The plain of Friuli narrows rapidly as it approaches its eastern limits, and at the old frontier the gap between the lagoons and the foothills of the Julian Alps is not 15 m. in width. And this gap has little depth; less than 10 m. to the E. of the old frontier begins the plateau of the Carso. The approaches from the W. are completely commanded from the Carso and the hills about Gorizia, and to the E. the ground rises again. Here, too, Italy had to fight over country where the enemy had a very great advantage in position. Still, the natural obstacles were much less formidable towards the Isonzo than elsewhere along the frontier; communications were fair in the plain and there was space for an attack upon a relatively wide front. Above all, a successful advance in this direction would lead somewhere, would threaten a vital part of the monarchy. An invasion of the Trentino held no such promise. At the most, success would have meant the reduction of the salient and the occupation of the unredeemed" territories, for northern Tirol must be considered impregnable. The choice of Cadore and Carnia for the main offensive was open to the same objection. Given the strong defensive positions near the frontier, the Austrian superiority in communications and the distance of any objective of firstclass importance, the prospects of an advance in strength afforded by this region were not tempting, the less so as the district afforded little in the way of supplies. There was a further argument in favour of attacking towards the E., that an attack in this direction would be calculated to occupy a much greater number of enemy troops than an attempt to advance in the mountains. The fact that Austria-Hungary was already heavily engaged elsewhere gave the Italian general staff the chance of attacking but there were corresponding obligations. The Italian campaign had obviously to be planned as part of a whole, and it was the duty of the Italian command not merely to strike for Italian aims but to cooperate in the general struggle.

Cadorna decided on the plan that offered the chance of the greater success, and he framed his scheme of operations on the supposition that in May 1915 he could expect simultaneous offensive action on the part of Russia and Serbia. The objections to an offensive in the direction of Trieste and Laibach were obvious enough: a successful advance meant the lengthening of a front that was already very long in proportion to the number of troops and guns available, and, moreover, increased the menace of the Trentino salient. But the drawback was lessened by the expectation of Allied action on the N.E. and S. fronts of Austria-Hungary, which would prevent the enemy from taking advantage of this weakness.

Cadorna's plan, completed in detail while the Russians were still upon the Dunajec, was as follows. Gen. Roberto Brusati with the I. Army was to conduct a limited offensive against the Trentino salient, with the object of shortening the line and securing strong defensive positions. Gen. Nava with the IV. Army was to push N. from Cadore to threaten the enemy communications in the Pusterthal and cooperate in an advance from Carnia. This advance was to be conducted by a separate force under Gen. Lequio, consisting mainly of mountain troops, which was to move in the direction of Tarvis. The II. and III. Armies, under Generals Frugoni and Zuccari respectively, were to cross the Isonzo and attack E. with all speed. A large number of troops, with units brought up to war strength by the recall of several classes, had been in the neighbourhood of the frontier for many months. They were not in sufficient strength for attack, but were aligned with the object of covering mobilization; for the enemy was already fully mobilized, and the prospect of a sudden attack on his part had to be considered.

As the discussions between Rome and Vienna gradually led towards the final break, the Austro-Hungarian command prepared for defence. In addition to the strong permanent works already existing on the main routes, "barrier lines" were constructed in the valleys and on the open sectors of the front; many of the fortress guns were removed and placed in wellconcealed positions, and wire was lavishly employed. At the end of April the Austrian covering troops, under the command of Gen. von Rohr, numbered about 80,000 infantry, 1,400 cavalry and 54 batteries, in addition to fortress troops and guns. Two divisions under Gen. von Koennen-Horac were stationed in the Trentino; one division under Gen. von Langen watched the approaches to Carinthia; two divisions under Generals von Boog and von Kuczera were upon the middle and lower Isonzo respectively, or, rather, E. of the river, in the mountains, on the Carso and about Gorizia. These divisions were improvised formations, with a considerable proportion of second-line troops and volunteer battalions.

When Italy denounced the alliance with Austria-Hungary, on May 3 1915, Vienna was already convinced that war was certain. The attempts to continue discussions had only been undertaken for the purpose of gaining time, and military preparations were hastened. It was the first intention of Gen. Conrad von Hotzendorf to wait for the Italians at Klagenfurt and Laibach and attack them as their columns came out of the mountainous country, but the plan was not approved by the German command. Falkenhayn declined to give the io divisions which Conrad required for this plan, and it was abandoned. Conrad wished to smash Cadorna's offensive by manoeuvre and counter-attack. Falkenhayn was not only unwilling to spare the troops for this plan but he doubted whether Cadorna would allow himself to be led into Conrad's trap; he feared the difficulties of recovering territory once abandoned, and he realized the great natural strength of the Isonzo and Carso lines. It was decided to conduct an obstinate defensive rather than to attempt Conrad's plan. The command of the AustroHungarian armies on the Italian front was given to the Archduke Eugene, who had commanded the Balkan armies. His chief of staff was Gen. Krauss, and under his direction Gen. Dankl, lately in command of the I. Army, was entrusted with the Tirol and Trentino sector; Gen. von Rohr commanded on the Carinthia front, while Gen. Boroevich von Bojna, lately in command of the III. Army, took charge of the Isonzo - Carso front. It was not until May 21, three days before the declaration of war, that the main body of Boroevich's army, consisting of five divisions brought from the Serbian front, began to be entrained from near Agram. When war was declared the Isonzo front, from Tolmino southward, was lightly held by three divisions under Gen. Ludvig von Goiginger.

Meanwhile Cadorna had to adapt his plans to the quickly changing circumstances. The Russian armies N. of the Carpathians had given way under the attacks of Mackensen and BoehmErmolli, and had begun the great retreat that was to go so far. There was no word of movement, even of demonstration, on the Serbian front. The request of the Allies that the Serbian armies should resume action, or at least make a show of action, met with no response, and in May the Austro-Hungarian troops on the Serbian front were reduced by five divisions, their place being taken by three newly formed German divisions, which had not yet completed their establishment. Various reasons, military and political, have been given for the inaction of the Serbians, but in the present connexion it is simply the fact that matters, the fact which allowed five Austro-Hungarian divisions to be transferred en bloc from the Serbian front to the Italian theatre of war.

The altered circumstances compelled Cadorna to revise his immediate objectives, but not his general plan of attack. A further handicap, in his view, was imposed by the denunciation of the alliance with Austria-Hungary three weeks before the declaration of war, and by the immediate leakage regarding the London agreement between Italy and the Entente, which gave the enemy more grace to prepare against his initial moves. The time for preparation was further lengthened by the political crisis caused by the last efforts of Berlin and Vienna to keep Italy out of the war. On the other hand, the main body of the Italian army was not ready for an earlier advance. It was not fully ready when war was declared. Mobilization was nearly complete as far as the men were concerned, for drafts had been brought up gradually during the previous months. The armies were ready to fight in their positions against an Austrian attack, or for preparatory movements on a limited scale. They were not ready, the eastern armies in particular, for a big advance.

On the eve of war, Cadorna's dispositions were as follows: Brusati's I. Army, with 5 divisions and io battalions of Alpine troops, was to push forward in the Trentino, and carry out the limited offensive already indicated. The IV. Army under Nava was to advance, the right wing upon the Pusterthal, the left wing across the great Dolomite road, past the peaks of the Sella group, to threaten the valleys running down to the Eisack. Nava had five divisions and seven Alpine battalions, while a sixth division of his army was at first held in reserve about Spilimbergo, near where the Tagliamento runs out into the plain of Friuli. To this army, in view of the positions which it had to attack, especially the Landro and Sexten fortifications, was assigned the bulk of Cadorna's very limited supply of heavy artillery, including practically all the guns above 149 mm., with the exception of seven batteries of 2 10's, assigned to the Carnia force. The task of Lequio's Carnia force, which consisted of an infantry division and 16 battalions of Alpine troops, was that designed in the original plan, the probable movements, in the event of success, depending upon those of the armies to right and left. The II. and III. Armies were to attack with all speed upon the Isonzo front, but their movements were to be inspired by strategic caution. They were to get under way as quickly as possible and break through the enemy's covering troops. Further movement was to depend upon what they found, and upon the news from the other fronts. While initial speed was obviously the essence of Cadorna's plan, he was handicapped by the fact that another fortnight was required for complete mobilization. Frugoni's II. Army was to consist of three army corps (eight divisions), and Zuccari's III. Army of three corps (six divisions) with three cavalry divisions. On May 24 only three corps and two cavalry divisions were ready for the initial attack. Meantime there had been a difference of opinion between Cadorna and Zuccari, and the clash of two strong characters made the difference irreparable. As a result Zuccari was relieved of his command and the III. Army was entrusted to the Duke of Aosta, on the very eve of the declaration of war.

In addition to the divisions already mentioned, a central reserve of io divisions and one cavalry division was in process of mobilization in the plains of the Veneto and Friuli,-5 infantry divisions in the rear of the Trentino sector, the other 5 and the cavalry between the Tagliamento and the eastern frontier, - but these troops could not be ready for action for some three weeks. The first shots of the war were fired by Austrian guns upon the Carnia front, a few hours before midnight on May 23, the hour fixed for the opening of hostilities, and early on May 24 the Italian advance began.

The opening moves of the campaign, all-important as they were in relation to the future operations which depended upon them, failed to obtain the results hoped for in Cadorna's design. The I. Army was prompt to carry the limited objectives assigned to it, overcoming the weak resistance of the enemy covering troops and occupying positions which not only were in themselves much better adapted for defense than the frontier, but greatly reduced the length of the line to be held. The IV. Army was very slow. Its heavy guns were not ready when hostilities began, and Nava waited upon their arrival, preoccupied by the strong positions which faced him and the permanent fortifications which lay beyond. It would appear that he was influenced by the positions themselves and assumed the existence of an opposition which in fact he would not have found. He was not ready himself to carry out his plan of advance, which was based on the supposition that the enemy resistance was already adequately organized. He held by his plan and may have missed an opportunity of reaching his objective by changing it. His initiative was hampered by adherence to method. Lequio's Carnia force was quick to move, and found that the enemy was equally quick. This sector was all-important to the Austrians, from the point of view both of offence and defence. It was essential to prevent a break-through to Tarvis and Villach, and if they could hold the frontier line it preserved for them the chance of the attack down the valleys converging upon the Tagliamento which had long figured in the plans of their general staff. This sector had been quickly reenforced as the danger of war became imminent; and here alone, in the first days of the campaign, there was, roughly speaking, an equivalence of infantry strength. The contending troops met on the passes and the mountains that flanked them; and though the Italians had the best of the fighting which followed, and wrested several important positions from the enemy, it was quickly evident that the way was blocked here against all but an attack in overwhelming strength. On the other hand, Lequio's quickness had locked a door upon which the enemy had his eye.

Meanwhile the II. and III. Armies were on the move. Frugoni with two corps (5 divisions and 14 battalions of Alpini) attacked along the line of the Isonzo from Saga to opposite Gorizia. The Duke of Aosta, with a single corps and two cavalry divisions, was to force the passage of the lower Isonzo and push on towards the Carso, his other divisions following rapidly as their preparations for movement were completed. The II. and III. Armies were in theory organized for quick movement; their artillery, except for 12 batteries of 149-mm. guns, consisted entirely of field-guns, mountain-guns and 149-mm. field-howitzers (19 batteries), and the proportion of guns to men and shells was very low. Speed and initiative were essential to the success of the opening moves, and at various points speed and initiative were lacking.

