Battles In Artois

"'BATTLES IN (1914-7) ARTOIS,' see Plates I., II., III. and IV. - First Battle Of Arras (Sept. 30-Oct. 8 1914). - After the stabilization of the battle front on the Aisne and to the E. of it, about Sept. 16, both the Allied and the German Higher Commands proceeded to despatch forces to their northern flanks, with the object of outflanking the hostile battle line. There thus ensued what is known as " the Race to the Sea," which ended about the middle o l l Oct. in the establishment of a continuous front from the Belgian coast to Switzerland. On this front, after a series of furious battles which raged until well into Nov., both sides settled down to trench warfare on the advent of winter.

The first attempt to outflank the German right N. of the Oise was entrusted to the French Second Army, under Gen. de Castelnau, which was transferred from Lorraine from Sept. io onwards. This army, consisting of the Xiii., Iv., Xiv., Xx., and XI. Corps, was eventually opposed by the German IX. Reserve, II., Xviii., Xxi., I. Ba y ., II. Ba y. and XIV. Reserve Corps, brought up from various parts of the line, and after heavy fighting, in which first one side and then the other held temporary and local advantages which proved impossible of exploitation, these forces were left facing each other on the general line Lassigny-Roye-Chaulnes-Albert-Hebuterne, on which they finally fortified themselves. The battle on the front of the French Second Army died down in this fashion about the middle of October. Before this date the further prosecution of the mutual attempt at envelopment by both sides had brought about an extension of the fighting to the neighbourhood of Arras and Lens.

Battle of the Tenth French Army around Arras, Sept. 29-Oct. ro. - The front of the Second Army was prolonged to the N. by the group of Territorial Divisions (the 81st, 82nd, 84th and 88th) under Brugere, which had been ordered on Sept. 29 to push forward detachments to cover the detrainment of reinforcements at Arras and Lens, and by the 1st Cavalry Corps (Conneau) (1st, 3rd, 5th and 10th Cavalry Divisions) which was holding the line of the Cojeul on the left of the territorials. On Sept. 30 Gen. de Maud'huy was given command of a " Detachment of the Second Army," consisting of the X. Corps, two divisions (the 10th and 77th) formed into a Provisional Corps under D'Urbal, and the ist Cavalry Corps; his orders were to concentrate in the region of Arras and to act against the right flank of the German corps facing the Second Army. It was believed that this flank would be found about Bapaume. Of the forces at Maud'huy's disposal the X. Corps was on this date marching from Amiens in the direction of Arras, being still some two days' march from the latter place, while the divisions of the Provisional Corps were commencing to detrain at Arras, covered by the ist Cavalry Corps in the line of the Cojeul and a mixed Territorial detachment at Douai.

The situation of the enemy on the front of the detachment, somewhat obscure on Sept. 30, became clearer on the following days. Strong hostile forces (the IV. German Corps) were reported as moving N. and halting for the night in the neighbourhood of Queant, with the evident intention of falling on the flank of the Second Army, at this time around Courcelles. The advanced guards of these columns had got into contact with the French cavalry on the line of the Sensee. Further to the N. other German troops (the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps) had driven the advanced troops of the Territorial detachment back to Douai.

Despite the fact that the battle showed as yet no signs of dying on the Second Army front, that the enemy were pressing hard against his centre, and that a shortage of munitions was beginning to make itself felt, Gen. de Castelnau adhered to his original intention of enveloping the hostile left with the detachment under Maud'huy on Oct. 2, and orders to this effect were sent to the latter on that evening; Maud'huy had already made his preparatory dispositions. The X. Corps was to be assembled around Ficheux, the divisions of the provisional corps N. of Neuville Vitasse and at Gavrelle, the Cavalry Corps N. of Monchy-le-Preux; all were to be in position by 6 A.M. The X. Corps and the 77th Division and the main body of the cavalry were to be ready to advance south-eastwards next morning against the flank of the enemy around Queant, while the 10th Div. at Gavrelle was in a position either to cooperate in this advance or to deal with any hostile forces advancing by Douai.

In continuance of these instructions, the X. Corps was directed early next morning to move eastwards to Mercatel, whence it was to advance against the line Ervillers-St. Leger, and thence in the general direction of Mory, as soon as orders were received from Gen. Maud'huy.

Before, however, the X. Corps had reached its area of concentration around Mercatel the 77th Div. on its left was assailed from the E. by newly arrived German troops (the IV. Corps), who forced it back from the Cojeul to the line GuemappeMonchy-le-Preux, while at the same time the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which had entered Douai on the evening of the 1st, was pushing its advance westwards to the north of the Scarpe - an advance which the 70th Div., delayed in its march from Lens, where it had detrained, to Gavrelle, was not yet available to oppose; the X. Corps was therefore ordered to change the direction of its proposed advance from S.E. to N.E., and assigned as its new line of attack the course of the Cojeul and as its objective the crest N. of Croisilles and W. of Heninel. The Corps would thus strike in flank the enemy advancing S. of the Scarpe, who by 2 P.M. had taken Monchy-le-Preux and driven back the 77th Div. to the line Neuville Vitasse-Feuchy Chapel. Meanwhile the 70th Div. on the N. bank of the Scarpe, advancing towards Gavrelle, had been held up and thrown on the defensive on the front Rouvroy-Izel-Bailleul, so that between it and the 70th Div. to the S. there existed a wide gap, which the ist Cavalry Corps was urgently ordered to fill to the best of its ability.

Owing to the change of direction which had been ordered the attack of the X. Corps was not delivered till the late afternoon, and made little headway against the IV. German Corps, so that at the end of the day a further gap in the French line was formed between the left of the X. Corps and the right of the 77th Div., which had to be filled by troops from the general reserve. Gen. de Maud'huy, despite the disappointment of the day, ordered that the X. Corps should be prepared to resume its attack next morning, the 3rd on the N. bank of the Cojeul in the direction of Monchy-le-Preux, while the remainder of the detachment was to maintain its positions of the previous day. The X. Corps, however, met with no better fortune on this day; the Germans maintained themselves in Neuville Vitasse after heavy to-and-fro fighting, and the retirement of the Territorial troops to the S., who were forced out of Courcelles by the attacks of the German Guard Corps, compelled the X. Corps to throw back its right in conformity, under severe enemy pressure, as far as the line Ficheux-Mercatel. Both the 77th and 70th Divs., however, succeeded in repelling all the violent efforts of the enemy; the gap between these two divisions in the Scarpe valley was successfully closed by Conneau's ist Cavalry Corps; and reinforcements consisting of the XXI. Corps (Maistre), detraining at Armentieres, Merville and St. Pol, and the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th and 5th Cavalry Div.) under De Mitry, then holding the front Benifontaine-Lens, were placed at the disposal of De Maud'huy. These forces were increased by the 45t h Div. detraining at Arras, which was assigned to D'Urbal's corps.

On the front of this corps fighting continued throughout the night, and the 10th Div. was forced to withdraw some three miles westwards to the line Vimy-Farbus-Bailleul, along the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge. This retirement uncovered Lens, which fell into German hands early on the 4th. The situation of the detachment, which now found both its flanks in the air, was by no means an easy one; Maud'huy's orders for the 4th, however, were that the positions then occupied were to be held at all costs. The X. Corps was to maintain itself onthe line Tilloy-Beaurains-Mercatel, with its right flank thrown back if necessary to Ficheux, and to reestablish the connexion with the left of the Second Army which had been lost owing to the retreat of the Territorials. D'Urbal's corps was to hold its ground on the front Vimy-Bailleul-Athies-Feuchy Chapel, so as to allow time for the XXI. Corps to advance by La Bassee against the flank of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which was attacking N. of the Scarpe. The 1st Cavalry Corps was to secure the left of D'Urbal around Givenchy-en-Gohelle. One brigade of the 45th Div. which had already been despatched to Arras was sent forward to reinforce the Provisional Corps, and the second was detrained at Beaumetz and passed on to Duisans in general reserve.

The German attacks continued without cessation throughout the 5th.

Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the Sixth German Army, arrived at Douai and took command of the whole battle front between the Somme and the Lys. On the French side Gen. Foch was entrusted with the coordination of the front N. of the. Oise, and with the general control of the Second Army, the Territorial group, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps and Maud'huy's command, which now became the Tenth Army; Foch moved his headquarters to Doullens on the 5th, Maud'huy's remaining at Aubigny.

During the greater part of the day the Tenth Army successfully held its ground, but in the evening its left was forced to retire still further W. by the vigorous attacks of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, to the N. of which the 2nd German Cavalry Corps of von der Marwitz was now coming into action. Givenchy fell into the hands of the Bavarians, and while their right advanced beyond it to Souchez their centre assaulted and carried the Vimy ridge as far S. as Thelus; the French cavalry were driven back to Villers au Bois and Mont St. Eloi, while the 10th Div., reinforced by all available troops of the 45th Div., again made head against the enemy on the line CarencyNeuville St. Vaast-Roclincourt-Athies. This was the situation reported to Gen. Maud'huy on the morning of the 5th; and shortly after this bad news had been received the X. Corps announced that its right had been forced back from Boisleux, where it had maintained itself throughout the previous day, to Ficheux; that hostile columns were reported moving round its flank by Blaireville; and that the stations of Beaumetz and Saulty on the Arras-Doullens railway were being bombarded.

This was about 10 A.M., and in view of the extreme gravity of the situation on both his flanks Gen. Maud'huy was already taking preparatory measures for the evacuation of Arras and for a withdrawal in the direction of St. Pol, should such become necessary as a result of further progress by the enemy, when Gen. Foch arrived at his headquarters and it was decided to make another effort to restore the position. The Germans had not pressed their advantage against the left of the army to the extent that had at first been feared; the Cavalry Corps was therefore ordered to advance against the right, which had pushed no further forward than Souchez, and disengage the left of the 77 th Division. D'Urbal's corps, which was about to fall back to the line Mont St. Eloi-Etrun-Warlus (W. of Arras), was directed to maintain its ground with its right and centre and cooperate with its left in the attack by the cavalry. Meanwhile reconnaissances had revealed the fact that neither the German IV. Corps nor the Guard had yet taken advantage of the gap between the X. Corps on the right of the Tenth Army and the Territorials on the left of the Second Army; the former was therefore instructed to maintain its line and echelon troops in rear of its right between Ficheux and Gouy. Accordingly on the evening of the 5th the X. Corps had established itself firmly on the front Beaurains-Riviere. The attacks of the Cavalry Corps and the 10th Div., however, made no headway, and their line was established at the end of the day at the western foot of the Vimy ridge on the front E. of Mont St. Eloi-S. of Neuville St. Vaast-Ecurye-Roclincourt-St. Laurent. Further S. the line was continued by the 77th Div., which had been drawn back .in conformity with the retirement of the formations on both its flanks to the second position prepared in rear, between Blangy and Tilloy.

The orders for the 76th were for a renewal of the attack on the left wing of the Tenth Army; it was to be carried out by the 43 r d Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which was assembling W. of Carency, the ist and 2nd Cavalry Corps which were to advance between Souchez and Lievin, and the XXI. Corps (less the 43rd Division) which was to envelop the enemy's right advancing by La Bassee and Lens on Vimy. Various untoward circumstances combined to thwart the execution of this plan. The attack of the Cavalry Corps began late and with invifficient forces, could make little impression on the strong front held by the enemy between Notre Dame de Lorette and Angres, and the 43rd Div. to the S. of it was also held up, while the enveloping attack of the XXI. Corps from La Bassee failed to develop. Elsewhere on the front the German attacks were repulsed, and by the evening the army held the line Beaumetz-Arras (X. Corps), Arras-W. of Neuville St. Vaast (Provisional Corps)-CarencyAix-Noulette (43rd Div. and Cavalry Corps)-S.E. of GrenayLoos (XXI. Corps) with cavalry towards Pont a Vendin and Carvin. Arras was being shelled by the enemy.