The Austrians had withdrawn beyond the line of the Isonzo, except at the two bridgeheads opposite Tolmino and Gorizia, which were held in force, and S. of Gorizia the line of defence chosen was the Carso plateau, only a few covering troops being disposed along the lower reaches of the river, which leaves the Carso at Sagrado. For the II. Army the first obstacle was the river line and the two bridgeheads, and the main initial attack was to come from the II. Army, whose preparations were further advanced and which was echeloned forward; but the I. Cavalry Division, which was attached to the III. Army, was to dash for the Pieris bridges and secure the crossing for the infantry. The cavalry were inexplicably slow, and the bridges were destroyed just before they arrived. This failure would have mattered less, and might have mattered not at all, but for a sudden and violent flood which filled the wide bed of the Isonzo with a deep and rapid stream and made the fords impassable. And the pontoon trains were far away. Cadorna had counted on passing the lower reaches of the river by bridge and ford, and his very inadequate supply of bridging material had been designed for later use or use in other sectors of the front. It was not until June 4, when the river was falling, that it was possible for the right wing of the III. Army to throw troops across in force. Meanwhile the left wing had advanced from Cormons against the northern half of the Carso, where the Isonzo flows like a moat under the plateau, and farther N. the II. Army had come in touch with the enemy all along its front. The long ridge which separates the valleys of the Judrio and the Isonzo from Kolovrat to Verhoolje, was occupied without resistance, but the Austrians had fortified the bridgeheads opposite Tolmino and Gorizia, and here an unexpected opposition was found. Both bridgeheads were naturally very strong. In neither case, owing to the course of the river, did the Austrian position form a salient. The defence of the hills of Santa Lucia and Santa Maria opposite, Tolmino, and of Monte Sabotino and Podgora, N. and W. of Gorizia, was supported by direct flanking fire from the positions to the N. and S. on the left bank of the river. The right wing and centre of the II. Army were quickly brought to a standstill in front of the bridgeheads; tentative attacks, carried out by small detachments, were readily repulsed, and a pause followed. The bridgeheads were invested, and here too, perhaps, the theory of "fixed positions," the old rule that these could not be ignored, had too much weight with the attacking forces. For every day lessened the chance of breaking through the thin enemy line, strong only at selected points. On the other hand, the country is extraordinarily difficult, and roads were few and mostly bad. And those which were suitable for the movement of troops and guns led only to the points where the enemy was holding in some force. On the left wing of the army the IV. Corps under Gen. Di Robilant crossed the Isonzo N. of Tolmino and pushed up into the mountains E. of the river, hoping to turn the Tolmino position. Appalling weather made movement in the mountains impossible during the critical week, and when the chance of a surprise had gone the great barrier of the Julian Alps was an insuperable obstacle to such forces as the Italians could bring against it. Guns, shells, machine-guns and transport were lacking.

The Austrians were rushing troops to the Italian front, and by the middle of June Boroevich had eight divisions to put against the II. and III. Italian Armies. Rohr's Carinthian army had been reinforced by two divisions and a mountain brigade from the Russian front. Dankl's Trentino army, which was not organized in divisions, but in groups assigned to various defensive sectors, had been increased to 96 battalions, including the Bavarian Alpenkorps which had come into line by the end. of May. The Austrians were greatly inferior in numbers - they had on the front some 20 divisions against Cadorna's 35 - but they held positions which were naturally ideal for defence, and these were well fortified by art, too well for the limited means of destruction at the disposal of the Italians.

Cadorna had counted upon surprising the enemy, but this advantage had been partly denied him. When he heard of the denunciation of the treaty with Austria-Hungary he pressed for an immediate declaration of war, which would allow him to move at once and reach the positions he had designed as his first objective. A striking force was ready then - there were nearly as many troops available for immediate movement in the first week of May as there were at the outbreak of war - and he would have gained between 15 and 20 precious days. Political considerations stayed his hand, and the initial delay was lengthened by the Biilow-Giolitti crisis. Bad weather and hesitation on the part of junior generals did the rest. The operations N. of Tolmino were practically stopped by the fierce mountain storms, and the advance of the III. Army only reached Monfalcone on June 6. Nor even then was it possible to attack the plateau in force. By blowing out a bank of the Sagrado - Monfalcone canal and closing the dam across the river, the Austrians had used the flood waters of the Isonzo to inundate a great stretch of lowlying ground below the Carso. It was not until June i 1 that the dam near Sagrado was destroyed and. the flooded area ceased to be fed by the waters of the river. During the following days the Italians succeeded in throwing troops across the Isonzo near Sagrado and by June 27, after prolonged and heavy fighting, they had pushed the Austrians up the slopes S. of Monte San Michele and established the bridgehead that was necessary for a general attack on the whole front of the Carso. Meanwhile a small bridgehead had been established at Playa, a few miles N. of Gorizia. The quick-flowing waters of the Isonzo, which here run pent in a narrow gorge, were crossed on June 9, 10 and 11, with great difficulty. The bridgehead won was very limited in area, and dominated by the mountains on the eastern bank; it was long before it could be enlarged to any great extent. Attacks were made along the greater part of the front from Tolmino to the sea at the end of June and during the early days of July, but these hardly reached the standard of a methodical, organized offensive on the scale that was now clearly necessary. There was some very stiff fighting during these days, and both sides lost heavily, especially on the slopes of the Carso, where the Austrians gave ground here and there and on more than one occasion were very hard pressed to maintain their lines intact. Two fresh divisions were brought from Carinthia to strengthen the threatened line between Gorizia and the sea, while another division was brought from the Balkan front and a mountain brigade from Pola. The Italian attacks had hitherto been conducted at "long range": that is to say, the point of departure for the infantry advance was at a considerable distance from the enemy entrenchments. In many cases the attacking infantry was checked before it reached the wire entanglements; too often when the wire was reached it was found nearly intact, for the destructive power of the Italian guns was insufficient to clear the way for the infantry, and many gallant attempts with wire-cutters and gelatine tubes were inevitably condemned to failure. Gradually it became evident that the hopes of a war of movement must be given up, that only the slow processes of trench warfare could lead to success. Sporadic attacks continued during the first half of July, and though the Austrians held on to most of their positions the Italians established themselves at much better jumping-off places than those which they had occupied before.

On July 18 the Italian III. Army attacked in the most determined manner, and after three weeks' hard fighting, during which the Austrians made a great attempt to push the Italians back across the river near Sagrado, the struggle came to an end with the latter firmly established under the crest of Monte San Michele and the village of San Martino del Carso, and in possession of most of Monte Sei Busi. Similar attacks by the II. Army made little impression on the Austrian lines, and losses were heavy, but the Austrians also suffered severely, losing more than io,000 prisoners. The lesson of two months' fighting, apart from the necessity of learning the business of trench warfare, was that the artillery, and especially the heavy artillery, at the disposal of the II. and III. Armies was altogether inadequate. There were not enough heavy guns and not enough shells, and much of the ammunition was defective. The bursting charge was weak, and there were a large number of "prematures." It was essential to increase the weight of artillery fire if the infantry were to have a chance. It was clear that developments in artillery technique were necessary, and the importance of counter-battery work began to impress itself upon some of the commands. But shells were few, and observation from the air was not taken seriously, so that it was long before the advocates of counter-battery work made any headway.

After two months' preparation a fresh attempt was made to break through on the Julian front. This action was preceded by various attacks in other sectors of the front, some of which resulted in useful territorial gains, while others carried the line forward without improving the general position or even with the result of weakening it. By his main attack Cadorna hoped to turn the Gorizia positions both from the N. and the S., and as a secondary operation, after crossing the middle Isonzo, to threaten Tolmino from the S. while the bridgehead and the town were attacked from the W. and N. It was also hoped to gain ground on the southern Carso, in the direction of Trieste. Cadorna had a great numerical superiority in men. The II. Army now consisted of 12 divisions and the III. of 7, while a reserve of 5 divisions lay ready in the Friuli plain. In all, Cadorna could dispose of 312 battalions on the Julian front. When the attack began Boroevich had about half this number of troops, but within three weeks he had the equivalent of 15 divisions at his disposal. It was on the II. Army front that the Italian superiority in number was great; on the Carso indeed the Duke of Aosta had no great advantage in numbers over the Archduke Joseph, who had assumed the command in this sector in July. But the terrain on Boroevich's right was such that he could expect to hold with greatly inferior forces, especially in view of the Italian weakness in artillery. Cadorna had put upon the Julian front every piece he could collect. He reduced the guns in the other sectors to the barest minimum; he dismantled the forts at Mestre and the lines of the Tagliamento, and so was able to form 20 batteries of medium-calibre guns, of old pattern. Altogether he had been able to give to the II. and III. Armies some 300 medium and heavy guns, but many of these were obsolete. And the supply of shells was very meagre, 2 5-30 per gun per day. The III. Army had the bulk of the heavy artillery, only 125 pieces being given to the II. Army, which had to attempt, by sheer superiority in infantry strength, to make up for its deficiencies in material. Along the whole Julian front there were some 1,250 guns of all calibre, and a million shells had been collected by the date fixed for the attack - Oct. 21.

The offensive went badly, like all the Allied offensives of those days. The means were insufficient for the width of front attacked; the artillery technique was not adapted to modern requirements, nor, as was natural at this stage, had the staffs as a whole, - army, corps or divisional, - fully realized the necessity of minute preparation and strict attention to detail. And a tendency noticeable during the first months of the war, especially in the II. Army, to use men in isolated petits paquets, first one detachment and if that failed then another and another, was still observable. The attempt to cross the river between Plava and Tolmino never promised success, for the preparations were insufficient and the crossing-points not well chosen. Although some successes were obtained N. and W. of Tolmino the attack in this region was not persisted in, owing to the failure farther south. The attempt to extend the Plava bridgehead and so gain room to threaten Gorizia from the N. was equally unsuccessful. After various attempts both these actions were broken off, and the battle was concentrated upon the Gorizia bridgehead and the Carso. Sabotino had been taken by direct assault on the first day of the battle, but, owing to defective staff work and an attitude on the part of the army command that can best be described by the phrase "laisser aller," this success was not promptly backed up, and a fierce counter-attack drove the Italians off the ridge they had so gallantly stormed. All subsequent attempts to retake Sabotino failed, and the prolonged struggle for the hills about Oslavia and the battered hog-back of Podgora was little more successful. The Italians gained ground here and there, eating into the Austrian lines, but they could not break through. Farther S. the attacks of the III. Army met with similar fortune. Ground was gained, a trench here, a trench there, and the Italian line was carried almost to the summits of Monte San Michele. The attacks were renewed again and again, and the troops displayed remarkable gallantry and resolution. They were met by a resistance no less determined, and the losses on both sides were very heavy indeed. Early in Dec. the offensive died down. Cadorna's battalions were worn out by their prolonged and gallant efforts, and drafts were not forthcoming to fill their terribly depleted ranks. During the six weeks' fighting Cadorna lost nearly 140,000 men, and he had little to show in the way of tangible prize. Nor did the mere figures of the casualty list give the measure of the loss suffered. The gravest loss was that of the trained officers and under-officers, who could not be replaced. Cadorna could not claim a victory, but he had reduced the forces of Boroevich to the last extremity. He had come very near performing what he had not means to perform, and only stubborn valour and an ample supply of machine-guns saved the Austrian lines. Boroevich had his back to the wall when the Italian offensive came to an end. He had lost nearly 9,000 prisoners; his battalions were worn out and his reserves were exhausted; but Cadorna had no strength left for a further attack.