According to army orders the XXI. Corps commenced its attack early on the 7th against the enemy reported to be on the line Angres-Lievin-Lens, while the cavalry and the 43rd Div. continued their endeavours to press forward towards Notre Dame de Lorette and Souchez. The Germans, however, had strengthened their positions during the night, and little progress could be made. Moreover, it had become evident that the battle line must be extended yet further to the N. in order to meet a renewed German attempt to envelop the French left by the valley of the Lys. Accordingly the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps were withdrawn from the battle-front in the late afternoon preparatory to their despatch to the N., the 13th Div., then in the vicinity of Lille, being ordered S. to take their place in the Tenth Army. On the rest of that army's front the situation underwent no important change during the 7th.

From this date forward the fighting at Arras died gradually away. Renewed efforts by the XXI. Corps on the 8th and 9th ended in the recovery of Notre Dame de Lorette. On Oct. 20 further fighting E. of Arras resulted in an advance by the 10th Corps, and on the 22nd the 77th Div. was forced back N.E. of Arras by strong enemy forces, who were compelled next day to relinquish part of their gains.

These were but the dying flickers of the fire of battle which had long since shifted its main focus to the north.

Extension of the Battle to the Lys Valley, Oct. 3-12. - While the battle of Arras was still at its crisis, the German right wing was already being extended further to the N. into Flanders. On Oct. 3 a mixed detachment of Landwehr entered Tournai; the 4th Cavalry Corps (3rd, 6th and Bavarian Cavalry Divs.) had come into line on the right of the ist Cavalry Corps, which was then engaged with the French 2nd Cavalry Corps, with its right S. of La Bassee. The right of these fresh forces advanced on Lille, from Tournai and Orchies,. while its left advanced from Douai on La Bassee; by the 4th contact had been made with the French in the western outskirts of Lille.

To meet this new threat the French Higher Command had moved up the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th, 5th and 6th Cavalry Divs.) under De Mitry to the area between Lens and Lille, and had garrisoned the latter city with the 13th Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which had detrained at Armentieres, covered by the 7th Cavalry Division. The first attacks of the German cavalry on the city were beaten off and the suburbs cleared; but, as has already been related, the 13th Div. was then called away to the S. to rejoin its corps, and left behind it only a weak detachment of six battalions and four squadrons to hold the city, and of these two further battalions were withdrawn on the 8th. Meanwhile to the S. between Lens and the Bethune-La Bassee canal the XIV. German Corps had come into line, forcing back the French cavalry to the W. of the Lens-La Bassee road to the line Vermelles-Cambrin; on this line heavy and continuous fighting took place from Oct. 10 onwards, where the position gradually became stable.

Further to the N. the German cavalry continued their advance, extending their right as far as and beyond the Lys and covering the whole country from La Bassee by Lille, Tourcoing and Wervicq to Ypres. The centre and left of De Mitry's cavalry fell back before them, pivoting back on their right from Neuve Chapelle by Estaires and Merville to Hazebrouck and Cassel; this line was reached about Oct. 9. The main body of the German cavalry appeared to be assembled around Bailleul and Steenvoorde, while behind it strong forces of infantry were advancing, the XIII. Corps to the S. and the XIX. to the N. of Lille. The garrison of the city, although reinforced on the 10th by a detachment, were unable to make head against these overwhelming forces, more especially as the presence of the German cavalry in all the area to the W. deprived it of all hope of succour; and after two days' bombardment Lille surrendered to the enemy with its garrison on Oct. 12.

The battle, however, was now about to enter on a new phase with the entry into action of the British army.

Operations of the British in the Lys Valley, Oct. zo-18

The transfer of the British from the Aisne to the left flank of the French army in Flanders had first been proposed by Sir John French on Sept. 29; the details were quickly arranged between him and Joffre, and the withdrawal from the line commenced on Oct. 1. The cavalry moved off first by road on the 2nd, and were followed by the infantry between the 8th and 12th. Sir John French, on his arrival at Abbeville on the 8th, had planned a general advance by the II. Corps, then detraining there, to the line Aire-Bethune, covered in front and to the left by the Cavalry Corps, and the detraining of the III. Corps to the N. at St. Omer. The IV. Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Div., under Gen. Rawlinson, which had been landed on the Belgian coast in order to assist the Belgians in the defence of Antwerp and had assisted in covering their retirement to the line of the Yser, had been holding the line of the Lys around Ghent on the firth, and were instructed to maintain themselves between that town and Courtrai for four or five days, if possible; it was intended to bring the rest of the army up on the right of the IV. Corps, so as to hold the Lys line from Ghent southwards. Rawlinson was authorized, however, in case he was attacked by strong hostile forces, to fall back in the direction of St. Omer, and as a matter of fact the retreat of the Belgians to the N. of him eventually necessitated his retirement by way of Thielt and Thourout to Roulers, where the IV. Corps arrived on Oct. 12, unmolested by the enemy.

On the 10th French visited Foch, and a plan for a combined Allied offensive for the 13th, to reach the line of the Lys from Lille-Courtrai, was then drawn up. The British were to advance with their right N. of Lille, to force the river Lys at Courtrai and join up with Rawlinson's IV. Corps below that town. The Belgians were also to cooperate in the north. In accordance with this plan, the British cavalry pushing forward on the rlth came into contact with the German IV. Cavalry Corps, operating before the right wing of the VI. Army, in the neighbourhood of Nieppe forest, and forced them back towards the Lys; the II. British Corps reached the line of the Aire-Bethune canal. By the 14th the cavalry had cleared the country to the E. as far as the Wytschaete-Messines ridge and pushed patrols forward to the crossings of the Lys; but the II. Corps, wheeling up its left in the direction of Merville, became heavily engaged with German infantry (the XIII. and XIX. Corps of the VI. Army), which prevented their making much headway. The III. British Corps, having completed its movement to Hazebrouck by the 13th, began its advance eastwards, to bring it level with the left of the II. Corps. This objective, however, was not attained without serious and sustained fighting; the Germans (XIX. Corps and IV. Cavalry Corps) stubbornly defended Bailleul, Meteren, Neuve Eglise, Sailly and Nieppe one after the other; by the 16th, however, the British were in possession of all these places. The II. Corps also had worked their way forward by dint of determined efforts to the line AubersGivenchy, and came into touch with the XXI. Corps on the left of the French X. Army, on the Bethune-La Bassee canal.

While the II. Corps, despite determined and unceasing attacks, found further progress impossible beyond the line GivenchyFestubert-N. of Aubers, which it reached on Oct. 18, the III. Corps entered Bois Grenier and Armentieres, and was able to establish itself on a line E. of these places, while the Cavalry Corps, guarding their Ieft, continued the line along the Lys to Menin. By the morrow the assembly of the British army in the N. was completed by the arrival of the I. Corps at Poperinghe, St. Omer and Cassel. The battle of the Lys now became merged in the greater battle of Ypres, in which the whole British force was engaged from Oct. 20 to Nov. 20, and the description of the fighting between these dates on the front of the British II. and III. Corps will be found under that head. It may be said, however, that neither the British nor the Germans, despite their utmost efforts, succeeded in bringing about any material change in the situation on the front between the Bethune-La Bassee canal about Givenchy and the Lys to the N. of Armentieres.

(B) French Offensives In Artois, 1915. - During the month of Oct. 1914 the western front had stabilized across Picardy and Artois, from the Oise to the neighbourhood of La Bassee. The line had not been chosen at the will of either party, but marked the points which each side had reached and held during the confused and rapid series of actions known as the " Race to the Sea." While there was still open country to the north it had been worth no one's while to attempt to dislodge an enemy present in any force. And when the sea had been reached and the German attacks upon the Yser repulsed, neither side retained the energy to advance. Both, therefore, had time to elaborate their defences in comparative peace, and thereby the sinuous and haphazard line already established became permanent.

About Arras the line bulged eastward, leaving Beaurains German but making St. Laurent-Blangy, Roclincourt, and Ecurie French. To the north was a westward bulge which gave the Germans Neuville-St. Vaast and La Targette, Carency and Ablain, Angres, Lievin, and La Fosse Calonne. North of Fosse Calonne the line ran straighter to the west of Loos, Hulluch, Haisnes, and La Bassee.

Artois is a chalk country. The surface soil is clay, with patches of sand unsuitable for cultivation and therefore wooded. The principal natural feature of the region is a long isolated ridge running from N.W. to S.E., which overlooks all the countryside. This ridge culminates at the chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette. East of the chapel there is a gap marked by the village of Souchez. East of Souchez again, the ridge continues as Vimy ridge and gradually dies away south of Vimy village.

The sector was of first-rate importance both for economic and for strategic reasons. North of the ridge ran the principal French and Belgian coal seam the axis of which in Artois is roughly the line Bethune-Lens. Although the public mind was naturally slow to grasp the fact, nevertheless as soon as it became clear that trench warfare would result in the postponement of a decision, first-class economic objectives, such as the coal-mines, began to increase in general military value and continued to do so until the decisive campaign of 1918.

Strategically, the German lines in Artois covered the LilleDouai-Cambrai railway, their main transversal line behind all this part of their front. Should this line be cut, were it even brought under effective artillery fire, their railway traffic would be compelled to use the inferior line Lille-Orchies-SomainCambrai.

Although the final elaboration of trench warfare was a matter of years, its general characteristics, especially the strain and hardship of remaining immobile and in close contact with the enemy, appeared at once. The possibility of manoeuvre disappeared and war became an affair of ever-increasing masses of material. In Artois, the importance of the sector and the nature of the soil made the fighting fierce and continuous and the hardships peculiarly bitter. The clay soil churned into a soft and sticky mud into which men sank deeply and sometimes even were lost. Everywhere the ground was humid; the Lorette ridge itself was honeycombed with springs so that trenches dug even on its summit were difficult to keep clear of water. Weapons often became unserviceable, and the men themselves looked like walking lumps of mud. Nevertheless, the fighting was not only savage but continuous. A major operation was merely a crescendo in a never-ending series of furious lesser combats, all centring about the commanding Lorette-Vimy ridges.

Throughout the first three years of trench fighting on the western front, in most of the minor operations, and in every major operation except Verdun, the Allies attacked. Save in that one case, the Germans held to their decision to stand upon the strategic defensive in France and Belgium, from Nov. 1914 to March 1918. In order to attempt a decision, it was, therefore, necessary to attack their entrenchments. The strength of the defensive in trench warfare, and the corresponding difficulty of the attack, were realized only with time.

Originally, the entire Lorette ridge was occupied by the Germans during the race to the sea; the French swept them off in a brilliant little attack. Then the Germans moved in again and took the chapel and all the eastern end of the ridge nearly to the wood of Buvigny, not by assault but because the place had been left entirely unguarded during the night of Oct. 7-8 in the course of a relief of the French troops in the sector - an incident altogether typical of the race to the sea. As regular trench warfare began, the Germans had the best of the artillery fighting. Their guns were both heavier and more numerous, and their fire control better suited to the new and unexpected sort of fighting. Their batteries were emplaced near Lievin and Angres, behind Vimy ridge, and behind the butte of Monchy-le-Preux. In Nov. they began to use hand grenades, the first of the typical trench weapons to appear, or rather to reappear. The French did not begin manufacturing grenades during the following winter, and were not able to issue them to the troops until March 1915. Nevertheless, despite the German heavy artillery and grenades, the month of Nov. saw such an improvement in the French defensive works that casualties became fewer, although it was not yet possible to put out continuous wire.