The results of the first seven months' campaigning were disappointing to those - and they were many, both in Italy and in the Allied countries - who had hoped for far greater effects from Italy's intervention. Some of the reasons for Cadorna's comparative lack of success have been indicated in the course of the narrative and some are illustrated more fully in other articles. First of all stands the fact that in May 1915 the Italian army was very meagrely provided with the material necessary to modern war. Cadorna's only chance of early success on the lines expected by the optimists lay in quick movement against an enemy unable to man the passes and defensive lines that lent themselves so well to resistance, even in face of greatly superior forces. The southern half of the Julian front offered a far better chance of an Italian success than any other sector. There was no comparison as regards terrain or communications. Yet it was the Austrian positions in this region that Falkenhayn described as "ideal for defence against superior numbers." When, for the various reasons which have been given, Cadorna's first move failed to secure the results hoped for, the Italian armies were forced into a warfare for which they were very badly prepared. It is true that they were badly prepared for any kind of warfare, and would hardly have fared better in a campaign of movement. In any case, a new technique had to be learned and the means for developing it were not available. The story of the first seven months of the Italian campaign is the story of a magnificent attempt to supplement deficiencies in skill and material by resolution and heroism. Not that resolution was always evident. Instances of the contrary have been given, and there were others: the long tale of general officers dismissed by Cadorna during the first months of the war bears witness to failures.

During these early months the Austrians, both officers and men, were clearly superior in skill to their opponents. They had the advantage of nine months' experience when Italy took the field, and they made good use of it. And their superior skill was backed by a spirit which the armies of the Dual Monarchy sometimes failed to show on the eastern front. The Slav troops which fought with reluctance against Russia displayed a very different demeanour against Italy, and, according to Gen. von Cramon, head of the German Mission at Austro-Hungarian headquarters, this was specially noticeable in the case of the Southern Sla y s, whose country was immediately threatened with invasion, and who had ambitions of their own which conflicted with those of Italy. The rest of the Habsburg peoples, moreover, were embittered by Italy's transformation from an ally to an enemy, and both Falkenhayn and Hindenburg bear witness to the fact that the Austrian army showed a very different spirit against its two main adversaries.

Many lessons were learned by the Italian army during the campaign of 1915, and the experience of these months bore fruit also in other quarters. It began to be realized in Rome that the army must have what it needed, that "conservative finance" had to give way before the imperious requirements of modern war, that every idea or estimate regarding numbers of men and supplies of munitions had to be revised in the light of new experience. The winter months were busily employed, especially in the munition factories. A great effort was necessary, for at the end of the 1915 campaign Cadorna had lost half of his small supply of middle-calibre guns through "prematures" or other accidents, and the factories, instead of augmenting his artillery strength, had so far scarcely kept pace with wastage. But the preparatory work was beginning to tell, and as far as artillery was concerned the situation was largely transformed during the winter of 1915-6. The small total of heavy and medium guns was increased sevenfold. But shells were still scarce in proportion to modern requirements, especially as these went on increasing with each month. And if Cadorna's artillery strength was greatly increased, so was that of his adversary.

The supply of men, no less than that of material, required to be replenished and augmented. In seven months the Italian losses in the field were close upon 280,000-66,090 killed, 190,400 wounded, and 22,520 prisoners. This was in addition to casualties from sickness, which were heavy, including as they did the losses from an outbreak of cholera which originated with prisoners freshly arrived from the eastern theatre of war. This outbreak was promptly tackled, and did not spread widely, but there were several thousand deaths in the isolated area. Men had to be found, not only to fill up the gaps but to make new formations, for it was clear that the war was going to make untold demands upon man-power. During the winter the gaps were filled and eight new divisions were ready in the spring, while others were in process of formation; and Cadorna had succeeded, after some difficulty, in having the classes required for drafts called up well ahead of his immediate needs. This was especially necessary, as, owing to the small annual contingent taken before the war, the bulk of each class was practically untrained. It was, moreover, necessary to instruct the trained units in the new methods which the trench warfare was evolving, if these new methods were to be carried out successfully. Unfortunately, the necessity for this methodical training was not generally, or even widely, understood, and the Italian army and nation paid heavily for the absence of properly organized training schools and camps. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, to begin with, at least, except for the drafts there was little opportunity for instruction. The men were fully occupied either in fighting or working at the trenches and shelters which had to be made out of live rock, working at roads or hutments or other necessary constructions. There was not even time for necessary rest in these first months. The front was very long in proportion to the number of men available, and if there were relatively few men required to hold the mountain positions, the number required to supply these few with food and drink and fuel and ammunition, especially in winter, was far greater than in the plains.

During the early months of 1916 there was a good deal of sharp fighting on the Julian front, especially at the Gorizia bridgehead. The long struggle of the autumn and early winter had left the Italians in possession of an irregular and unsystematized line, unsuitable for prolonged occupation, and both sides carried out numerous small operations with the object of "rectifying the front." The Austrians were the more skilful at this game, as they were in conducting raids with the object of securing information, but the work done by the Italians with sap and mine on Monte Sabotino advanced the line by more than 600 yd., and brought it close under the main Austrian trenches, eliminating the wide stretch of open ground, exposed to both frontal and flanking fire, which had led to the failure of repeated attacks. In March, when the German attacks upon Verdun were at their fiercest, and rumour said that Austrian reinforcements might be sent to increase the weight of the offensive, Cadorna opened a big demonstrative action against the Gorizia bridgehead. This was only a demonstration, but brisk fighting took place, and both sides suffered considerable loss. Meanwhile preparations for a real offensive on the Julian front were well advanced, when news came that the Austrians were preparing a big attack in the Trentino. Cadorna was slow to believe in this project, which was first reported to him by Brusati on March 22. He considered that the news was a deliberate attempt on the part of the enemy to distract his attention from the Julian front, but further information convinced him that the Trentino offensive was really intended, and meanwhile he had taken what seemed adequate measures against the threat.

It was not unnatural that Cadorna should doubt the report of a really formidable enemy offensive in the Trentino. The situation on the Russian front hardly seemed to justify an Austrian offensive on the grand scale in a sector so "eccentric" (in the literal sense of the word). Conrad, however, had calculated that he could carry out the attack in the Trentino before Brusilov's armies could move. Relying upon his advantage of interior lines and the late passing of winter on the Russian front, he made his preparations gradually and secretly throughout the winter and spring, collecting vast quantities of stores and ammunition about Trento, and sending his reenforcements piecemeal until March, when troops were hurried to the front with all speed. Conrad had proposed the plan to Falkenhayn in the previous Dec., but Falkenhayn disapproved, and in the end Conrad acted independently, stripping his eastern front, especially of guns, to a dangerous extent. According to Falkenhayn, no official intimation of the offensive was given to Germany, and Falkenhayn himself did not know the extent to which Conrad had weakened his forces in the east. On the other hand, Falkenhayn attacked at Verdun without informing Conrad, so that each would seem to have the like ground for complaint.

The Strafexpedition, as it was termed in Austria, before the event, consisted of 14 divisions of picked troops, with over 2,000 guns, including a large proportion of heavy artillery. It is clear that such a force was by itself insufficient to "knock out" Cadorna's armies, but it is equally clear that a successful drive through the Italian lines in this sector might have compelled a rectification of the whole Italian front, and might have prepared the way for a further offensive in greater strength. And in the worst event there seemed the prospect that Cadorna's programme for the summer would be seriously upset. But the Austrian staff underestimated the resistance of the Italian infantry and Cadorna's power of manoeuvre; and it was mistaken about the date on which Brussilov could attack.

To meet the Austrian attack Brusati had a sufficient number of troops, but a considerable proportion of these were untried, and he was greatly inferior in artillery. He had 850 guns of all calibres, of which 336 were heavy or medium. Apparently both Cadorna and Brusati considered that the I. Army was sufficiently strong to resist the coming attack, and, though both had underestimated the weight of fire that was actually brought to bear on the Italian lines, their estimate of the situation would probably have been justified if the troops available had been more skilfully disposed, if the defensive positions had been better chosen and adequately prepared. Cadorna has been much criticized for his hesitation to believe Italian Campaigns (1915-1918) 4,4 - ,'

49pdYna U Q, E  Militia (I  English Miles 0 10 titgrOWLiv, rei :mica Istr  in the forthcoming attack, and for his tardy concession of reserves for the threatened sector. The reinforcements sent before the battle may have been insufficient in view of the dispositions made by Brusati, but these dispositions did not fit in with Cadorna's general plan, and, in fact, transgressed his definite instructions. The positions held by the I. Army were at many important points well in advance of those laid down by Cadorna as the definite line of defence upon which he relied for relative freedom in his operations on the Julian front. And much labour had been expended in fortifying these advanced lines, while the "battle positions," marked out as such by nature and by the orders of the supreme command, had been inexplicably neglected. There had already been friction between headquarters and the I. Army command in regard to the tendency of the latter to go outside the role allotted. The difficulty was to some extent an outcome of the difference of opinion in regard to Cadorna's strategy which prevailed in the Italian army. It was natural that those who had to deal with the Trentino and Cadore sectors should see opportunity for offensive action and chafe because they were not given the means to act. It was perhaps natural, too, that they should be inclined to do what they could with limited means in the hope of inducing, by the bait of actual success, a revision of the general plan. But such experiments in despite of discipline can only be justified by success. This attitude, and these actions, were inspired partly by the wish to exploit the opportunities that seemed to offer and partly by the difficulty of maintaining permanently an inactive defensive; but they were probably influenced by the belief, which was widely shared, that an offensive in the Trentino would give better results than continuance of the attempts upon the Julian front. In any case, Brusati's I. Army was aligned as though for an offensive. Its main infantry positions and the bulk of its guns were alike badly placed for defence against a resolute attack. By Cadorna's direct intervention the lines were modified in the Val Lagarina and Val Sugana, and on May 8 Brusati was relieved of his command, a measure which Cadorna had wished to take at a much earlier stage. He was succeeded by Gen. Pecori-Giraldi, commander of the VII. Corps (III. Army) .

A week later the Austrian offensive was launched. The Italian wings in Val Lagarina and Val Sugana held firm, though some of the positions which should have been prepared had not been touched; but in the centre, between the Val d'Assa and the Val Terragnolo, where the Austrian fire was heaviest and the positio,as occupied were not suitable for defence, and where the Italian line was thin, the front was driven in. Cadorna, who had himself assumed direct control of the operations, ordered a withdrawal to S. of the Posina and E. of the Astico and Assa, while he dispatched ample reinforcements to support the retiring troops and gave orders for the concentration of a large reserve force, to be known as the V. Army, E. and S. of Vicenza. Heavy fighting went on until June 17, but a fortnight before that date the Austrians were held. By June 2 Cadorna felt himself safe, though his opinion was not generally shared. The line was holding; his V. Army was practically ready in the plains, and still untouched; and in fact, although the Austrians were to gain a little more ground at heavy cost, his confidence was fully justified. The Strafexpedition was already condemned to failure when Brussilov, answering the appeal for cooperation made by Cadorna on May 19, attacked the weakened Austrian lines in front of him on June 4, and won the great victory that came within an ace of being decisive, if Cramon may be believed. At the Allied Conference held in the preceding March Brussilov's offensive had been fixed for the first half of May. As the time drew near the delay of a month was proposed, but when Cadorna asked for Russian cooperation and pointed out that the Austrian front in the E. had been weakened in order to carry out the Strafexpedition, the answer came that Brussilov would attack on June 2. His offensive, according to Falkenhayn, was not expected by the enemy to take place until the beginning of July; and, though it was delayed by two days in order to bring more troops into line, the surprise was complete. The attack in the Trentino, based on a miscalculation, nearly ended in the collapse of Austria's eastern front and it brought no gain corresponding to the risk run and the losses suffered.

The Austrians were 10th to give up the attack that had begun so well. For a fortnight after the beginning of Brussilov's drive they struggled to break through from the mountains to the plain, but at the end of that time, having made but negligible progress, they found their left wing attacked. Cadorna had begun his counter-offensive, and after a week's pressure the Austrians withdrew, flattening the salient which their advance had made.. They withdrew skilfully and steadily, before the Italian counter-attack was fully under way, to a line considerably in advance of their old positions, including as it did Cima Dodici, both sides of the Val d'Assa and the Tonezza plateau. This advance was the sole gain made, and the immediate price paid for it, apart from the disaster on the Russian front, was a casualty list that was estimated at over ioo,000 men. Nor did the penalty end here. Cadorna refrained from knocking his head against the lines upon which his retreating enemy turned and stood. The positions which he had regained were adequate to his aims in the Trentino, which were purely defensive, and instead of persisting in his counter-offensive he rapidly swung his reserves back to the Julian front, smashed through the Gorizia bridgehead and took Gorizia, and drove the Austrians from the western regment of the Carso plateau.

Cadorna had judged rightly and Conrad wrongly, and the former's swiftness of decision and manoeuvre led to a big Italian success. But there was a moment when the situation compelled Cadorna to consider and prepare for the possible retreat of the II., III. and IV. Armies from the Julian and Cadore fronts. Ten days after the opening of the Austrian attack he had to reckon with a possible failure of the troops of the I. Army to prevent the enemy reaching the plains in force. Cadorna made his plans for such a retreat, from the Isonzo to the Piave, and his frank statement of the possibility, together with his request for the recall of a division from Albania and 'one from Libya (one division had already been recalled from Albania towards the end of April), caused natural alarm in Rome. Salandra suggested a meeting of the commanderin-chief, the four army commanders, the premier, the Minister of War and two other members of the Cabinet, a suggestion which Cadorna declined, insisting that the responsibility for military decisions lay with himself, and not, as Salandra's proposal claimed, with the premier and council of ministers. He requested that if he no longer enjoyed the confidence of the Government he should be replaced at once. Salandra replied that his proposal had been misunderstood; but when the measures taken preparatory to a possible retreat from the Isonzo line were communicated to the Cabinet he returned to the charge, maintaining that such provisions could not be regarded as being confined to the province of the military authorities, but must be subordinate to the decisions of the Government. In reply Cadorna pointed out that military exigencies might demand immediate decisions which could not wait upon the deliberations of a Government, and that responsibility must lie with the commander-in-chief. Fortunately the question was not put to the test. The Austrian offensive was now fairly held, and it was not necessary to consider further, at this time, the question of a general retreat. The incident, however, has an importance as exemplifying a difference of opinion regarding the relative functions of the Government and the supreme command, which was to grow more serious as time went on. It was difficult, if not impossible, to say where precisely the functions of each should begin and end, and at a later date the friction increased.

During July, while a gradual transference of troops from W. to E. was being carried out, and preparations for an offensive on the Julian front were being hastened, the counter-offensive on the Trentino front was continued and several positions were taken, while the Austrians were kept on the qui vine by movements in Tirol. The attacks against the new Austrian lines in the Asiago and Arsiero uplands were not very fruitful; and on July 9, with his eye on Gorizia, Cadorna gave orders to slow down the offensive and return to the idea of defence. The attack farther N., on the other hand, gave good results. It was clearly unexpected by the Austrians, and the Italians made a considerable advance in the region of the Fassa Alps, occupying the Passo di Rolle and the mountains of Cavallazza and Colbricon on July 22, and seizing the village of Paneveggio, in the Val Travignolo, at the end of the month. The Austrians made repeated attempts to recapture their lost positions, hurrying reinforcements into the Val Travignolo, but their efforts were useless, and as the summer went on the Italians gained more ground in successive sharp actions, though operations on the grand scale were never undertaken and were indeed practically excluded by the nature of the terrain and the lack of communications. But the continued threat kept the Austrians nervous, and by the autumn some three divisions of picked mountain troops were concentrated in the valley of the Avisio.

During the winter of 1915-6, in preparation for an attack on Gorizia and the Carso, the right wing of the II. Army had been transferred to the III., so that the whole front from N. of Monte Sabotino down to the sea was under the command of the Duke of Aosta. Both III. and II. Armies had been temporarily weakened by the withdrawal of troops to form the V. Army, but even at the most critical moment of the Asiago battle the Duke had eight divisions and a dismounted cavalry division at his disposal. During July he was reinforced by three divisions, and a considerable number of heavy guns, and at the end of the month four more divisions with their artillery were rapidly transported from the Vicentine plain to the III. Army front.

A further division was given to the army from the general reserve, so that the Duke of Aosta had under his direct command 16 divisions and a dismounted cavalry division. He had 1,250 guns, of which 520 were heavy or medium, and these were supplemented by nearly Boo trench-mortars (bombarde), of which 138 were of 240-mm. calibre. These bombarde had been constructed during the winter in order to make up for the deficiency in heavy artillery which the manufacturing resources of Italy were inadequate to meet. The bombarda was in fact much more than what is usually understood by the term trenchmortar. Its range was much longer, and the destructive power of its big projectile was very great. Its advantage over the big gun, given Italy's poverty in manufacturing resources, was obvious. Its disadvantages are equally obvious: its forward position and the big flame of its discharge made it a relatively easy mark for the enemy's guns. The question of ammunition supply was also complicated by the forward position. The bombarda was a pis aller, but thanks to the devotion of the bombardieri it rendered great service.

On the Carso and about Gorizia Boroevich was badly prepared to meet the Italian attack, for Cadorna's quick transference of troops to the III. Army front enabled the Duke of Aosta to throw an overwhelming force against the Austrian lines. Boroevich had only five divisions in line and one in immediate reserve between Sabotino and the sea when the Duke launched his attack, and the Austrians were taken by surprise. The Duke began with a feint. On Aug. 4, after a heavy bombardment, the Italian VII. Corps attacked the low hills E. of Monfalcone, which had already seen much stubborn fighting. They stormed the enemy lines, but were driven back again by a counterattack. The thunder of the guns continued all along the III. Army front - a far heavier fire than had ever come from the Italian side, - and on the morning of Aug. 6 the intensity of the bombardment was redoubled. The infantry attack came in the afternoon, when the VI. Corps attacked the Gorizia bridgehead and the XI. the summits of Monte San Michele. The VI. Corps, commanded by Gen. Luigi Capello, had outgrown the dimensions of an army corps, for Capello, acting under the Duke of Aosta, was in command of no fewer than six divisions. His attack was brilliantly successful. Sabotino was taken on the run, in 40 minutes, while farther S. the greater part of the Podgora ridge was torn from the Austrians and some detachments reached the river at sunset. The Austrians defended themselves with the most obstinate valour. They counterattacked frequently, and on the afternoon of Aug. 8, when they were finally driven across the river, they had gained precious time for their hard-pressed commander. Italian troops crossed the river the same night and the town of Gorizia was occupied next day without resistance, while a general attack on the Carso was breaking down the stubborn defence which had survived the loss of the summits of San Michele early in the first day's fighting. On Aug. io the Austrians were driven back across the Vallone, the deep cut that separates the San Michele - Doberdo section of the Carso from the main plateau. Only at the extreme S. of their line, on the low ridges above the Lisert marshes, did they succeed in preventing a break through their original lines of defence.

Both to the E. of Gorizia and on the far side of the Vallone the advancing Italians found themselves faced by new lines, hidden among the woody slopes beyond the town or the stony undulations of the Carso. Cadorna still hoped to go through, for it was not yet clear whether the Austrians were standing on a line which they had fully prepared, or whether they were fighting to cover a retreat to positions still farther east. Hoping to find a way round, and at the same time to prevent a concentration of force against the advance of the VI. Corps, he ordered an attack by the II. Corps from the Plava bridgehead, at the same time restoring the VI. Corps to the II. Army, and instructing the Duke of Aosta to continue his attacks on the Carso. The attack from Plava came to nothing - given the difficulties of the terrain, the artillery preparation and support, through shortages of guns and ammunition, was totally insufficient - and the VI. Corps was held up by hidden machine-gun posts. The information regarding the new enemy lines was meagre, and they were well concealed among the trees. Only the III. Army continued to make progress, and Cadorna broke off the action in the plain of Gorizia, deciding that careful preparation was necessary for an attack upon the new positions. He reenforced the artillery of the III. Army with guns taken from the II., and the Duke of Aosta carried on his attack for a few days more before it became evident that on the Carso also the enemy lines were too strong to be taken in the later stages of an offensive, with ammunition ebbing and troops already weary. The enemy troops, of course, were still more worn-out. Their reserves were all in line, and to back these were only broken units and march battalions. If Cadorna had been able to bring, immediately, a fresh weight of destructive fire to bear upon the new lines he would almost certainly have gone through. He was still handicapped by lack of material.

The loss of the Gorizia bridgehead was a serious blow to the Austrians, but the advance on the Carso was a still greater threat to their line as a whole. It gave the Italian III. Army ample room beyond the Isonzo, and an admirable line of observation posts. The Duke of Aosta's divisions were no longer attacking a formidable glacis, with every inch of their own ground under the observation of the enemy, and with no "eyes" themselves to view his country. And an advance upon the Carso, now rendered more feasible by the alteration in relative position, threatened to turn the enemy lines E. of Gorizia. To complete the scheme, it is clear, a simultaneous attack to the N. of the town was indicated. Such an attack was always in Cadorna's mind; it had been attempted more than once. But he had not been able, nor was he now able, to collect the means necessary to the simultaneous attack. His artillery strength, both in guns and shells, was altogether insufficient. He had to choose between the Middle Isonzo and the Carso, and he chose the latter, with Dornberg, the Iron Gates and the Hermada as his objectives.

This idea governed the operations on the Julian front during the rest of the year 1916. Three times Cadorna attacked on the main Carso plateau, between the Vippacco and the Brestovica valley, using the right wing of the II. Army in the Gorizia plain to support the main operation, the attack by the Duke of Aosta's left. The first attack, launched on Sept. 14 and pursued for three days, was affected by bad weather and gave disappoint ing results, though considerable progress was made. The handicap of bad weather continued, and delayed each of the two short, sharp blows dealt by Cadorna before winter closed down. In four days' heavy fighting in Oct. and three days' still fiercer struggle at the beginning of Nov., the Duke of Aosta punched out a big salient on the northern half of the Carso, driving the Austrians back to their last line of trenches and occupying the important position of Faiti Hrib. In each of these three actions the attack was broken off as soon as it slowed down. The second and third were in fact only preparatory actions, not offensives on the grand scale. Previous experience had shown that more men and more guns and shells were necessary for a successful attack on a wide front; and it had now become an axiom that only with a wide front of attack was success possible. Cadorna was ready to strike another blow if the weather had let him, but winter came early with heavy mists and much rain, and in Dec. he decided that he must reserve his strength for the following year.

The early advent of winter put a stop to other operations, in the mountain zone, which had borne considerable fruit. Good progress had been made in the region of the Fassa Alps, towards the Val d'Avision, and in Oct. an attack N. of Pasubio gained a wide stretch of high plateau which gave additional depth to the Italian defensive position and freed some 10 m. of the Vallarsa road from direct observation and worrying fire. Both here and in the Fassa Alps bad weather put an end to active military operations in the middle of Oct.; and an attack in the Asiago uplands, which was planned for the middle of Nov., had to be given up owing to the heavy snows that came a few days before the date was fixed.