Early in Dec. the situation changed for the better with the arrival of several units of French heavy artillery, whose fire compelled the Germans on Lorette ridge to take cover in their deep dug-outs. The French Higher Command ordered the XXI. Corps, which had held the Lorette sector since its stabilization, to attack in the hope of a break-through. The Corps commander, Gen. Maistre, was doubtful of the success of the operation proposed, judging the means insufficient and the obstacles to be encountered too strong. Nevertheless, the attack took place on Dec. 17 at 1:10 P.M. on a front of a mile and a quarter, with diversions against Auchy-les-La Bassee, and Loos, and in front of St. Laurent-Blangy. Near Lorette the artillery preparation had not been sufficient to prevent the assaulting troops coming under heavy fire, especially from machine-guns, as they left the trenches. The German wire was strong and had been very little cut. Nevertheless, they struggled on through deep mud, and succeeded in taking some trenches. For four days the operation was persisted in. The artillery support was weak, partly because of the winding, irregular front line, partly through insufficient liaison with the infantry. Against such handicaps the infantry strove bravely but in vain. At last, after murderous losses which justified only too well Gen. Maistre's forebodings, the attack was broken off.

An unbroken series of minor operations took place throughout the winter and early spring. In the afternoon of Dec. 27 ten battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, commanded by Gen. Barbot, attacked the hamlet of La Targette, after two hours of artillery preparation. " No-man's-land " was here a quarter of a mile wide, quite flat and without cover save for a single sunken road. Hence losses were heavy and onl y half a mile of first-line trenches were taken.

As the winter went on, the sticky mud became even worse, and the heavy German trench-mortar projectiles added still more to the danger and discomfort of the trenches. On March 3, at dawn, after a short but violent preparation by heavy artillery and heavy trench mortars, an entire German division made a sudden attack along the crest of the ridge, and drove the French into Buvigny wood. Two days of counter-attacks recovered most of the ground lost, and throughout March and April a series of local attacks and counter-attacks slightly improved the French position at a cost in casualties disproportionately large in comparison with the ground gained. The dead were not all Frenchmen. Already the German troops were beginning to call the ridge " Totenhilgel," the Hill of Death.

In April the first French. 58-mm. trench mortars, few in number, were put in service. The French had already begun the use of hand grenades in March.

About May 1 the French Higher Command decided upon a general attack, and chose Artois as its sector. It was desirable that something be done on the western front in the hope of relieving the pressure upon the Russians, on whose front the great blow was about to fall. The British agreed to support the operation by a diversion in Flanders.

From the original formation of the French " Group of armies of the North," Gen. Foch had been in command. This command he still retained, and his was the decision as to the length of front to be attacked. Even at this early stage of trench warfare, he saw clearly that to estimate the possible width of an assault according to the number of infantry available was nonsense. He therefore insisted upon calculating the front to be attacked according to the available quantity of heavy artillery, insisting that a clear superiority in heavy pieces was necessary over the full width of the operation proposed. On the western front as a whole, the Germans still disposed of superior numbers in this particular arm, so that it seemed impossible to obtain a sufficient superiority of fire over a front of much more than six miles. As a result of Foch's insistence the width of the attacking front was limited accordingly. The right of the proposed assault was fixed in the neighbourhood of Roclincourt, the left on the northern slopes of Lorette ridge. At this stage of the war it was still believed that a violent effort, even on so restricted a front, stood a fair chance of breaking through the opposing trench system and restoring a war of movement.

From May 4, the German Higher Command was convinced that a considerable attack was to be expected. Nevertheless, so high ran their hopes of victory in the east that even Falkenhayn, usually so chary of reinforcements for that theatre, drew yet another division thither from France.' In Artois, the French order of battle was as follows: the left of the XVII. Corps was around Roclincourt. North of them stood the XX. Corps; its left facing La Targette and extending a little north of that village. North of the XX. came the XXXIII. Corps, commanded by Petain, the future commander-in-chief of the French armies on the western front. His extreme left faced Ablain. North again of the XXXIII. Corps, astride the Lorette ridge and on to the Arras-Bethune high road, stood the XXI. Corps which, always under Maistre, had held the sector from the beginning. The XX. and the XXXIII. Corps had three divisions each, the other corps two. All four corps formed part of the X. Army, now commanded by D'Urbal, who had relieved Maud'huy, the original army commander, in March. Foch shifted his headquarters from Cassel to Frevent on the Doullens-St. Pol road in order to follow the operation more closely. The troops were in high spirits at the prospect of quitting the foul and muddy trenches, and in the hope of fighting in the open thenceforward.

Opposite them, the German defences were formidable; indeed the painstaking German national character is well adapted to the construction of elaborate works. Each of the solidly built French villages was a complicated little citadel. North of Ecurie a huge tangle of trenches formed a strong point, known as the Labyrinth, covering more than half a square mile. A series of works, known to the French as the " Ouvrages Blancs," ran in a concave line from a hummock in front of La Targette to the western end of Carency. On the Lorette ridge itself, the ground favoured the defence. The southern slopes were precipitous and were, moreover, cut by deep ravines which the French likened to the grooves in a melon rind. Of the five spurs between these ravines, the Germans held the easternmost three, their front line running from a point a thousand yards west of the ruins of the chapel, across the summit of the third spur, and so to the western end of Ablain - a curious position which only the great strength of the modern defensive made possible. To the 1 Falkenhayn, Die Oberste Heeresleitung, p. 74. At this period, Falkenhayn says, the total German combatant strength in the western theatre was 1,900,000 against an Allied total of .2,450,000.

north the ground fell away gently in an even slope broken only by the unexpected Buval ravine. The entire German part of the ridge was covered with trenches and obstacles and swept by batteries (at ranges of two to four thousand yards) around Lievin and Angres and behind Vimy ridge.

The troops which held these defences belonged to the German VI. Army which held the front from south of Ypres to within io m. of Arras. It comprised 16 divs., at a combat strength of about 17,000 per division according to the reduced German divisional organization dating from the early winter of '14. This gave a little less than three men per yard of front considering the irregularities of the line. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria commanded the army, with Maj. Gen. Krafft von Dellmensingen for chief-of-staff, and headquarters at Lille.

The attack, originally ordered for May 7, was put off to the 8th and then to the 9th. Demolition fire was begun on the 7th and continued on the 8th, especially against the region of Neuville and the Labyrinth, but was hindered by the lack of all observation from the ground (no commanding points being in French hands), and by the serious imperfections of the aerial observation attempted by planes and dirigibles. The morning of the 9th dawned fair, with a light mist that soon cleared away. At six o'clock an intense bombardment was opened along the whole line from Loos to Arras, with heavy, divisional, and trench artillery. On the front of the XXI. Corps the 75's held their fire until eight o'clock, then began, and continued, at the rate of four shots per piece per minute. Amid the din of the bombardment, the French observers saw the German positions lost in vast clouds of smoke and dust sent up by the exploding shells. The German artillery replied energetically, searching for the French infantry assembled for the assault and occasionally hitting them with considerable effect. At io o'clock, precisely, the French artillery automatically increased the range and the infantry attack began.

The assaulting troops left their jumping-off trenches without signal. In a few moments it was clear that both wings were held up. The XVII. Corps could not gain a foot; the wire in front of them was still intact. The X. Corps, attempting a diversion east of Arras, uselessly lost 3,000 men in Do minutes from machine-gun fire. North of the XVII., the right of the XX. Corps was helpless in front of the wire of the Labyrinth. The left of the XX. was doing better, the wire in front of them having been cut by the bombardment. In spite of heavy losses from German machine-guns still in position, they slowly cleared La Targette, fighting hand to hand, and by z i :30 they had advanced a little over half a mile and reached the westernmost houses of Neuville. On the ridge, the XXI. Corps was advancing only very slowly, at a cost of murderous losses. Their attack was peculiarly difficult to organize for want of a single conspicuous object in their front to serve as reference point for the artillery, and upon which the infantry could align their advance. Their assaulting elements came under heavy machine-gun fire as soon as they showed themselves, so that the communication trenches were obstructed by numbers of wounded who blocked the reserves. Machine-guns firing northward from Ablain made advance impossible along the southern slope. On the plateau itself and the northern slope, swept though they were at short ranges by the German batteries around Angres and Lievin, there was a slow and painful advance of about half a mile, which took three successive lines of trenches and reached, at noon, the neighbourhood of the chapel and the land N.W. of it. Through the morning, the extreme left of Petain's Corps, the XXXIII., was fixed in front of Ablain. Other units, fighting every step of the way, were slowly working forward south of Carency.

Meanwhile, the right of the XXXIII. Corps had broken clear through the German line. Here, alone on the attacking front, the wooded hill of Berthonval had given good land observation by which to direct the bombardment. The wire had therefore been cleared and most of the machine-guns put out of action. Carrying conspicuous markers to enable the artillery to follow their march, the infantry swept forward without a check. In the intoxication of such an advance after a winter in the abominable trenches, they got out of hand and ran forward, cheering as they rushed the German elements that tried to resist them. They crossed the Bethune road, gained the crest of Vimy ridge, and looked down upon the rolling plain to the north and east, towards Lens and Douai, with no more German troops before them. Hundreds of prisoners had been taken, it was only i r :30, and they had advanced over two and a half miles.

Naturally, the German command was frightened. Partially, at least, they had been surprised, for they had assembled no reserves. Twenty miles away, in Lille, the Prince of Bavaria's staff began packing up, for if the gap could be widened the whole front would go. But naturally, the assaulting troops were completely exhausted. They had run and yelled too much and their water-bottles had been emptied too quickly. During the advance, officer casualties had been numerous. About a mile of the crest between '19 and 140 was occupied, and patrols were pushed forward to Souchez and Givenchy.

Everything now depended upon the arrival of reinforcements. With them everything might be hoped; without them it would be hard to hold the ground already gained, limited as it was by concentric machine-gun fire from Souchez, Neuville, and La Folie wood; and no reinforcements came. The advance had been faster than had been planned, and either the army staff work was slow and the necessary orders not issued in time, or else the units ordered forward failed to make good speed. Perhaps, after all, the thing was impossible. Certainly no good road ran east into the newly created salient. At all events the opportunity was lost.

On the German side, when the first moment of panic had passed, the reaction was rapid. Great and deserved credit was won by the staffs concerned. During the afternoon, enough battalions from the second line of the division near by were scraped together for a counter-attack (supported by artillery behind La Folie wood) which retook the crest. The French-African troops, with most of their officers gone, failed to do themselves justice. All this time Neuville and Carency were holding out, and the XXI. Corps could not clear the Lorette plateau. Towards evening the cemetery south of Souchez had to be abandoned. Through the night, third-line battalions from the neighbouring German Army Corps began to come up. The French maintained themselves with difficulty at the Cabaret Rouge and along the road from Souchez to Neuville. The golden moment had passed.

During the next three days, the French improved their positions in vigorous local operations, taking the debris of Lorette chapel, Carency, and most of Neuville. By June r Ablain, the sugar-works west of Souchez, and the south-eastern slopes of Lorette were cleared. June saw the Labyrinth painfully occupied, and a narrow and difficult salient (including a bit of Vimy crest) first thrust out eastward from the Cabaret Rouge and then withdrawn. About the same time the Germans were pushed off the north-eastern slopes of Lorette - their last foothold on that murderous ridge now thickly covered with the dead of both sides.

The diversions attempted meanwhile by the British had failed to affect the general situation.

Tactically, the spring offensive in the Artois had partially succeeded. Twenty-five square miles had been gained, the enemy's local resistances had been beaten down, for some hours his front had been pierced. But strategically, the operation had failed. The German front had been very slightly modified and the Russians had been helped in no way.

During the summer, the usual round of little fights went on, barren of results but endured always with the same spirit. In Aug. trench knives were issued to the French infantry for the first time.