The year had seen much heavy fighting, and both sides had suffered severely. The Italian casualties were nearly 120,000 dead, 285,000 wounded and 78,000 prisoners. The bulk of the latter were taken in the first days of the Austrian offensive in May, when the front lines, too full of troops, were overwhelmed, and a number of detachments were cut off in isolated mountain positions. The Austrian losses were also heavy. The Strafexpedition is said to have cost about 10o,000 men. The Italian offensives on the Julian front, from Aug. to Nov., yielded more than 40,000 prisoners to the attacking forces, and the list of killed and wounded during these months came not far short of ioo,000. If the territorial gains at the end of the year's fighting were not great, Cadorna's continued attacks, following upon the costly failure of the Austrian offensive in May, had done their work in occupying an increasing number of the enemy's troops and wearing down his powers of resistance. The Italian casualty list, as was the rule with the attackers, greatly exceeded that of the Austrians, but the advantage of man-power lay with the Entente, and the policy of attrition was generally, though not universally, accepted as indicating the only road to victory. No other policy, certainly, was open to Cadorna while the plans of the Allies were based upon this idea. His role was clearly marked out: he had to hammer when he could, with what means he could collect from month to month as the output of guns and munitions increased and fresh troops were trained, keeping always in view as an essential aim that of attracting to his front, and wearing out, the maximum number of enemy forces. Judged from this standpoint, the Italian effort in 1916 was of the greatest value to the Allied cause. Some 35 Austrian divisions, with their march battalions, were pinned to the Italian front; and Ludendorff in his Memoirs refers to the impossibility of detaching any Austrian troops from the Italian front to assist in other operations, notably to continue the operations against Rumania.

Although Cadorna was strongly opposed to the dispersal of his forces in petits paquets and had resisted the suggestion of an expedition to Libya to quell the rising which had reduced the Italian occupation to a few points on the coast, the importance of the Balkan front had not been lost sight of by the Italian Government. In March a strong force was dispatched to strengthen the Italian position at Valona. The Austrian attack on the Trentino caused two divisions to be recalled to Italy almost at once. It is worthy of note that the Albanian expedition was dispatched at a time when Italy was being criticized in the British and French press for her supposed refusal to cooperate in the Allied operations towards the Balkans. That coOperation was only delayed. When the situation on the Italian front permitted, fresh troops were sent to Albania, and in Aug. a strong force arrived in Salonika under the command of Gen. Petitti di Roreto to take part in the Allied advance upon Monastir. Early in Oct. an Italian column occupied Argyrokastro and before November the Italians were in touch with the left wing of the Allied forces based upon Salonika.

Up to the end of 1916, except in the case of the Balkan campaign, the question of military coOperation between the Allies had been confined to the timing of the individual efforts on each front, so as to minimize the advantage possessed by the Central Powers by their possession of the interior lines. The suggestion was now put forward that a wider meaning should be given to the word coOperation, that an Allied force should join the armies of Italy in an attempt to "knock out" the weaker of the two enemy Powers and so hasten the end of the war. The idea had been the subject of discussion in Italy in 1916, but the formal proposal was made Jan. 1917, during the Allied Conference held in Rome. The chief work of this conference, on the military side, was the organization of a line of communications through Italy to Salonika, via the south Italian ports, a route which greatly lessened the dangers from submarine attack, and at the same time made a much smaller demand upon the diminishing tonnage of the Allies; but the question of a joint offensive on the Italian front was also discussed. The French and British general staffs were against the proposal which came to be known as "Cadorna's plan," but it appealed to Mr. Lloyd George, who was in favour of Allied troops and heavy guns being sent to Italy, in order to add that extra weight to the attack which, to judge from the experience of 1916, would lead to important military successes. In spite of Mr. Lloyd George's advocacy, the French and British military authorities decided that they could not spare the men and guns asked for, but they offered to send 300 heavy guns for an immediate offensive, on condition that they were returned to the French front by the month of April, in which it had been decided to launch a general offensive. This offer was refused by Cadorna, on the ground that the season was not suited to an offensive on his front, and that the guns would have to be returned at the moment when they would be most useful. The discussion and rejection of Cadorna's plan gave rise to many rumours, among them the report that he had asked for "a million men or nothing." This legend found consecration even in serious commentaries published after the war.

Cadorna's actual proposals, embodied in a memorandum written after the Rome Conference, were as follows: If the Allies would send at least 300 heavy guns he would make two attacks, on the Trentino and Julian fronts - his own artillery was insufficient for this double offensive - and so find the enemy's weak point. He had the advantage of interior lines, and would move his reserves of guns and men from the Venetian plain according to the development of the two actions. If, on the other hand, the Allies would send a minimum of eight divisions in addition to the heavy guns, he would concentrate upon the Julian front and attack from Tolmino to the sea, with the object of breaking through towards Laibach. Such an attack, in Cadorna's view, would have had decisive results. He believed that Austria could not recover from such a blow.

The plan was tempting, but it did not commend itself to the Allied commands. French and British military opinion was against any further diversion of effort from the western front, for there was the chief enemy, upon whose defeat the result of the war depended. Great things were hoped from the offensives which had been planned for the spring, and it was not realized that Russia's active military contribution to the Allied cause, so valuable in the past, was practically ended; still less was it foreseen that before the finish of the year the Russian front would cease to exist at all. It was realized that Cadorna was short of munitions, but he was stronger than he had been in 1916, when he had pressed the Austrians very hard. There was reason to think that he and Brussilov between them could be trusted to deal with the hard-tried armies of the Dual Monarchy, even though these were reinforced by German armies in the east. There were, moreover, obvious technical reasons against the choice of the Julian front for a joint offensive. The front lay far from the French and British bases and from their munition factories, and communications from France to Italy were not too good. On the other hand, Cadorna was right in pointing out that on the Isonzo front the enemy was more vulnerable than anywhere else in the whole western theatre of war, and that the Habsburg Monarchy was "less disposed to persist in the struggle" than Germany. An advance on the Julian front would have the great advantage of carrying the war well into enemy territory and so bearing more directly upon the resisting power of the people.

There were excellent arguments for both plans, but it is not surprising that the "Westerners" prevailed. If it had been realized that Germany and Austria were one for the purposes of the war, - if the Italian front had been regarded as the right wing of the front in the W.,--a different decision might have been reached. But at this stage the tendency was to distinguish between Austria and Germany and rather to consider the Italian operations as being linked up specially with the war in the East. Still, the idea which was brought forward in Rome did receive consideration during the following months, and in the spring of 1917 both Nivelle and Robertson visited the Italian front. These were the first visits of any important British or French military authorities since those of Joffre and Kitchener in the autumn of 1915, and the occasion was taken by Cadorna to press the question of closer coOperation, especially in the event of an Austro-German offensive against Italy. Both Nivelle and Robertson agreed to the principle of direct cooperation by the dispatch of troops and guns, but both were inclined to prefer coOperation by a simultaneous attack, and, while a scheme for the quick transport of troops from France to Italy was prepared, no definite engagements were taken. It was agreed, on the other hand, between Cadorna and Nivelle that the French and Italian spring offensives, which had been provisionally planned at Chantilly the previous autumn, should be timed to coincide as nearly as possible. The Chantilly agreement had in view an attack in Feb. but the date was deferred till April. In the meantime the Austrian forces on the Italian front were considerably increased, and the fact of the German retreat in France, which upset the French and British plans, seemed also to increase the possibility of an Austro-German offensive on the Trentino front, or even of the double attack on the Trentino and Julian fronts which had strong advocates in Austro-Hungarian military circles. The prospect of an attack from the Trentino seemed to be increased by the fact that Conrad, who had been replaced by Arz von Straussenburg as chief of the general staff, was now in command at Bozen. Cadorna held that he could not attack on the Julian front until he could feel reasonably safe in regard to the Trentino, for his offensive would imply the weakening of the Trentino front, especially in artillery. His request for guns had not been met, and to give his attack a chance he had to strip the Trentino front of its heavy artillery. His case seems unanswerable, but in March Nivelle demanded the assurance that Cadorna would attack in the middle of April and suggested diplomatic pressure upon the Italian Government. Cadorna maintained his position, that he would attack when the situation in the Trentino permitted him to move eastward the heavy guns he required for his offensive. In April he received 11 batteries of British 6-in. howitzers and 35 French heavy guns, but this assistance, useful though it was, fell far short of the requirements he had indicated. Three days after launching his ill-fated offensive, Nivelle called upon Cadorna to attack, but the latter had already given the order, fixing the date of May 7. Bad weather caused a short delay, but the Italian guns opened fire on May 12. But for the weather Cadorna would not have exceeded the margin of three weeks by which the Chantilly agreement had enlarged the expression "contemporaneous." The threat from the Trentino obviously justified a delay, but even with this handicap Cadorna succeeded in attacking within, or nearly within, the limits allowed by the provisional agreement. In the circumstances it is difficult to understand Nivelle's attitude or the comments made at the time, still less the criticisms published after the war.

Cadorna attacked on the morning of May 12, feinting with the III. Army on the Carso, and making his real attack against the hills N. and E. of Gorizia. North of the town the greater part of the long ridge (Kuk Vodice) running southward from above Pla y a was gallantly stormed and held against the most determined counter-attacks, but on the hills E. of the town little progress was made. As soon as the occupation of the Kuk Vodice ridge seemed assured Cadorna moved the bulk of his heavy guns southward, and attacked with the III. Army on the Carso. Lack of guns and ammunition made it impossible to attack in both sectors at once. Useful progress was made here also, a number of enemy positions being captured on the Carso proper, and the VII. Corps on the right carrying one line after another till they were half-way up Monte Hermada, which dominated all the southern Carso and was the enemy's main bastion in this sector. But ammunition was running low: the offensive had to be broken off at a moment when it seemed as though further success lay very near.

There was only a short breathing space. On June 4 the Austrian troops on the Carso, now grouped under the command of Gen. Wenzel von Wurm, counter-attacked in the most determined manner. Against the Italian left and centre they had no success, but on the right they found a weak resistance on the part of the troops who had come into line as reliefs. They freed the lower slopes of the Hermada and took a large number of prisoners. This was the limit of Wurm's success, though his attacks were conducted with great determination and his artillery fire was both accurate and intense. If Cadorna had been able to increase his artillery, his adversary had kept pace. The Austrian gunfire, both in defence and attack, was far heavier than it had been in former actions.

During the four weeks' fighting Cadorna used 31 divisions, and his casualty list was very heavy: 132,000 killed and wounded. He also lost more than 25,000 prisoners, the bulk of them due to the weak resistance in the Austrian counter-offensive in the Hermada region, though a considerable number of captures were those of troops who had pushed on too far in the Italian attacks. Boroevich had held his ground, or nearly, with 17 divisions, and his losses, including 25,000 prisoners, were close upon 120,000. Once more he had been pushed to the last extremity, and once more the fighting power of his troops and an ample supply of machine-guns had checked the Italian effort, handicapped as it was by lack of ammunition for the guns.

The rumour of battle had scarcely ceased on the Julian front when the Italians attacked N. of Asiago, in an attempt to drive the Austrians off the line which they had occupied after their offensive in 1916. The Italian attacking force consisted of 12 divisions, with 1,50o guns and trench-mortars, and the front did not exceed 9 miles. In spite of the strength of the forces employed and the weight of fire brought to bear upon the enemy lines, the general attack was a failure. On the extreme right alone, in the region of Monte Ortigara, the Alpine troops of the 52nd Div. made good headway and captured Soo prisoners. The left wing also gained ground to begin with, but could not maintain their success. Bad weather interfered with the artillery work, and the troops suffered very heavily. The feeling was general that the Austrian positions were nearly impregnable, and some of the troops fell below the usual standard. After a pause the Alpine troops renewed their magnificent effort, gained more ground in spite of the extreme difficulty of the terrain, and captured another i,000 prisoners with several guns. But their advance left them in an impossible position, completely dominated by the enemy's reserve lines, and largely isolated from the rest of the Italian force. The Austrians brought up strong reserves of guns and men, and after a heavy artillery fire, which caused heavy losses among the troops who were lying on the bare rocky slopes of Monte Ortigara, they counter-attacked in force. The Alpini were driven off the summits of the Ortigara, but after a long struggle kept the Passo dell' Agnello.

The Italian losses in this abortive action were very heavy indeed, 24,000 killed and wounded and 2,000 prisoners, and it was commonly felt that in view of the initial failure farther S. it was a mistake to persist in the attack upon the Ortigara positions. An isolated success at this point was useless, as it could lead nowhere. The officers in command of the Alpini, who knew what was possible in such difficult conditions of terrain, were opposed to the further attempt and their misgivings were fully justified. The record of the Alpine battalions was proof that they had no objection to attempting the impossible if there were sound reason for the attempt. On this occasion they felt that their sacrifice was useless, and though they fought and died as staunchly as ever, the remnants who came back from the Ortigara had the bitterness of failure.

The general situation at the end of June gave cause for disappointment and some anxiety. The big battle on the Julian front had come very near triumphant success. It had brought the Austrians close upon disaster, and it had shown once more that with a little added weight, especially of heavy guns and shells, the stubborn resistance of Boroevich might have been overcome. But the balance was swinging against the Entente. The whole military situation threatened to be altered by the disorganization which had followed upon the Russian revolution. While it was not yet fully clear that the revolution meant the defection of Russia, it had already meant the possibility of a considerable transference of guns and men from E. to W., and it had heartened the weary soldiers of Austria-Hungary. The prisoners taken by the Italians boasted that the whole effective strength of the monarchy would shortly be concentrated against Italy; and the information that came from the East all tended to confirm the fear that the Russian front, which had filled such an important part in the war for nearly three years, would shortly become a vast rest-camp for the soldiers of the Central Empires.

Russia was going out of action, and the consequences for the Western Allies showed clear enough. Nor was it only in Russia that signs of war-weariness had made themselves evident. This was in fact the critical year. France for the first time, after the failure of Nivelle's offensive, had to deal with serious disaffection in the army which had borne the heaviest burden, and suffered most, of the Western Allies. In the case of England, though the army was sound, there were disquieting symptoms among the population. In Italy war-weariness was showing itself in various ways. The troops who failed on the slopes of the Hermada had displayed a mutinous tendency before going into line, and in the attack in the Asiago uplands some of the units had shown less than the usual spirit. Cadorna was disturbed by these manifestations, especially by the first, which he put down to "defeatist" propaganda in the country. He addressed urgent protests to the Government, claiming that the Ministry of the Interior did not show sufficient severity towards anti-war propaganda. The fact of war-weariness could not be disputed, and there were ample reasons for its existence, both in the army and in the country. Units were kept too long in the trenches, partly because the wearing effects of these long spells were not fully realized, but partly also because the number of troops available was small in relation to the length of the front, which was nearly as long as the Allied front in France. Nor was it then generally understood that the soldier who comes into rest billets requires "remaking" as well as rest. In the first place, little or nothing was done in the way of providing comforts and recreation. It was only in the summer of 1917 that recreation huts began to be established and the idea of organizing amusements found favour with the authorities. Another lack was the almost complete absence of the volunteer canteens near the front which proved so useful in France. For his modest additional comforts the Italian soldier had to depend almost entirely upon the speculative ventures of small dealers who made large profits. And the pay of the soldier gave him no margin for such expenditure. There was little to soften the hardships or lessen the dreariness of life in the war zone.

In the second place, the rest periods were not utilized as they might have been for the training of the troops in the methods of warfare that experience was constantly developing. The loss was double. Both officers and men suffered from lack of knowledge and practice, and, not less important, they suffered from ennui. They were either occupied in dull fatigue duties, or, in many cases, they were not sufficiently occupied at all. Too often they had little to do but to wonder when the war would come to an end. Socialist newspapers preached that the enemy was ready for peace, and among the new drafts were some who told the same story. Anti-war propaganda was active both in the country and in the army, and neither at the front nor among the public was there efficient counter-propaganda.

Another reason for depression was the actual shortage of food, both in the army and in the country. Conditions had grown very difficult in Italy. The soldier's ration had to be cut down to a very low standard, so that the lack of extra comforts was all the more severely felt. And at the same time the troops were distressed by the news that their families were suffering want, and even actual hunger. The allowance to soldiers' families was altogether insufficient in view of the great rise in the cost of living. In all these ways the strain upon the army was far greater than that experienced by the troops of England or France. To those conversant with the conditions it was a matter of surprise, not that there was discontent here and there, but that the willingness and cheerfulness of the troops as a whole triumphed over circumstances that tried them so hardly.

There was reason for anxiety owing to war-weariness, but there were many signs of the same trouble in the enemy's camp. It was felt that Austria-Hungary was very near the end of her tether, and subsequent revelations showed how grave the situation was. The chief cause for anxiety lay not in the occasional symptoms of weariness, which had become evident elsewhere as well as in Italy, but in the hard fact of the Russian catastrophe. The effect of this disaster was both material and moral. It definitely altered the military balance, and, while it encouraged the Central Empires to go on, it clearly removed to a distance the prospect of an Entente victory with which the year had opened. The advocates of "peace without victory" were heartened in their efforts to show that a continuance of the struggle was useless.

The military situation was changing for the worse, but there seemed a chance of striking the enemy hard before he could definitely ignore the eastern front. At the end of July there was a further inter-Allied discussion regarding plans, in Paris first and then in London. In Paris, Cadorna was urged to undertake two big offensives, one in Aug. and one in Oct., but it was not difficult for him to show that his supply of shells would not permit of two attacks on the grand scale. Nor were his trained reserves adequate, in view of the casualties with which he had to reckon. The discussions were continued in London, when Cadorna had returned to Italy from Paris, and the idea of a joint offensive on the Italian front was brought forward again by Gen. Albricci, who represented Italy. It was clear that such an attack could not be undertaken at once, in view of the great Flanders offensive which had just begun, and from which so much was hoped. Albricci's proposal was to delay the Italian offensive planned for Aug. until the Allies could spare troops and guns to give the added weight which experience had shown to be necessary. The idea was not at once rejected on this occasion. The suggestion was made that Allied reinforcements should be sent in Oct., when it was hoped to have reached objectives set for the Flanders attack. Albricci feared that this might mean losing the favourable season for an Italian offensive. The experience of the previous year had shown that the autumn mist and rain on the Isonzo front were a serious handicap to artillery fire, and the countervailing advantages to an attack were not yet realized by the Allies. It was decided to keep to the Paris plan and attack in Aug. without reinforcements. The efforts of the Italian munition factories and depots had provided many new heavy batteries, and there were now 99 British and French heavy guns on the Italian front. Altogether Cadorna could dispose of 2,300 heavy guns for his attack.

The army was strung to the highest point of tension, awaiting the order to attack, when Pope Benedict XV. launched his appeal for peace. A forecast came first, in the clerical press, on Aug. 14. Next day, the festival of Ferragosto, there were no newspapers, but the text was published on Aug. 16. Forty hours later Italian guns began, from Monte Nero to the sea; and on the night of Aug. 18 the offensive began. Parts of the army were shaken. For the Pope in his impartiality placed the two contending groups of Powers on the same level; he held out the hope that Germany and Austria were ready to consider certain territorial questions "in a conciliatory spirit," taking into account "the aspirations of the peoples"; and to the long and weary struggle he attached the label "useless slaughter." The Papal Note in itself was vague, and promised little. But it hinted much, and some of the press comments upon it filled in the gaps. The word ran round that a peace might be arranged which would give. Trentino and Trieste to Italy. Some of the commands were anxious about their men when the attack began.

As a matter of fact the troops put aside their questionings, and the blow dealt to the Austrians was a very heavy one. The Isonzo was crossed in many places between Tolmino and Pla y a, and the greater part of the Bainsizza (Bainsitsa) plateau was occupied by troops of the II. Army, while the southern end of the Chiapovano valley was passed, and a footing obtained on the western corner of the Ternova plateau. No progress was made against the positions E. of Gorizia, and the action in this sector was quickly broken off, but the right wing of the III. Army gained ground, especially on the southern edge of the main Carso plateau and in the Hermada sector. The Carso action was broken off when it was clear that the initial impetus would carry the troops no farther, and guns and men were moved N. to endeavour to make the most of the success gained by the II. Army. The extreme difficulty of the country and, above all, the lack of roads called a halt after io days. The infantry had outrun the heavy guns in position on the right bank of the Isonzo, and they found the Austrians, as the pressure relaxed, strongly placed among the hills to the W. of the Chiapovano valley. Capello's II. Army had won a big victory, but at two vital points the Austrians had held their own, on the Lom plateau S. of Tolmino and on Monte San Gabriele, N.E. of Gorizia. While these positions were maintained the Italians could not obtain the fruits of their initial tactical success in breaking through the lines on the Bainsizza.

Little progress had been made by the left of the Italian attack. Austrian reinforcements had been hurried to the spot, and an immediate renewal of the attack, without further preparation, did not commend itself to the Italian command. It was decided to concentrate against the Austrian centre, and attempt the capture of San Gabriele, while the troops on the Bainsizza dug in and roads were made from the left bank of the Isonzo to join those leading to the old Austrian positions. In spite of prolonged and furious bombardments, and infantry attacks renewed again and again, the defenders succeeded in maintaining their principal line of resistance on the battered mountain, though they were driven off more than once. With the failure of the attack on San Gabriele, the hope of finding, at least, a way through the defences of the Gorizia zone was abandoned for the time.

Cadorna hoped to renew his offensive at the end of Sept., when he had rested his troops and replenished his supply of shells, by an attack against the Ternova plateau, in the hope of definitely turning the Gorizia positions from the N. and cutting the main line of communications between the Austrian right and left. The III. Army was to hold the troops on its front and pass to the attack when the right wing of the II. Army had made the necessary ground. The drawback to this plan was that it left the Tolmino bridgehead in undisturbed possession of the Austrians, and by advancing the Italian right increased the danger which would come from an Austrian drive in this sector. But Cadorna had faith in the natural and prepared strength of his positions opposite Tolmino, and if he were to succeed in his attack upon the Ternova plateau, the chances were that his adversary would be too busily employed to attack his left at Tolmino.

Towards the middle of Sept. news came of increased enemy forces and a probable counter-offensive at an early date, and when Cadorna took stock of his forces he decided that he could not go on. He came to this decision on Sept. 18, and on that day he gave orders to the II. and III. Armies to "concentrate all their activities in preparations for defence." At the same time he communicated his decision to the Allied commanders, explaining his reasons. Unfortunately, there was a misunderstanding caused by a hasty and incomplete transmission of Cadorna's memorandum to the Allies. The first news received by Gen. Robertson did not give Cadorna's reasons for suspending his offensive action, and the result was a telegram which said that the 64 British guns sent to the Italian front had been given for offensive purposes, not for defences, and requested their withdrawal. A similar request came from France, for the return not only of the 35 guns which had been in action already, but of a further reinforcement of 102 guns which were arriving. Cadorna at once ordered the guns to be returned, but he pointed out that he was the only judge of what should or should not be done on the front for which he was responsible, and he took very natural exception to the tone of the communications which he received from England. The arrival of Cadorna's explanatory memorandum relaxed the tension, and some of the British batteries were left in Italy. The others, however, were sent to Egypt, and the French guns were withdrawn. This misunderstanding emphasized the drawbacks of the absence of a permanent inter-Allied war council, which was only to come into being when disaster had taught a further lesson.