In the autumn, another Entente offensive on the western front was decided upon. The French prepared to attack in Champagne and both French and British in Artois, the French from Neuville to north of Souchez, which large village was, by this time, laid almost level with the ground; the British from Haisnes to Loos - a far more ambitious effort than previous British trench-warfare operations. The main attack, however, was that in Champagne, Artois being only the scene of a diversion on a large scale.

The troops to be put in motion were Maistre's much-enduring XXI. Corps in front of Souchez, and on their right the XXXIII. Corps, now commanded by Fayolle, in front of La Folie. The French and German Higher Commands were the same, except that Maj. Gen. v. Kuhl was now chief-of-staff at Prince Rupprecht's headquarters.

Tactically, the operation was planned differently from that of May in that the attempt was made to crush the enemy by an intense bombardment prolonged throughout several days and that, therefore, no surprise could be hoped for. Objectives were to be strictly limited.

Accordingly on Sept. 20, with improved ground and air observation, and with guns and munitions available on a larger scale than ever before, there began a bombardment of the German works and rear areas, which continued day and night for five days. On the morning of the 25th the bombardment was intensified. At the same time the Germans began their counterpreparation and succeeded in inflicting some loss on the French infantry in their jumping-off trenches. The fine weather had turned to rain.

At 25 minutes past 12 the infantry attack began. The spirit of the German infantry had been broken by the bombardment so that there was little or no resistance, what little there was being due to imperfect "mopping-up."' Meanwhile, the German barrage had been laid down too late, and afterwards ignorance of the situation made their artillery afraid to fire. On the other hand, the rain and the muddy, shell-torn ground made the advance very slow. Not until 5:30 in the evening of Sept. 26 were the ruins of Souchez completely cleared and the line carried a quarter-mile to the eastward.

Meantime, unknown to the French, the German command was passing through a crisis of anxiety. Their reserves had not yet come up and the positions on Vimy ridge were almost without defenders and trains were run at short intervals on the DouaiMericourt-Rouvray line to simulate the arrival of reinforcements. But the bad weather, the abominable terrain, and the French policy of limited objectives saved the situation for the Germans. On the 27th their reserves arrived and the situation was reestablished. The action continued, but although the 28th saw the French lines advanced to include an important redoubt in front of Givenchy, the German front was no longer in danger of being broken, and after the 28th the French broke off the battle.

Early in 1916, British troops relieved the French in the sector, which had seen the longest, and (after Verdun) the most murderous battle of the entire war. The French are said to have had in Artois no less than 100,000 killed. The XXI. Corps alone, by Dec. 1915, lost 80,000 dead or wounded, 18,000 of whom fell in the six weeks from May 9 to June 20. (H. N.*) (C) Neuve Chapelle. - The objects with which Sir John French attacked the German lines in March 1915 were to obtain a more favourable position for his share in the major operations to be undertaken in conjunction with the French. The fighting of Oct. and Nov. 1914 had left the British right between the La Bassee canal and Armentieres in an indifferent position tactically. After gaining a foothold on the ridge which runs S.W. from Lille past Aubers they had been thrust off it into the more or less waterlogged low ground at its foot. To recover this ridge was essential if the German hold on the Lille-La Bassee line was to be effectively shaken and Sir John hoped, moreover, to stimulate his troops whose offensive spirit had found few 1 This process, called by the French " nettoyage " and by the British " mopping-up," was the clearance, by troops specially detailed for the purpose, of the enemy trenches that had been reached and passed by the leading troops of the attack but might - and in practice usually did - contain scattered but intact and dangerous groups of the enemy.

outlets in the cramping conditions of trench warfare in a swamp. The point he selected for his attack was on the front held by Sir Douglas Haig's I. Army, where the Germans' capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle (Oct. 27 1914) had driven a salient into the British lines. This portion of the British front had always been particularly difficult and costly to hold and a substantial success here might not only gain a footing on the Aubers ridge but render the German positions opposite Givenchy and Festubert untenable.

The attack delivered on March io by the 8th Div. (IV. Corps) on the left and the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) on the right was successful in effecting a surprise. There had been no long preliminary bombardment to give warning of the attack, for the ammunition supply only sufficed for 35 minutes' shelling, and the infantry, finding the wire well cut except at the extreme ends of the line, stormed the positions with ease. The 25th Bde. of the 8th Div. carried Neuve Chapelle village and joined hands with the Gahrwal Bde., who had overrun the ground between the village and the cross-roads S. of it known as " Port Arthur." Many prisoners were taken, and. it seemed that reinforcements had only to push on to achieve a substantial advance. Unfortunately, the stubborn resistance of the Germans at the ends of the line absorbed the attention of the troops in immediate support. On the left, S. of the ruined farm known as " the Moated Grange," the 2nd Middlesex were held up by wire, which a fold of the ground had concealed from the artilleryobserving officers; on the right at Port Arthur a strong point held out for several hours, and was only carried when the 2nd Seaforths of the Dehra Dun Bde. reinforced the original assailants of the Gahrwal Brigade. Similarly, it was not till well past midday, and after heavy fighting, that the 23rd Bde.,improving the lodgment made by their right battalion, the 2nd Scottish Rifles, secured their second objective, and then only by utilizing two battalions of the 24th Bde. as well as their own supports, the 2nd Devons and 2nd West Yorkshires. Meanwhile the 25th Bde. had cleared Neuve Chapelle but found their left too much exposed to allow any advance beyond the village. More important still, the orders had been explicit that the reserves were not to be put in without sanction from the Corps, and the extreme difficulty of maintaining communications with the advanced troops prevented divisional and corps headquarters from keeping in touch with the progress of the attack and delayed the advance of the reserves. Not till the afternoon was well advanced did the leading troops of the 7th Div. pass through the 8th, and though the 21st Bde. then cleared a substantial area N. of Neuve Chapelle and made some progress down the German trenches beyond the Moated Grange, German reinforcements both of men and guns made their presence felt, and darkness stopped the advance before the road running N.W. from the Moulin du Pietre past Mauquissart had been crossed. On the right, meanwhile, two Gurkha battalions of the Dehra Dun Bde. pushed forward into the Bois de Biez, but their position was dangerously isolated and they had to be withdrawn E. of Riviere des Layes.

The chances of substantial progress on the second day, already diminished by the arrival of strong German reinforcements, were further reduced by weather conditions which made aerial direction of the British artillery fire impossible. This, combined with the interruption of telephone communications between the forward observing officers and their batteries, prevented the cooperation between artillery and infantry needed to reduce the numerous machine-gun posts furnished by the houses which studded the area N. of Neuve Chapelle. Groups of these, especially along the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road, proved most formidable obstacles. Moreover, the Germans, besides throwing in all the local reserves of their VII. Corps, together with the 6th Bavarian Res. Div. which was resting near Lille, brought up much additional artillery, so that the 7th and Lahore Divs. came under heavy fire and suffered severely in crossing ground in rear of the advanced troops, sometimes without even reaching the front line. The 7th Div. beat back counter-attacks and added considerably to the tale of prisoners, but made no real progress; the 8th could do no more, but until the right of the 8th Div. could come forward to cover it the Indian Corps could not tackle the Bois de Biez.

On the next morning (March 12) violent counter-attacks against several points made it obvious that strong German reinforcements had come up. Advancing in mass against the Bareilly Bde. along the Rue du Bois and against the rest of the Meerut Div. N. of Port Arthur, the Germans were mown down in numbers without ever reaching the British line. Opposite the Moulin du Pietre another determined attack broke through the 24th Bde., to be thrown back by a prompt counter-stroke by the ist Worcesters; and in this quarter also very heavy losses were inflicted on the Germans. Further N. again the 21st Bde. lost some advanced trenches, but successfully maintained its main position and lent effective aid to the 2nd Scots Guards and 2nd Borderers of the 10th Bde., who carried a strong redoubt N.E. of the Moated Grange and took 300 prisoners of the VII. Corps. But still the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road barred any advance, and the machine-guns in the fortified houses held up all attempts to get forward. Thus, though the 25th Bde. repulsed several attacks they could not carry the line forward from Neuve Chapelle; the Sirhind Bde. (Lahore Div.) made a little ground and took prisoners but could not cross the Riviere des Layes; and now that all advantages of surprise had gone Sir John French saw that little was to be gained by pressing the attack. March 13 therefore saw the fighting much diminished in intensity; gains were consolidated and the troops reorganized, but the attack was suspended.

The battle of Neuve Chapelle ended therefore somewhat disappointingly. The substantial advance which had at one moment seemed within reach had not been realized: the delay in pushing the British reserves had allowed the Germans to rush to the danger spot reinforcements sufficient to bar the road to the high ground of the Aubers ridge. Thus while the tactical position round Neuve Chapelle was much improved the strategical situation was unchanged. The losses, over 4,200 in the Indian Corps, nearly double that in the IV., had been heavy, while of three minor operations undertaken as diversions those at Givenchy (I. Corps) and Wytschaete (II. Corps) failed, only the III. Corps proving successful against l'Epinette (S.E. of Armentieres). Still, it would be wrong to class Neuve Chapelle among British defeats. The troops were undoubtedly encouraged by seeing that German positions could be stormed and the captured ground held against powerful counter-attacks. Nearly 1,700 prisoners had been taken and the German losses had exceeded the British. Rifles, artillery and machine-guns had found splendid targets, and the German battalions who had shown themselves in the open had been shot down in masses. It was felt that another attack in which .the lessons of the battle could be turned to good effect might lead to far-reaching results.

(D) Aubers Ridge And Festubert. - The part assigned to the British in the Allied offensive of May 1915 gave them as their immediate objective the S.W. end of the Aubers ridge. The IV. Corps was to attack at Rougebancs, N.E. of Neuve Chapelle, using the 8th Div. in the first assault and supporting it with the 7th, while S. W. of Neuve Chapelle the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) and the 1st Div. (I. Corps) attacked from the line of the Rue du Bois which joins the Estaires-La Bassee road at the " Port Arthur " cross-roads. It was hoped that these divisions pushing forward in an easterly direction would establish touch behind the Bois de Biez with the IV. Corps advancing southward past Aubers. But whether successful or not in their immediate tasks, the British would materially assist the Allied operations if their attack diverted German guns and men from the crucial point N. of Arras where the French were attacking.

It was with the greatest confidence that the British forces looked forward to this attack. Neuve Chapelle had whetted their hopes; it was believed that at this second attempt the lessons of Neuve Chapelle would be turned to good effect, that the causes which had robbed that attack of greater success would be avoided, that the increased artillery and ammunition available would allow of a far more effective bombardment. Unfortunately, the delays in renewing the attack, due partly to weather conditions but even more to the insufficient ammunition supply, had given the Germans time to so strengthen their positions that only the heaviest artillery could produce any substantial effect upon them. Parapets, many feet in thickness and backed up by concrete, were proof against 18-pounders, and afforded complete protection against anything short of a direct hit to the machine-guns placed in pits sited at the ground level which swept the " no-man's-land " with a grazing fire. It was only the bitter experiences of May 9 which revealed how very formidable the German defences had become and what an increase in battering-power would be needed to reduce them.

The actual attack delivered early on 'May 9 met with modified success at Rougebancs, but with complete failure at. Rue du Bois. Here the infantry found the enemy's trenches strongly manned; the machine-guns from their pits at the ,base of the parapets maintained a deadly fire; scarcely any of the assailants managed to reach the enemy's parapets, and the few who did get into the German lines were promptly overwhelmed. Moreover, the German artillery at once opened a heavy counterbombardment, and the British supports and reserves, packed into crowded communication and assembly trenches, suffered severely, while the task of evacuating wounded and reorganizing the troops for a second attempt proved extremely difficult.

A second effort was, however, made by both the ist and Meerut Divs. about 7 A.M., though without success; and when in the course of the afternoon the Bareilly Bde. of the Meerut Div. and the ist Bde. of the ist Div. were put in, the same result followed. A handful of the ist Black Watch made a lodgment in the enemy's trenches, but so small a party was powerless and was speedily overwhelmed.

At Rougebancs the right brigade of the 8th Div., the 24th, failed except at one point to reach the enemy's trenches, and suffered very severe losses. On its left, however, the 2nd Rifle Bde. and ist Royal Irish Rifles of the 25th Bde. captured a considerable frontage, and lodgments were also made by the 2nd Lincolnshires and the 13th (Kensington) London Regiment. However, consolidation proved exceedingly difficult. Machineguns on the flanks, which could not be located or silenced, prevented the advance of reinforcements; efforts to dig communication trenches came under heavy shelling, and could not be, completed before German counter-attacks, vigorously pressed and well supplied with bombs, drove back those assailants who had penetrated beyond the front trenches and gradually forced the survivors out of the positions they had captured. The Rifle Bde. held on longest, keeping the Germans at bay till after midnight, but before the 7th Div. could push a battalion across to relieve them a renewed counter-attack .ousted them from the German trenches. The division's losses came to over 4,500, about the same as at Neuve Chapelle, but without the satisfaction of retaining any of the ground won. at the first assault. The ist Div. lost nearly 4,000 men, the Indian Corps had over 2,000 casualties, and the completeness of the failure was the more felt because of the high hopes so generally entertained.

However, though the French attacks had also fallen short of the success anticipated, they had gained some ground and were being continued. Sir John French therefore determined to renew his efforts to assist his allies, though on a less ambitious scale. North-east of the village of Festubert the German lines running northward from Givenchy turned N.E. at a sharp angle towards the Bois de Biez, making a salient which it was proposed to attack on two sides. On the night of May 15-16, therefore, the I. and Indian Corps renewed their attempt to advance from the Rue du Bois, using the Meerut and 2nd Divs., while the 7th Div., which had been transferred from the IV. to the I. Corps, attacked eastwardly from Festubert. The attack was preceded by an intermittent bombardment extending over several days, instead .of the short but intensive bombardment employed on March io and May 9. Over a large part of the front attacked the German wire was effectively cut, but opposite the Indian Corps the German parapets successfully defied the efforts of the British artillery and (on the left of the front attacked) the Meerut Div. and the left of the and Div. failed to carry the hostile trenches. The rest of the and Div. fared better; the 6th Bde. and part of the 5th stormed the front German line, and reinforced by their reserves began pushing on against the second line. At 3:15 A.M. on May 16 the 7th Div. attacked, while the Meerut Div. made a fresh attempt. Once again machine-guns sheltered behind Lille damaged parapets and shot down the Gahrwal Bde., and this failure affected the advance of the division, who had to establish a defensive flank on their left and to devote their main efforts to getting touch with the and Div. whose attack had met with considerable success, especially in the centre, where the and Scots Guards and 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers had penetrated deep into the German positions. On their right also the and Queen's, after a temporary check, had got well in, and while they pushed on towards La Quinque Rue a bombing attack down the German front line, S. of the point of entry, led to the clearing of 700 yd. and the capture of 200 prisoners. But casualties had been heavy, and on the left the stubborn resistance of a strong point held up the left of the aoth Bde., which exposed the flank of the most advanced parties. These, out of touch with their supports, were forced back by counter-attacks. Similarly, the progress of the and Div. was retarded by the resistance of two fortified farms, Cour d'Avoue and Ferme du Bois. Until these strong points could be reduced substantial progress was impossible.

Next day (May 17) operations were continued, a special effort being made to close the gap between the and and 7th Divs., after which it was hoped to push on towards Rue d'Ouvert and Chapelle St. Roch. The first of these objects was effected, after about 700 Germans in the angle between the two attacks had left their trenches, apparently intending to surrender, but had been shelled by their own guns and almost wiped out. But the Ferme du Bois held up the and Div., which could only progress to some extent on its right. The 7th Div. started well and cleared the strong points which had checked the left of the aoth Bde., but could not get much further in the direction of Cour d'Avoue, while the efforts of the and Bedfords and 4th Camerons to push on against Rue d'Ouvert were not in the end successful. On May 18 the 4th (Guards) Bde. attacked Cour d'Avoue from the W., but could not carry it, and Canadian infantry, who on that day began relieving the 7th Div., did not succeed in doing more than master an orchard which had been reached (but lost again) on May 16 by some of the 7th Division. By this time the Germans had brought up considerable reinforcements and many machine-guns, and as the ammunition available was nearly exhausted all chance of substantial success seemed gone. For another week, however, severe fighting continued between La Quinque Rue and Givenchy, the brunt falling on the Canadians and on the 47th (London) Div. who were holding the Givenchy sector. These operations resulted in the capture of several hundred yards of trenches, including two formidable strong points, and the repulse of several German counter-attacks, but by May 25 Sir John French found it necessary to call a halt. It was now clear that though the great French effort further S. had won much valuable ground it had failed to break the enemy's line or to prove the decisive stroke that had been hoped for: the Allies had to resign themselves, therefore, to a suspension of active operations. Actually, it was not till the end of June that this became complete, and in the interval two minor attacks were made near Givenchy, one by the 7th and 51st (Highland Territorial) Divs., the other by the Canadians: neither, however, resulted in any appreciable gain of ground, and although on June 16 an attack by the 3rd Div., now in the V. Corps, carried some German trenches W. of the Bellewaarde ridge and improved the tactical situation in the Hooge neighbourhood, it did not lead to the recapture of Hooge and involved the assailants in heavy losses.

For three months, therefore, the position on the British front was one of almost complete stagnation. The only events of real importance were 'the arrival of the long-expected " New Army " divisions, the first of which, the 9th (Scottish) Div., actually began its disembarkation at Boulogne on the day of the disastrous repulse at Fromelles and Rue du Bois. By the end of July eight of these divisions were in the country, and their presence permitted the formation of a III. Army, which took over from the French a line to the N. of the Somme between Arras and Albert. During this period there was of course intermittent activity on the British front, mainly in the Ypres salient. Here at the end of July the Germans, making use for the first time against the British of their Flammenwerfer (liquidfire projectors), attacked and captured the right trenches of the 14th (New Army) Div. just S. of Hooge. The battalion holding the trenches was overwhelmed, and a counter-attack next day was unsuccessful. Ten days later, however (Aug. 9), two brigades of the 6th Div. made a fresh attempt after careful reconnaissance and preparation. The German position was carried on a front of I,000 yd., and heavy losses were inflicted on them; they brought up large reinforcements and strove desperately but unsuccessfully to regain the ground, but the 6th Div. held firm, retaining the trenches lost in the Flammenwerfer attack with a small spur N. of the Menin road.

It gives some indication of the difference in scale between the war of 1914-8 and the greatest of the previous campaigns of the British army that the 1,800 casualties of the 6th Div. in this quite minor action exceeded by 50% the losses of Wellington's army at Busaco.

(E) Loos. - If in the Allied offensive of Sept. 1915 the British army, as in May, played only a subsidiary part, its contribution far outstripped both in men and in materials the meagre preparations of May. A four days' bombardment on a scale hitherto unprecedented preceded the attack, for which nine divisions were available as against the four of May 9, while six others contributed by undertaking diversions. The frontage attacked extended over nearly 6 m., from just S. of the mining village of Loos on the right to the La Bassee canal on the left. The line ran fairly straight from S. to N. for nearly 3 m., but then curved away in a N.W. direction towards Cuinchy, so that two of the three divisions of Sir Hubert Gough's I. Corps on the left had to attack N.E., while the right, Sir Henry Rawlinson's IV. Corps, was striking due east. Further, Gough's left division, the and, was to attack on both sides of the canal, the 5th Bde. from Givenchy-les-La Bassee, the 6th and 38th Bdes. from Cuinchy. The 5th Bde.'s attack was one of the operations intended to distract the enemy and divert his reserves, but the other brigades aimed at reaching Auchy and linking up near Haisnes with the left of the main attack. A defensive flank would thus be established, under cover of which, and of a similar flank to be formed on Rawlinson's extreme right by the 47th Div., the central divisions of the I. and IV. Corps with the XI. Corps in support and the cavalry in readiness behind, would, it was hoped, break through between Haisnes and Loos, reach the Deule canal at Port a Verdin and unite E. of Lens with Gen. Foch's troops.

To improve the chances of success and introduce an element of surprise it had been decided to employ against the Germans their own device, gas. Elaborate preparations had been made for the use of this weapon, and on its expected effectiveness in surprising and demoralizing the defenders the highest hopes were based.

The operations to be undertaken as diversions were much more substantial in scale than those which had accompanied the Neuve Chapelle attack. The 19th Div. was to attack in the low ground E. of Festubert. North of Neuve Chapelle the Indian Corps, supported on the left by the aoth Div., was to assault the German salient at Mauquissart, the legacy of the Neuve Chapelle fighting. Further N. again the 8th Div. was to attack at Bridoux, while the principal diversion was that to be undertaken against Hooge and the Bellewaarde ridge on the Ypres front by the 3rd and 14th Divisions. These attacks were more than mere raids; they all aimed at definite tactical improvements in the local situations, but their primary object was to prevent the transfer of reserves to the main point of attack. This object they achieved, even if they nowhere resulted in permanent gains of ground, for it was only by prompt and vigorous use of reserves and hard fighting that the Germans recovered their initial losses at Hooge, at Bridoux and at Mauquissart where the Indian Corps made a fine fight.

In the preliminary bombardment the field guns were employed to cut the wire, while the heavier guns battered the other defences. Considerable damage was inflicted both on the trenches and their garrisons, though in places deep dug-outs allowed the defenders to escape lightly. Most of the wire was effectively destroyed, but at several points folds of the ground concealed it from observation, and at two at least this had farreaching effects, parts of the attack, which was delivered at 6:30 A.M. on Sept. 25, being held up by uncut wire. Moreover, the wind proved too weak to carry the gas forward quickly, and thus made it in places worse than useless. This was notably the experience of the 2nd Div. at Cuinchy, and its attack, though gallantly pressed, proved unsuccessful and costly. Better success attended the 9th Div. E. of the railway to Vermelles, though its left brigade, the 28th, found the wire practically intact and was repulsed with heavy losses, a second attack by the supporting battalions faring no better. The 26th Bde. had to assault the formidable and important Hohenzollern Redoubt, which protruded in front of the slag heaps and miners' cottages at " Fosse 8," S. of Auchy. With great gallantry and at a heavy cost the Highlanders carried the Redoubt and swept on over the German main line, clearing the cottages and slag heaps behind. Some of the supports were absorbed in securing .this first objective, but the remainder pushed forward and established themselves just short of Haisnes in the Pekin trench, part: of the German second line. With prompt support Haisnes might have been carried, but the 27th Bde. were much delayed by the returning wounded and German prisoners who crowded the communication trenches, and before its leading battalions could reach the front the opportunity had passed; German reserves had arrived. All the 9th Div. could attempt was to maintain its gains against the counter-attacks.

Opposite the 7th Div. the chief tactical feature was a group of quarries W. of Cite St. Elie. These were reached and taken by the 22nd Bde., but at a cost which left it too weak to carry its second objective, Cite St. Elie. The 10th Bde., however, penetrated much deeper into the German position, capturing eight guns, and reaching the cross-roads between Cite St. Elie and Hulluch. But it was out of touch with the 22nd Bde. on its left, and as the division's reserves, the 2rst Bde., were partly absorbed in consolidating the quarries sufficient reinforcements were not forthcoming to carry the attack any farther. Thus despite its substantial initial success the advance of the I. Corps came to a standstill. The detachments which had established themselves in the German second line were scattered and isolated, and needed both reinforcements and artillery support. But information was scanty and slow to get back to headquarters and without accurate information artillery support was impossible; the immediate reserves had been used up, and as no more were forthcoming the opening could not be exploited.