Cadorna's reasons for suspending his offensive, or rather for giving up the idea of a new attack, can hardly be questioned The four weeks fighting in Aug. and Sept. had cost him ovt:: 166,000 men-40,000 killed, 108,000 wounded, and over 18,oc.i prisoners. His casualties from May to Sept. reached the total of 92,000 killed and 226,000 wounded. The toll taken by sickness had also been very heavy. There had been much malaria among the troops in the low ground near Monfalconc. a severe type of jaundice had made its appearance in various parts of the front, and the II. Army had suffered severely from an intestinal epidemic which had been prevalent in the Judrio and Natisone valleys. The units were at a low strength, and the new drafts had not been satisfactorily absorbed. A breathing space was urgently needed.

A number of Cadorna's critics have urged that the best way of meeting the forthcoming enemy attack was to anticipate it by renewing his own offensive. But the weakness of his units and the shortage of ammunition made it very doubtful whether he could win even an initial success. The one thing certain was that he would suffer heavy losses and reduce to danger-point his limited reserve of shells. He had to look forward, and face the fact that if strong enemy reenforcements were already coming from Russia these were only the advance-guard of what was to be expected within a few months. If he were to gain the small amount of ground that seemed all he could hope for, he would find himself in a much less favourable position to meet a later attack from still stronger forces.

The Austro-German success against the II. Army, and the subsequent retreat of the Italian forces to the line of the Piave, and the resistance in the new positions, are fully described in a separate article (see Caporetto, Battle Of), and only a bare record of facts need to be given here. The Austro-German forces under the command of the German General Otto von Below (XIV. Army), divided into four "groups," attacked the left wing and centre of the Italian II. Army on the morning of Oct. 24. The Italian line was pierced between Tolmino and Caporetto, and by the afternoon of the 24th the situation was already serious. Owing to a complex of causes the situation grew rapidly worse. The Italian left wing crumbled, and on the night of Oct. 26-7 the order was given to retire beyond the Tagliamento. This was only a first step in the move decided upon by Cadorna. In view of the breakdown of the II. Army and the danger of attack from the N., Cadorna decided that it was essential to shorten his line by a retreat to the Piave. He had already foreseen such a contingency (see AsIAGO, Battle Of), and after the failure of the Austrian offensive of May 1916 he had given orders for the preparation of a line of defence on the mountain ridges between the Piave and the Brenta and to the N.E. of Asiago.

By the end of the first week in Nov. the Italians were in line W. of the Piave. The III. Army, reinforced by the VII. Corps of the II., held the greater part of the river line, and was in touch with the IV. Army, which had come down from Cadore and occupied the northern sector of the river line and the mountains between the Piave and the Brenta, where it had established contact with the right wing of the I. Army. The remnants of the II. Army and the Carnia force were being reassembled in the Venetian plain.

In the meantime France and England had acted with all possible speed. As soon as the gravity of the situation became apparent the order was given for six French and five British divisions to entrain for Italy, precedence being given to the French troops, and Foch and Robertson hastened to the spot. Foch arrived at Treviso, where Cadorna had been for three days, on the morning of Oct. 30, and the situation was fully discussed. Cadorna felt that the troops available for the defence of the Piave line were dangerously weak in numbers, the more so as he was anxious to detach two divisions of the III. Army to reenforce the line W. of Lake Garda, where there were rumours of intended attacks, and he suggested to Foch that as soon as the French troops arrived they should go into line on the Montello, between the III. and IV. Armies. Later in the day, having received further news regarding the threat W. of Garda, he asked that Foch should detach a French division to reinforce this sector. Foch was unwilling to divide the French X. Army, and it was finally agreed that the French, as they arrived, should be aligned between the Melia and the Adige, ready to reinforce the I. Army in case of necessity, the defence of the Piave line being left to the Italian troops. Foch agreed with Cadorna's dispositions for the defence of the Piave line, but he was naturally much preoccupied by the appearance which the situation presented: weary disheartened troops, insufficiently provided with guns and ammunition and relatively weak in numbers, facing a greatly superior army flushed with a victory that had exceeded all hopes. And behind these, their only reserve, with the exception of the young boys recently called to the colours and a limited number of troops from the depots, was a great mass of broken troops largely without arms and equipment, who had lost order in the immense confusion of the heavy retreat. These troops, disorganized, worn-out, sullen and bewildered, might well have seemed more of a danger than a potential reserve of strength. There had been a failure in moral among certain units in the first phase of the fight. It had spread during the retreat. None could be sure how far it had gone or would go.

The Italian losses, both in men and material, had been enormous. To the casualties suffered in the enemy attack upon the II. Army, some 10,000 killed and 30,000 wounded, were added some 230,000 missing, who had already surrendered, or were still fighting hopeless isolated actions among the mountains, cut off and doomed. The retreat was not yet over, and the list was sure to be swelled still further. Many guns which had been brought safely as far as the Tagliamento had been lost owing to the premature destruction of the main bridges between Codroipo and Casarsa. When the material losses came to be calculated, the figures were as follows: 3,152 guns, 1,732 trench mortars, 3,000 machine-guns, 2,000 "pistol" machine-guns, considerably over 300,000 rifles, and an immense mass of stores and war material of every kind.

On Nov. 4 Mr. Lloyd George, Gen. Smuts, Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, M. Painleve and M. Franklin Bouillon arrived at Rapallo, and were there met by Gens. Foch and Robertson, Signor Orlando (who had just succeeded Signor Boselli as Italian premier), Baron Sonnino, the Foreign Minister, Gen. Alfieri, Minister of War, Gen. Porro, sub-chief of the Italian general staff, and M. Barrere, French ambassador in Rome. From the Rapallo discussions were born the Supreme Allied Council which was to meet, once a month if possible, at Versailles, and the Versailles Military Council, which was to sit permanently. It was agreed that the failure of the Italian armies to resist the enemy attack called for a change in the Italian command, and Cadorna was appointed Italian military representative at Versailles. He was succeeded by Gen. Armando Diaz, commander of the XXIII. Army Corps, and the functions of Gen. Porro, who was also relieved of his post, were divided between Gen. Giardino, who had been Minister of War during the summer, and Gen. Badoglio, commander of the XXVII. Corps. These were all comparatively young men, who had come to the front during the war. Diaz was not yet 56, Giardino was 53, and Badoglio was only 46.

The moment was critical in the extreme, for the reasons given above, but the work done by Cadorna during the last days of his leadership had laid solid foundations for the wonderful recovery that put a term to the enemy advance. Cadorna's conduct of the great retreat was a masterpiece of military skill and cool judgment, and he had long ago made his plans for a defensive battle on the Piave line.

A legend was put about both in France and in England that the Italian command wished to continue the retreat to the line of the Adige, and it was asserted that only Foch's intervention prevented this further retirement. The legend had no basis of fact. Both the Italian and Allied press indicated the possibility of a further retreat, and their opinion was no doubt inspired by soldiers who realized the dangers of the situation and by politicians who wished to prepare opinion for the possibility of a further enemy success. But neither Cadorna nor Diaz had any intention of leaving the Piave line, unless, of course, the step was compelled by a new defeat. The line of the Piave was to be defended "to the last." Cadorna's orders are quite explicit, and he never entertained the idea of a retreat to the Adige unless he were forced back from the Piave line, or had his flank turned by an attack from the north. Diaz was no less resolved that resistance on the Piave line was the only possible course. An order of the day published by Cadorna on Nov. 7 fixed the Piave as the line on which "the honour and life of Italy" must be defended, and this blunt statement unhedged by reservations, frightened the politicians. They feared that after such a,statement tie effect of further disaster, if it should come, would be more serious. But the soldiers realized the mistake of playing with the idea of a further "strategic retreat," and when Diaz was asked his view, he said plainly that he would resign rather than carry out such a plan.

Both Cadorna and Diaz, who succeeded him on Nov. 9, were convinced of the necessity of standing on the Piave, and they had good hopes that their troops would hold. The Allied commanders were equally against any further retreat, but they were strongly impressed by the uncertainty of the situation. The break-through at Caporetto was universally attributed to a failure in moral. Since that failure the Italian armies had undergone the trial of the retreat, and they were weakened by great losses of men and material. Would they "come again," or would their moral suffer a more widespread breakdown under a new strain? It was natural that both British and French commanders should hesitate to send in the Allied troops to the front to stiffen it by units as they arrived. There was the chance that they might be involved in a fresh disaster, and in the circumstances it was obviously more prudent that both French and British armies should be held intact on a reserve line. The French X. Army stood behind the Italian I. Army, while the British divisions under Gen. Plumer, which began to arrive as soon as the railway communications from France were free from their transport, were detrained at Mantua and assembled near the Adige.

On Nov. io, the day after Diaz took over the command from Cadorna, came the first enemy attack against the new lines, a tentative action on the Middle Piave, but after several unsuccessful attempts to pierce the line W. of the river, the Austro-German efforts were concentrated on the mountain front, between Asiago and the Piave. The main thrust was between the Brenta and the Piave, where a desperate struggle raged for weeks, though Conrad gained ground in the Asiago uplands, and might perhaps have gained more if he had been given the reinforcements for which he called in vain.. The critical period was the fortnight from Nov. 10-25, and the end of the month saw the line fairly established. The AustroGerman attack was to continue for another four weeks, and the Italians were to lose more ground in the mountains, more prisoners and some guns. But the crisis was past.

At the end of the third week in Nov. the Allied divisions began to move up to the front, and at the beginning of Dec. they took over the sectors assigned to them, three French divisions occupying the Monte Tomba - Monfenera ridge W. of the Piave and a similar British force holding the Montello sector, on the Middle Piave. It was expected that the enemy would attack at both these points, but throughout Dec. Boroevich's Isonzo army lay practically idle to the E. of the Piave, nor were the French attacked. The aim, naturally, was to attack as far W. as possible and so turn the Italian positions from the N., and compel a further retreat. Conrad in the Seven Communes and Krauss in the Grappa sector hammered in vain, favoured by the late coming of the snow, but hampered by bad weather and insufficient communications. Their efforts were fruitless. On both sides of the Brenta the Italians fought them to a standstill, and on Christmas day the long struggle ended, with the Italians counter-attacking, and the enemy hard pressed to hold the slight advantages they had won.

The Italian recovery on the Piave - Grappa line, that great triumph over disaster and despair, was one of the most remarkable achievements of the war. On the result of the fighting in those November days depended the ability of Italy to continue playing a principal part in the world-struggle. Further defeat would not have meant submission, for the Austrian invasion had stilled the questioning voices and bound the nation in one resolve. But further defeat, with its consequent loss of war material and territory, would have so weakened Italian military strength as to render still more critical the position of the Allies. If Austria had been able to assist Germany the following spring, the course of the 1918 campaigns would certainly have been changed. Hence the service rendered to the Allies by the men who held fast on the Piave and in the mountains wasincalculable.

During Nov. and Dec. the Italian armies suffered further heavy losses, some 20,000 killed. and 50,000 wounded, and the total number of prisoners lost in the last three months of the year, including those belonging to labour battalions and the sick and wounded left behind in hospitals or on the field, was increased to 335,000. The total loss in men from Caporetto to the end of the year was close upon 450,000. When to these are added the disorganized troops of the II. Army, and the Carnia Force and the stragglers from the III. Army, the temporary loss may be calculated at 750,000. But the prompt arrival of the British and French troops and the quick reorganization of a portion of the broken units shortened the critical period. The Allied divisions, as has been said, were in position by the beginning of Dec., and before that time two corps of the II. Army had been reconstituted and had gone into line. Another followed immediately afterwards, and by the end of the year two others were reformed and ready. For the remaining three disbanded corps, which were reorganized as the V. Army, under the command of Gen. Capello, late commander of the II. Army, a longer period was necessary. In the case of these units the loss of cohesion had been more complete, and, moreover, the supply of guns, rifles, etc., was insufficient to arm them. When they moved into the zone of operations in Feb. they were still partially equipped with French guns and rifles, but before long these were replaced by Italian material. In addition to the reorganization of these units, a system of march brigades was instituted for the retraining of stragglers and other troops superfluous to establishments.