On the left of the IV. Corps the rst Div. had as its objective the line from Hulluch to Bois Hugo, N.E. of Loos. Its left brigade, the 1st, was most successful: it stormed the front line and pushed on to Hulluch over several lines of trenches, capturing three guns. But here it found itself unsupported, for the 2d Bde. on its right had been stopped by uncut wire several hundreds of yards long and its repeated assaults proved equally unsuccessful and costly. The reserves of the 1st Div. had, therefore, to be used against its first objective, and not till the afternoon were they able by crossing the German trenches on the flanks of the untaken portion to compel its defenders to surrender. By the time, therefore, that the 2nd Bde. finally reached its objective at Bois Hugo the delay had had serious consequences: the 1st Bde. had already been forced back 500 yd. from Hulluch, and the left flank of the next division to the right, the 15th, had been insecure all day.

Nevertheless, the r 5th Div. had achieved remarkable success. Attacking with the 46th Bde. on the left and the 44th on the right, it carried the German front line, swept on over a second trench system into Loos and through it, and pushed on over " Hill 70," E. of Loos, until brought up by the defences of Cite St. Laurent, one of the suburbs of Lens, and by a railway embankment farther north. But their rapid advance had carried the men beyond the reach of artillery support; mixture of units had destroyed cohesion, and touch had been completely lost with the headquarter formations in rear. Moreover, though some of the 46th Bde. had reached and occupied Puits 14 bis, a mine S. of Bois Hugo, the 2nd Bde.'s failure had left the r 5th exposed to counter-attacks from the N., and reserves which might have secured the advanced position had to be diverted to that flank. On its other flank, however, the r 5th Div. had no cause for anxiety. The 47th (London) Div. had as its task the formation of a defensive flank from the S.E. of Loos back to the British front line. This task it had accomplished to the letter, capturing three guns and several hundred prisoners, and after consolidating all its objectives it maintained them against vigorous counter-attacks.

About noon, then, on Sept. 25 the prospects of a breakthrough seemed bright. If reserves could have been promptly pushed in, the arrival of German reinforcements might have been forestalled and the advanced troops not only supported but carried farther forward. Unluckily, neither Gough nor Rawlinson had reserves available, and at noon the leading troops of the XI. Corps were still 3 m. from the original German front line and had to thread their way forward through an area congested with transports and with traffic of every description. More guns meant larger ammunition columns, while additional machine-guns meant additional limbers, and the rapid expansion of the British army had not only meant increased impedimenta but had brought into staff posts many officers without staff training or experience. The congestion of the rearward areas was a serious handicap, but hardly to be wondered at.

By the time the leading units of the XI. Corps reached the front matters had already changed for the worse. At nearly every point German counter-attacks had thrust back the most advanced troops, and though the Germans had had to pay heavily for their gains the fact that their reinforcements were arriving in strength was even more serious than the loss of ground. At Hill 70 in particular there had been desperate fighting, and only with great difficulty had the 15th Div. maintained a position on its western slopes, thanks largely to the initiative of a battalion commander who, arriving there after the advance had swept on over the crest, had promptly entrenched a position on which the remnants of the advanced troops were able to rally when the counter-attack drove them back. But now that the XI. Corps was up it was hoped to push on again next morning.

The plan for Sept. 26 was that the IV. Corps, reinforced by the 2rst and 24th Divs., should renew the attack from Loos to Hulluch. As a preliminary portions of the r 5th and 2rst Divs. were to recover the crest of Hill 70. However, as their attack started the Germans began a series of heavy counter-attacks from Bois Hugo southward, and succeeded in driving out of Bois Hugo the brigade of the 21st Div. which had just relieved the 2nd Bde. there. Profiting by this they pressed in on the left flank of the r 5th Div. and gradually forced it back. Farther S. the efforts of the 45th and 62nd Bdes. to carry Hill 70 were held up by wire which the Germans had rapidly put up, and by a redoubt on the crest. Moreover, when the main attack was delivered it was mainly by enfilade machine-gun fire from Bois Hugo that the 24th Div. was repulsed and driven back. All efforts of the 2rst Div. to recover Bois Hugo failed; the 1st Div. could effect nothing by itself, and it was largely the possession of Bois Hugo and of Puits r4 bis which finally enabled the Germans to thrust the defenders of Hill 70 down the hill in upon Loos. That village, however, was secured by the arrival of the 6th Ca y. Bde., and N. of Bois Hugo the Germans did not attempt to advance beyond the La Bassee road.

To the I. Corps also Sept. 26 had brought disappointment. Shortly before midnight (Sept. 25-26) a German attack broke through at the junction between the 7th and 9th Divs. and penetrated into the quarries, which passed back into German hands, the left of the 7th Div. recoiling to the old German support trenches. On its right the 7th Div. maintained all but its most advanced positions, and linked up with the 1st in front of Hulluch, but two attempts to recover the quarries failed. At Fosse 8 the 73rd Bde. of the 24th Div. (which had relieved the 26th Bde.) had great difficulty in holding its ground against counter-attacks. Fosse Alley, however, the intermediate line between the front system and Haisnes, which had been evacuated when the quarries were lost, was reoccupied and held by the 27th Bde., and the Germans had to pay highly for such ground as they regained. But they had now brought up several fresh divisions, and pressed their attacks hard, especially against the inexperienced 73rd Brigade. Before midday on Sept. 27 these troops, short of ammunition, food and water, and quite unable to reply effectively to the German bombers, were driven out of their positions. A dashing advance by the remnants of the 26th Bde. prevented the loss of the Hohenzollern, which had seemed imminent, but the recapture of Fosse 8 and the dump made Fosse Alley untenable and compelled its evacuation. Against the 7th Div., however, the Germans were less successful, and Sept. 27 saw the right of the position of the I. Corps fairly satisfactorily consolidated.

'While the I. Corps had been defending its gains, the IV. had been striving to make more. During the night of Sept. 26-27 the Guards Div. had relieve I the 21st and 24th opposite Hulluch and Bois Hugo. On the afternoon of the 27th its 2nd Bde. attacked Bois Hugo and Puits 14 bis, while its 3rd advanced through Loos against Hill 70. Both attacks were splendidly pressed and achieved valuable gains. Chalk Pit Wood was reached and secured, though Puits 14 bis could not be held against heavy counter-attacks, and a line was established just W. of the La Bassee road to link up with the 1st Div. opposite Hulluch. Similarly the 3rd Guards Bde. put Loos out of danger of recapture by making good a line just below the crest of Hill 70.

By the evening of Sept. 27 all hopes of a speedy and decisive success were gone. No break-through had been achieved, and Gen. Foch's attack also had been checked. Still the vigour with which the Germans hurled counter-attack after counterattack at the positions taken from them testified to the value they attached to them. The fighting was fiercest round the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which the 28th Div. took over from the 9th on Sept. 28 and held under considerable difficulties till Oct. 3, when a specially violent attack drove them from its ruins, though even then they retained a substantial portion of the 9th Div.'s gains of Sept. 25. On Oct. 5 the Guards relieved the 28th Div., and during the next week made several minor gains by bombing-attacks. Fighting was also heavy without producing any marked change in the tactical situation round the quarries on the frontage held in succession by the 7th, 2nd and 12th Divisions. From the Vermelles-Hulluch road to Loos the Germans were less aggressive, their only serious effort on this front being on Oct. 8, when they attacked in great force, only to be repulsed with very heavy losses especially by the 1st Div. at Chalk Pit Wood and by the French, who had taken over Loos itself on Sept. 30.

After this repulse the Germans made no more big counterattacks. By recovering the dump and Fosse 8 they had won back observation posts which overlooked much of the salient which the battle had produced. Sir John French was naturally 10th to abandon the effort to recover them, and decided to bring up the 46th (North Midland) Div. for a fresh attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, while simultaneously the 12th and 1 st Divs. should attack the quarries and Hulluch. The attack, delivered on Oct. 13, was only partially successful, but did result after heavy fighting in the recovery and retention of the bulk of the redoubt. The 12th Div. failed to retake the quarries, but made useful gains which improved its line. The 1st Div., however, once again found Hulluch too much for it, so that the net result of the attack did not encourage a repetition, and with this major operations in the battle area ended. The French continued attacking in Champagne for some weeks, though even there all prospect of decisive success was gone, while in Artois they had already abandoned their offensive.

When the results of the British offensive are set against the high hopes entertained before the attack it is excusable to write it down as a failure. The gain of ground was not worth the 50 to 60 thousand casualties incurred in its capture, but the German losses on the British front were almost as heavy, and the capture of over 20 guns and 3,000 prisoners was no small encouragement. It had been shown that the Germans could be driven from positions they believed impregnable. Moreover, valuable experience had been gained not only in the use of the new weapon, gas, but in staff work, in administrative arrangements and in tactics, experience to be turned to good account in 1916. At Loos an effort had been made to apply the lessons of Neuve Chapelle. It was partly because Neuve Chapelle had shown the dangers of retaining too close a hold on the immediate reserves that it had been arranged that the troops (immediate reserves included) were to press forward without limitation. Loos showed the advantages of the " limited objective " and of dealing with untaken portions of a hostile line rather by outflanking them than by renewing direct attacks; it also showed that the patterns of grenades in use in the British army were too varied and mostly unsuitable for wet weather, with other lessons major and minor. It is easy in the light of the experience gained at and after Loos to criticize the whole plan as too ambitious for the resources, human and material, at the commander-in-chief's disposal; to point out the unwisdom of employing raw troops in a great battle within a fortnight of their landing in France; to argue that, had the frontage attacked been narrower and the divisions disposed in greater depth, more immediate reserves would have been available. Still the balance remains on the side of gain. Loos inflicted heavy losses on the Germans; it was a foretaste of heavier losses in store for them. The performances of the 9th, 12th and 15th Divs. showed that the improvised " New Armies " of Britain were likely to prove a factor of decisive importance in the war.

(C. T. A.) (F) THE German Retreat To The Hindenburg Line, 1917. - In order to follow intelligently the operations which took place during the early part of 1917 it is necessary to understand thoroughly the situation which had arisen and the general atmosphere which had been created as a result of the prolonged fighting on the Somme. In Dec. 1916 Gen. Nivelle was appointed to the chief command of the French forces. He declared great confidence in his ability to break through the enemy's defences by the delivery of a mighty blow specially prepared, and immediately disclosed his project to the British commander-in-chief, Sir Douglas Haig. The plan was briefly as follows: (a) to deliver the main attack by three French armies on the Aisne front - one of these armies to be in reserve for purposes of exploitation; (b) to deliver a subsidiary attack by the British army on the Arras front; (c) to undertake minor actions between Reims and Arras to contain the enemy; (d) vigorous exploitation. In order to give effect to these proposals and to enable the French to undertake the major operations with large reserves, Gen. Nivelle's plan included the relief of French troops by the British as far S. as the Amiens-Roye road. The weakness of this plan, apart from the Russian revolution and release of German reserves, which could not be foreseen, lay in the imposition of the major task on the French armies, already exhausted by two years of heavy fighting and the strain of the defence of Verdun, while the British, at the height of their strength and vigour, instead of being trained and concentrated for a vigorous blow, were relegated to defensive work and the minor role. These operations were to take place as early as possible, and it was hoped that the respective attacks would be launched early in April. The Somme battles had evidently shaken the enemy seriously, and had caused his defensive front in the neighbourhood of the Ancre to become a pronounced and dangerous salient. Moreover, it was known that he was constructing a rearward line of defence, subsequently known as the Hindenburg Line, which would materially shorten his defensive front and thus release a number of divisions which could be moved into reserve.