The winter saw a comprehensive reorganization of the whole Italian army. There was a technical reorganization, based on a recognition of new war conditions, and greater attention was given to specialized instruction, both for officers and men. More important still were the measures taken for the welfare of the troops and their families. The shock of disaster and invasion had brought about a great reaction both in the army and the country, but it was clearly necessary to alter the conditions which had made some of the troops inclined to lend an ear to the peace propaganda which had been rife during the summer. Diaz devoted special attention to this work, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the value to the Allied cause of the great task of reorganization carried out by him during the winter.

After the failure of Krauss and Conrad to break through to the Venetian plain, the Italian front saw no action of first-class importance for nearly six months, but there were several minor combats worthy of mention. The first of these was a brilliant attack by a French division on Monte Tomba, which finally drove the Austrians down the northern slope of the ridge to the Ornio torrent. The artillery preparation was particularly destructive, and the positions were stormed with great dash. Nearly 1,50o prisoners were taken, and the French losses were insignificant. This attack was followed by two small Italian attacks, on the Lower Piave and on Monte Grappa respectively, which showed that the troops had regained their offensive spirit and, at the end of Jan., by a notable success in the Asiago uplands. Two important positions were wrested from the Austrians and held against repeated counter-attacks. More than 2,500 prisoners were taken, with six guns and loo machine-guns. The only other important feature during the winter months was supplied by the Austro-German air raids against Padua and Venice and the little towns of the Venetian plain, and the activity of the Allied airmen along more legitimate lines.

Gen. Otto von Below and the German divisions 1 eft the Italian front at the beginning of 1918, in anticipation of the great offensive which was being prepared on the western front. Austrian and German divisions were now coming W. in increasing numbers from the Russian front, and it was clear that both armies would attack at the earliest possible moment. Gen. Plumer left Italy to take up his old command when it was evident that the German blow would come first. He had acquired a great popularity among all with whom he came in contact and his departure was much regretted. Fortunately he left in the Earl of Cavan an admirable successor.

The spring saw a change at the Italian headquarters. On the appointment of a commission to enquire into the Caporetto disaster Cadorna was recalled from Versailles and replaced by Giardino, who had shared with Badoglio the duties of sub-chief of staff. This appointment was only temporary, for shortly afterwards Giardino and Di Robilant changed places, Di Robilant going to Versailles and Giardino assuming command of the IV. Army.

When the German offensive in March 1918 pierced the line of the British V. Army four French and two British divisions were immediately withdrawn from Italy to reinforce the Allied armies in France. These were followed by the Italian II. Corps under the command of Gen. Albricci, which was to distinguish itself in the fighting W. of Reims. This left Diaz with 55 divisions (50 Italian and 5 Allied) as against 60 freshly organized Austrian divisions. The Austrian command had taken the opportunity of the winter lull to reorganize the army, of which 60 divisions were now concentrated on the Italian front, and, according to Krauss, the reorganization gave rise to great confusion and much unnecessary work and fatigue. It was probably due to this work of reorganization that the Austrian offensive which was expected in April was planned for the end of May or beginning of June.

The original proposal of the Austrian command was to make a drive on both sides of the Brenta and concentrate upon this single attack, but Conrad thought the sector unsuitable and pressed for an attack upon the line in the Asiago uplands. Krauss was consulted, and disapproved of both plans. He argued that the aim of an offensive must be the destruction of the Italian army, and that this could only be achieved by an attack farther W., on both sides of the Lake of Garda. A successful break-through by the Val Lagarina and the Giudicaria would cut off the whole Italian army, while the other attacks could do no more than force a retreat. He pointed out the great difficulty of movement, both of guns and troops in mass, in the Brenta and Asiago sectors, and claimed that his plan, based upon good communications, was in every way preferable.

Krauss's plan found no support, and it was arranged that Conrad should have his way. But Boroevich urged that the main offensive should be accompanied by a straight drive by his armies across the Piave. He apparently thought that this should be the main operation, and opposed the attack in the Asiago uplands, but a compromise was effected, and both army groups attacked on June 15. Conrad attacked with Scheuchenstuel's XI. Army, from S. of Asiago to Monte Grappa, the main drive being against the British and French divisions S. of Asiago, who had taken over this sector in March, while the Archduke Joseph attacked the Montello and Werzel von Wurm crossed the Lower Piave. Conrad had 27 divisions at his disposal, and Boroevich 23. Conrad's attack was a complete failure. It went well to begin with, but by the end of the day all hope of success had gone. Counter-attacks had retaken most of the positions lost in the first rush, and by the evening of June 16 Conrad was finally beaten. Boroevich on the other hand made good headway on the first two days. Though his principal attack, astride the Oderzo - Treviso railway, was immediately held up, he succeeded in establishing three bridgeheads across the Piave, and at two of these on the Montello and opposite San Dona del Piave, the attacking troops penetrated some distance westward. In various places the Italian front lines were quickly overrun, and many prisoners were taken. But a very thorough defensive system had been prepared, and while the front lines had been comparatively lightly held, there were ample reserves on the spot and within easy reach. After a week's fighting, at the end of which time the Austrians were being closely held within the limited room they had won, and had lost ground in various places to Italian counter-attacks, the order was given to retire across the Piave. Some days previously the attacking troops had been handicapped by the sudden rising of the Piave, but the river was falling again before the retreat was ordered and Boroevich, in a letter written after the battle, lays the blame, not on the Piave, but on Austrian headquarters, which had failed to organize the attack on proper lines and give the necessary supplies in time.

It is clear that the offensive suffered from the struggle between two opposite views, that of Boroevich and that of Conrad, and that strength was distributed instead of being concentrated. But Conrad probably had as many divisions as he could use in the sector he chose for his attack, and it is difficult to see that Boroevich could have won a big success even if he had been able to dispose of more troops. A concentration of force in the mountains and an extension of Conrad's attacking front farther W., to include the Val d'Astico and even the Val Lagarina, might perhaps have offered a better chance, but judging from the circumstances and issue of the fight it is hardly likely that any different plan would have led to a victory worth gaining. Even where the attack was initially successful, it was fairly held when the reserves of the defence came into play. The fact is that the Austrians had greatly under-estimated the Italian powers of resistance. Von Cramon stated that the spirit of the Austrian troops was excellent, and that every technical preparation had been made - that both Conrad and Boroevich reported in this sense to the Emperor.

The Austrian failure was costly, for the casualty list totalled over 135,000 and more than 24,000 prisoners were taken; but the moral effect of the defeat was far more important than the material loss, grave though that was. Few single weeks throughout the whole war saw more bloodshed, for the Italian list of killed and wounded was over 40,000. No single week, perhaps, up to this point, led to so evident a victory or marked so clear a turning point. The defeat on the Piave and in the mountains broke forever the offensive power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the fact was plain to see. There was, moreover, a further significance in the Italian victory. It was the first Allied success of the year, and it came at the end of a period in which the resistance of the Allied arms had been tried to the uttermost. The message which Mr. Lloyd George sent to the Italian premier, Signor Orlando, gave full emphasis to the fact. "This great success has been a deep source of encouragement to the Allies. Coming as it has at the most fateful hour of the whole war, it is a good augury that the alliance of free nations will ere long free the world once for all from the military domination which has threatened it so long." The defeat made a profound impression in Austria-Hungary, and led to much criticism of the army command. The discussion was specially bitter in the Hungarian Parliament, for the Hungarian troops had suffered very heavily, and it was alleged that the attack had been conducted with insufficient means. This charge was not borne out by the facts, and it was proved that the attacking armies were stronger in artillery and better supplied with shells than ever before, a comparison with the guns and shells available for the Caporetto offensive the previous year showing a very large increase. But the consciousness of impending disaster grew and spread through the monarchy and the troops were greatly disheartened by failure.

Prior to the Austrian attack the Italian command had had under consideration the question of an anticipatory offensive, on the Asiago plateau, with the object of gaining depth of position, and, if possible, of reaching the main Austrian line of communication between Trento and Feltre. When the extent of the forthcoming enemy offensive became apparent, this plan. was given up and the Italian armies stood on the defensive. The general situation, and particularly the supply of guns and men available, did not allow the concentration on the Asiago plateau of a force sufficient to carry out the attack contemplated. When the Austrian offensive was broken and the armies of Conrad and Boroevich thrown back in disorder, the question of a counter-offensive on the grand scale was considered by the Italian command. Lord Cavan urged that the original plan should be carried out, and was of opinion that Conrad's troops were so demoralized that an attack in the Asiago uplands early in July would lead to a very important success. Local counter-attacks by Italian troops, both on the Piave and in the mountains, gave good results, important positions being occupied' and many prisoners taken W. of the Brenta, in the Grappa sector and on the Lower Piave, but as the enemy put up a stout resistance and the Italian losses were heavy, Diaz did not feel himself strong enough to attack in force without further careful preparation. His armies on the Piave had suffered severely, he had only six fresh divisions on the spot, and, above all, as his report states, "the supply services - never very ample - had been severely strained and were quite unequal to fresh operations over a wide area." A general counter-offensive, to include an attack across the Piave, was not practicable without prolonged and careful preparation. The same considerations did not apply in equal measure to an offensive operation on the Asiago plateau, where there was no treacherous river to cross, but Diaz was preoccupied by the question of reserves. Excluding the boys of the 1900 class, who were being held in reserve against the possibility of the war continuing into another year (at that time the possibility was generally regarded as a probability, if not a certainty), his supply of men was little more than sufficient to make good the normal wastage of the next six months. An immediate attack in the Asiago uplands might very well have led to important results - looking back after the event with further information available, the chance of success can be seen more clearly - but at the moment the general circumstances of the war seemed to impose caution. In July Germany was still on the offensive, though the failure E. and W. of Reims in the middle of the month and Mangin's great counter-blow a few days later were finally to put an end to all hopes of victory on the western front. But Diaz had to count upon his own resources, and he had to take into consideration the possibility that Germany might succeed in establishing a defensive front in France, and join Austria-Hungary in a last attempt against Italy. He had to be prepared for defence as well as attack, and his weakness in man-power and material enjoined caution. He decided to wait until his units were remade, his stores of ammunition replenished, and his supply services reenforced. Plans were drawn up and preparations made for an offensive between the Vallarsa and the Brenta in the middle of September.

The considerations which governed the Italian preparations were resumed by Diaz in a report published in the spring of 1919. "The plan for the offensive, considered by itself, had to aim at assisting the general effort of the Allies to the utmost in accordance with two different and possible solutions; to drive the attack home with all available forces, throwing even the last available man into the scale, in case the possibility presented itself on the fronts of the Entente of obtaining a real superiority of forces and of gaining a decision at one blow; or else to make a preparatory attack as a first phase of a more complex effort, in case the enemy, although already beaten, should succeed in reestablishing a solid defensive front in all the theatres of war." Diaz did not think that the time was ripe for the more ambitious effort, but he did not lose sight of the possibility which might be afforded by a change in the course of events. He prepared for the attack between the Vallarsa and the Brenta, but at the same time, according to his report, "another and bigger scheme was being silently matured in the interior of the Comando Supremo, entrusted to a few men only to be worked out and guarded with the strictest secrecy." In the meantime a joint Franco-Italian offensive in Albania had caused the Austrians some trouble and compelled them to reenforce their line. They had lost several thousand prisoners, and the Italians had occupied both Berat and Fieri. This occupation was only temporary. When Gen. Pflanzer-Baltin arrived with reenforcements in Aug. the Italian line, which was to