Such was the position of affairs on Jan. I 1917. The maintenance of pressure on the enemy on the Ancre-Somme battlefront was now of immediate importance. Signs were not lacking that the enemy had considerably weakened, and his position in the Ancre salient was vulnerable and dangerous. After a period of bad weather it became possible during Jan. to undertake minor and local operations, which resulted in the capture of the Beaumont Hamel spur, thus opening up a wide field of view and observation for artillery fire. No time was lost in making use of this advantage. Indeed, it was essential to engage the enemy closely, whether it was his intention to retire voluntarily to some previously prepared position, or whether his defence was involuntarily weakening. The country on both banks of the Ancre consists in pronounced undulations with spurs running towards the stream from both north and south. Opportunity was offered for skill in the handling of comparatively small bodies of troops, in making use of the ground, and of cooperation both by movement and by fire. Making use of the tactical advantage obtained by possession of the Beaumont Hamel spur, the 63rd Div. carried out a successful operation early in Feb. which carried the British front forward on the N. bank of the river. This assisted towards the capture of a point on the S. bank, which gave observation into the upper valley of the Ancre and over the German gun positions. These hostile batteries which protected the Serre salient were forced to withdraw, thus weakening to a dangerous degree the German defences to the north. It was now possible to attack with advantage the Serre-Beauregard and Courcelette-Miraumont ridges, the possession of which, besides turning the German defences on the N. in the neighbourhood of Gommecourt and Monchy, would open up a further field of view up the valley of the Ancre, where many hostile batteries had been located. In order to gain this position an assault was delivered on the morning of Feb. 17 by the and, 18th and 63rd Divs. on both banks of the stream. On the N. bank the attack was completely successful, while on the S. bank considerable resistance was encountered. Nevertheless, the whole position was occupied shortly afterwards, and small detachments and patrols working forward succeeded in occupying the enemy's defences on a wide front from opposite Guedecourt to Serre, including the villages of Warlencourt and Miraumont as well as the Beauregard spur.

It had become increasingly evident that the German defence was weakening, and their troops were being gradually withdrawn, the first indications being on a narrow front in the valley of the Ancre, but now on a more considerable scale. The prolonged period of exceptional frost following on a wet autumn had frozen the ground to a great depth. The thaw, however, began in the third week of Feb.; the roads, disintegrated by the frost, now broke up, and the area of the 1916 battlefield became a quagmire. On the other hand the conditions of the weather favoured the defenders, who fell back on to fresh unbroken ground, and the succession of misty days covered their movements.

Notwithstanding these difficulties the British and Australian troops kept up constant pressure, and by the delivery of minor attacks drove the enemy from position to position, until by the end of Feb. the whole of the Ancre valley and the higher ground to the N., including the village of Gommecourt, fell into their hands. The enemy had now evidently fallen back into a previously prepared line of defence - the trench system known as the Le Transloy-Loupart line, cutting off the Ancre salient and covering the villages of Le Transloy, Grevillers, Achiet-lePetit and Bucquoy. It was possible that he would make a stand on this defensive line. If not, undoubtedly his withdrawal would be conducted on a more comprehensive scale altogether and on a wider front.

Owing to the heavy work required to be executed in rendering the roads passable, and moving forward guns, ammunition and supplies, in addition to the necessity for gaining ground to within assaulting distance of this defensive system, a delay of a week occurred before operations of a more serious character could be undertaken. On March I i and 12 the Le TransloyLoupart line was subjected to so effective a bombardment that on the morning of the 13th the enemy abandoned this strong position. Grevillers and Loupart wood were immediately occupied, and preparations put in hand to attack the enemy's next line of defence, which covered Bapaume and Achiet-le-Grand. For some time prior to this date indications had been observed of a further and wider extension of the German withdrawal. It had been ascertained that the Germans were preparing with feverish haste a new and powerful defensive system, the Hindenburg Line, which, branching off from the original defences near Arras, ran S. E. for 12 m. to Queant and thence passed W. of Cambrai in the direction of St. Quentin. The immediate object appeared to be to escape from the salient between Arras and Le Transloy, but it was also evident from the preparations the Germans were making on a grand scale, that they contemplated an eventual evacuation of the greater salient between Arras and the Aisne valley N.W. of Reims. The withdrawal to the Hindenburg defences would cause a very considerable contraction in the length of the line, with a consequent increase of the German reserves. It was evident that the Somme battles of 1916 had materially reduced his strength, and with the expected onslaughts on the western front, coupled with a Russian offensive on a grand scale, it was necessary for them to contract the front and conserve their strength.

Constant watch had accordingly been kept by the British along the whole front S. of Arras, strong patrols, kept alert and active, pushing forward here and there, with the result that St. Pierre Vast wood was occupied on March 16. Meanwhile information was received which indicated the reduction of the enemy's forces S. of the Somme, and pointed to the probability that his line in that sector was being held by rear-guard detachments supported by machine-guns, whose withdrawal might be expected at any moment.

It was evident that the enemy was withdrawing according to a carefully prepared plan along the entire front of recent operations and on both banks of the river Somme. Orders were accordingly given by the British G.H.Q., in conjunction with the French, for a general advance on the morning of March 17. Except at certain localities where detachments of infantry and machine-guns had been left to cover his retreat, there was little serious resistance to the advance, and that resistance was rapidly overcome.

On March 17 Chaulnes was captured by the 61st Div. and Bapaume by the and Australian Div., while further to the right the French entered Roye. On the following and subsequent days the advance continued, and the whole intricate system of German defences in this area, consisting of many miles of powerful well-wired trenches which had been constructed with immense labour, passed into the hands of the Allies.

On March 18 the British 48th Div. gained the important tactical position of Peronne, and Mont St. Quentin which lies above it. The possession of this locality at the angle of the Somme showed clearly that the enemy would not stand on the line of the river, for it outflanked that line to the south. The bridges over the Somme, which had been systematically destroyed, were temporarily and partially repaired with great rapidity, and the British troops, passing over, deployed into open country with patrols and cavalry thrown forward.

By this time the Allies' advance had reached a stage at which the increasing difficulty of maintaining the communications rendered it imperative to slacken the pace of the movement. Not only had the bridges over the river Somme been destroyed, and the roads rendered almost impassable both artificially and from the weather, but the wide belt of devastated ground over which the Somme battle had been fought offered immense difficulties to the passage of guns and transport. Moreover, in front lay an enemy whose armies were capable of launching a vigorous counter-offensive. Strong detachments of his infantry and cavalry occupied tactical points along the line of advance, serving to keep the enemy supplied with information and as a screen to his own movements. His guns, which had already been withdrawn to previously prepared positions, were available at any moment to cover and support a sudden counterstroke, while the conditions of the country across which the Allies were moving made the progress of their own artillery unavoidably slow. The bulk of the enemy's forces were known to be occupying a very formidable defensive system, upon which he could fall back should his counter-stroke fail. On the other hand the Allies, as they moved forward, 1-ft all prepared defences farther and farther behind them. In such circumstances the necessity for caution was obvious. In order to combat these dangers and difficulties, the Allies were compelled, at the various stages of the advance, to select and put into a state of defence successive lines of resistance, which the main bodies would occupy, and in which they could give battle in the event of a hostile riposte. Meanwhile advanced guards, patrols and reconnoitring detachments pushed ahead and maintained touch with the enemy, and roads, railways, bridges, telegraphs and telephones were constructed or restored with rapidity.

As the Allies approached the Hindenburg Line, the resistance of the enemy stiffened and the fighting for the various tactical localities became more severe. During the first week in April the British had almost reached the Hindenburg Line, and had gained possession of the villages of Lempire, Epehy, Metz-en-Couture, Lagnecourt, Noreuil, Croisilles, Henin-surCojeul and Beurains. The enemy was now withdrawn to his great defensive line, which he had taken months to prepare, shortening his front considerably and enabling him to bring several divisions into reserve. He had in front of him a devastated zone where the mounting of an Allied attack would present extreme difficulties, thereby releasing yet other troops from the guard of the trenches to pass into reserve.

(G) Battle Of Arras (April - May 1917). - At the close of 1916, and before the appointment of Gen. Nivelle to the command of the French forces, a general plan had been agreed upon by all the Allies to conduct a simultaneous offensive on all fronts. The British part in this offensive was to consist of a double attack along the Scarpe and Ancre valleys, to cut off the Gommecourt salient created as a result of the Somme fighting. The V. Army was to attack along the Ancre, the III. Army was to debouch from Arras along the Scarpe, while the I. Army (Canadian Corps) was to secure the left flank of these operations by seizing the Vimy ridge. Owing to the exhaustion of the French armies the main operations were to be conducted by the British, who would not press the attack unduly in the direction of Cambrai, but be prepared to switch rapidly to the N. and undertake further operations of greater dimensions in Flanders.

The appointment of Gen. Nivelle in Dec. 1916 to the chief command of the French, and the acceptance of his plan of offensive, dislocated the strategical plans for the British armies at this particular juncture.

The Nivelle plan gave the French the major role, as indicated earlier, namely, that of delivering a decisive blow from the Aisne front, while the British operations in Artois were to be of a subsidiary character. It is to be noted in this connexion that the extension of the front in relief of the French caused a reduction of power to the British which materially affected their operations throughout the remainder of the year. The Nivelle plan relied on the success of the main offensive by the French, but if that failed the subsequent operations would be seriously handicapped. This was a. matter of first-class importance, seeing that the French had already been overstrained while the British were reaching the height of their strength and efficiency. Apart from this, the actual tactical scheme and dispositions required little modification as a result of the acceptance of the Nivelle plan.

General Nivelle did not altogether approve of the plan of the British commander-in-chief, and urged that the attack on, the Vimy heights should be abandoned, and that the concentration should be effected farther S. on the Arras Ancre front, pointing out that the inclusion of Vimy would cause too wide an exten sion and dissipation of force. This point is of some interest as showing the difficulties which a commander has to face in the selection of his front of attack and objectives. Sir Douglas Haig had, however, given the closest attention to the various factors affecting the situation, and refused to give way. His arguments were mainly two: firstly, that the capture of the Vimy ridge was essential to secure the left of his operations, and secondly, that any attack mounted S. of Arras, and S. of the point where the Hindenburg Line hinged on the main German front, would be delivered into a pocket or would be entirely dislocated by a voluntary withdrawal of the enemy from the Gommecourt salient, whereas the German forces were bound to stand and fight for the Vimy ridge. The British commanderin-chief scented the retreat of the Germans to the Hindenburg Line and laid his plans to meet that eventuality. The result was that even after the German retreat little or no alteration was necessary. Had he, however, given way to the pressure placed upon him and mounted his attack from Arras to Gommecourt, the operation, which was required by Gen. Nivelle to draw in the hostile reserves and pave the way for the main French attack on the Aisne, could not have taken place at all.

The task of the British was to attract as large forces of the enemy as possible and so reduce the opposition to the French. As soon as the German retreat developed, all those troops and heavy artillery which were not required with the V. Army in its advance from the Ancre were diverted to the III. and I. Armies in order to strengthen their attacks to the utmost.

The preparations for a great offensive, where reliance is placed on artillery to destroy the enemy's defences and reduce his fire-power to such a point as to enable a successful advance to be made, are extremely long and arduous. When transport requirements on the Arras front were first brought under consideration, the neighbourhood was served by two single lines of railway leading to Arras, the combined capacity of which was less than half the requirements. Considerable constructional work, therefore, both of standardand narrow-gauge railway, had to be undertaken to meet the programme. Roads had to be improved and adapted; new roads had to be constructed, and material massed forward for construction across the enemy's defences as soon as the troops advanced. For this latter purpose use was made both in this and in later offensives of plank roads. These were built chiefly of heavy beech slabs laid side by side, and were found to be of great utility, being capable of rapid construction over almost any nature of ground. By these means the accumulation of the vast stocks of munitions and stores of all kinds required for the offensive, and their distribution to the troops, were made possible. Hutting and other accommodation for the troops concentrated in the area had to be provided in great quantity; an adequate water-supply had to be guaranteed. Very extensive mining and tunnelling operations were also carried out. In particular, advantage was taken of the existence of a large system of underground quarries and cellars in Arras and its suburbs to provide safe quarters for a great number of troops. Electric light was installed in these caves and cellars, which were linked together by tunnels, and the whole connected by long subways with the trench systems E. of the town.

A problem peculiar to the launching of a great offensive from a town arose from the difficulty of ensuring the punctual debouching of troops and the avoidance of confusion and congestion in the streets both before the assault and during the progress of the battle. This problem was met by the most careful and complete organization of routes.

Practically the labour of the whole of the troops was required to carry through all this work, and while this immense task was proceeding, the British IV. and V. Armies were vigorously pursuing the enemy to the Hindenburg Line, and the French front was in process of being relieved as far S. as the AmiensRoye road. All this placed a heavy strain on the British troops.

Meanwhile, during the first three months of 1917, negotiations of fundamental importance were proceeding between the high commands and the Governments of France and Great Britain, touching on the principle of unity of command. General Nivelle desired to secure the command of all the forces involved, both British and French. Certain differences of opinion early declared themselves between the British and French commanders-in-chief. These were chiefly in the first instance in connexion with the date of attack, and the extent to which the French troops in front line should be relieved. The transportation service and the Nord railway were not equal to the work of operations on so great a scale. at so early a date as that proposed by Nivelle; and in view of the fact that the British commanderin-chief desired to give his troops some rest and training and was somewhat sceptical as to the degree of success which would be attained by the French, was desirous of limiting the extension of his front to the Amiens-Villers Bretonneux road. A temporary agreement on Jan. 1 that the attack should take place as early as possible, and that the French should be relieved as far as the above road by the end of Jan., did not satisfy Gen. Nivelle; the latter referred the whole question to his Government and, indirectly, to the British War Cabinet, with the result that a Cabinet meeting was held in London on Jan. 15 at which both Sir D. Haig and Gen. Nivelle were present. The conclusions arrived at were as follows: (a) the British to relieve the French forces as far S. as the Amiens - Roye road, relief to be completed by March 1; (b) the offensive to commence on April 1 at latest; (c) vigorous exploitation to be undertaken by all the forces both French and British, if necessary. The French troops in front line were accordingly relieved to the Amiens - Roye road, and preparations pushed forward to deliver the attack at the earliest possible date. But the transport difficulties had become so acute that, notwithstanding the fact that every available British soldier was utilized for railway construction and other work, a serious breakdown in the Nord railway system appeared to be inevitable, and the matter had to be referred to the French Government with a view to obtaining greater facilities. Further negotiations in regard to the problem of command took place secretly between the British and French Governments, and materialized in the Calais conference on Feb. 26 and 27 1917. This conference had originally been summoned to discuss the question of transportation. There were present: AI. Briand (premier), Gen. Lyautey (Minister of War), Gen. Nivelle (French C.-in-C.), Mr. Lloyd George (British Prime Minister), Gen. Robertson (Cl.G.S.), Sir D. Haig (British C.-in-C.), Gen. Kiggell (C.G.S.). A scheme was set before the conference by the French Government for the establishment of an Allied G.H.Q. and the appointment of a French generalissimo, and the breaking up of the British divisions to form an "amalgam" with the French troops. General Robertson and Sir D. Haig were in complete ignorance of this proposal until the cut-anddried scheme was produced; the British Prime Minister, however, while opposing the French proposal to break up the British army and form an " amalgam " with French brigades, directed these two officers to draw up a scheme of command, by which the control of operations in the coming battle would be solely in Gen. Nivelle's hands, and the British army under his orders. This was the decision of the War Cabinet. The scheme was accordingly drawn up in the course of the morning of Tuesday Feb. 27, so that when the conference met at 11:30 A.M. on that day, discussion was limited to questions of detail. Finally the French War Committee and British War Cabinet agreed to the following arrangements: - .

(1) The British War Cabinet recognizes that the general direction of the campaign should be in the hands of the French commanderin-chief.

(2) The British commander-in-chief to conform his plans to those of the French during the preparation and progress of the projected campaign.

(3) Within the limits of (2) the British commander-in-chief will be permitted to utilize his own resources and forces in the manner which he considers most desirable.

(4) In regard to (2) an exception will be made in a case where he considers that such action would endanger the safety of the army or prejudice its success; in that case a report shall be made, together with the reasons, for the information of the War Cabinet.

(5) The respective Governments will decide the date at which the operations referred to in (1) and (2) shall be deemed to be at an end.

As all students of war agree, within the army of a combatant nation, unity of control is essential to secure the most effective execution of military operations. In theory, it is equally desirable in all circumstances. There is, however, a difficulty inherent in applying the principle of unity of control to Allied nations. This difficulty lies in the incidence of responsibility. For example, if the British armies are placed under the command of a French general, the British commander cannot be held responsible to the nation. The responsibility for the British armies cannot devolve on the French commander, and must therefore devolve on the British Government. At the Calais conference, however, an effort was made by the British War Cabinet to make the field-marshal commanding the British forces retain responsibility by instructing him to conform his preparations to the views of the French commander, except in so far as he considered that this would endanger the safety of the army or prejudice the success of its operations.

The battle of Arras was the first occasion on which the experiment was tried of securing a form of unity of command, and after the conference of Calais the British forces to be engaged in the battle were placed, within the limitations noted above, under the general control of Nivelle. Certain differences of opinion, however, still existed, and the whole question was again referred to the Governments, with the result that the two commanders-in-chief and two Cabinets met in London on March 13 in order to define the position more clearly.

During the month of March, as previously narrated, the Germans continued to withdraw to the already prepared Hindenburg Line, followed up and pressed by British troops, until early in April they were established in positions covering that line. On the British side, the extensive preparations necessary were pushed ahead as quickly as possible and so far as the available transport facilities permitted. The general plan agreed upon was that the British attack should be launched as early as possible in April and that the French main attack on the Aisne should follow two or three days later. This was to permit and induce the German reserves to be drawn into the British battle and towards the British front, and thus enable the main attack by the French to be delivered with greater prospects of success and exploitation., The British actually launched their assault on April 9, but for reasons of unfavourable weather the French postponed their attack until April 16. Prior to the offensive the new German lines of defence on the British front ran in a general north-westerly direction from St. Quentin to the village of Tilloy-les-IIoffiaines just S.E. of Arras. Thence the German original trench systems continued northwards across the valley of the Scarpe to the Vimy ridge which, rising to a height of 475 ft., dominates the country eastwards. The front attacked by the III. and I. Armies on the morning of April 9 extended from just N. of the village of Croisilles, S.E. of Arras, to just S. of Givenchy-en-Gohelle at the ncrthern foot of the Vimy ridge, a front of nearly 15 miles. The enemy's defences comprised the normal powerful defensive front consisting of three separate and heavily wired trench systems, and in addition, from 3 to 5 m. further E. a new defensive system, known as the Drocourt - Queant line, which in fact was a northward extension of the Hindenburg Line, branching from that line at Queant.

The great strength of these defences demanded very thorough artillery preparation, and this in turn could only be carried out effectively with the aid of the air service. A greater mass of artillery, both guns and howitzers, was used for preparation in proportion to the front engaged than had yet been available in any previous British attack. Three weeks prior to the attack the systematic cutting of the enemy's wire was commenced, while the heavy artillery searched the enemy's back areas and communications. Night firing, wire cutting and bombardment of hostile trenches, strong points and billets continued steadily and with increasing intensity on the whole battle-front till a few days before the assault when the general bombardment was opened. During this latter period extensive gas discharges were carried out and frequent raids undertaken by day and night along the whole front of attack.

Aircraft were incessantly at work during the whole of this time not only in air fighting and directing the artillery fire, but also in photographing the enemy's defences so as to ascertain the extent of damage effected and the best means of approach for the infantry. Much intelligence and information was gleaned from these photographs as to the progress of the preparation, and from the raids as to the condition of the enemy, and any modifications in regard to his method of holding his defences.

The general object of the attack was to engage and absorb the maximum number of hostile troops; the general plan was to secure the high ground at Monchy-le-Preux and the Vimy ridge and to bring the V. Army into effective operation on the southern flank of the battle; the general method of attack was a succession of comparatively short and deliberate advances, the separate stages of which were arranged to correspond approximately with the enemy's successive trench systems. As each stage was reached a short pause was to take place according to a prepared time-table to enable the troops detailed for the attack on the next objective to form up for the assault.

Tanks were allotted to each corps for specific tasks, such as the capture of the powerful redoubts of Telegraph Hill and the Harp (just S. of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines) and Railway Triangle, a stronghold formed by the junction of the Lens and Douai railway lines E. of Arras. The whole scheme of attack along the entire 15-mile front was carefully coordinated. A special feature in the operation was the debouching of the troops to the assault directly from the town of Arras, the subterranean passages and caves of which had been prepared so as to harbour the reserve troops and enable them to pass protected to the trench systems, and so to the assault.

The troops engaged in the attack were as follows (from S. to N.): III. Army (Gen. Sir E. H. H. Allenby), VII. Corps (21st, 30th, 56th, and 14th Divs.), VI. Corps (3rd, 12th, 15th, and 37th Divs.), XVII. Corps (9th, 4th, 34th, and 51st Divs.), I. Army (Gen. Sir H. S. Horne), Canadian Corps, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divs., and 13th Bde. (5th British Division). In all there were 17 divisions, with 989 heavy guns and 1,890 field pieces. In addition the Cavalry Corps was brought forward behind the III. Army, in case the development of the battle should give rise to an opportunity for the employment of mounted troops.

The general attack on April 9 was launched at 5:30 A.M. under cover of a heavy and effective artillery barrage; the infantry advanced everywhere, and within 40 minutes the whole of the German first line system had been stormed and captured, except at the northern extremity of the Vimy ridge. At 7:30 A.M. the advance was resumed according to programme; more severe fighting took place in view of the greater opposition encountered. Several strong points and localities were stubbornly held by the enemy, but by 12 noon the whole of these and all the second objectives with the exception of the railway triangle had fallen, from Neuville Vitasse as far N. as La Folic farm. As always happens in such a battle, the enemy's troops managed to retain certain tactical localities. Meanwhile the artillery was brought forward to support the attack on the third objectives. Owing to the long range the wire in front of the enemy's third trench system had not been effectively cut in many places; nevertheless good progress was made, and many batteries were captured.

The battle now inevitably became more ragged, owing to the increasing opposition and to the local modification of plans necessitated by the unexpected occurrences inseparable from the battlefield. South of the Scarpe, St. Martin and Feuchy Chapel on the Arras - Cambrai road were captured. In the Scarpe valley the 15th Scottish Div. after a long struggle stormed the railway triangle, and moving rapidly forward captured the village of Feuchy. The 37th Div., hitherto in reserve, whose role it was to pass through the first-line troops to the assault of the high ground and village of Monchy-le-Preux, endeavoured to widen the breach made in the enemy's third line of defence in order to carry out its task, but was held up by the wire. South of the Scarpe, the enemy's third line had been captured in places, but he still retained possession of the greater portion of it, together with the high ground of Orange Hill and Monchy-le-Preux. North of the Scarpe practically the whole of the day's programme was carried through. On the right the 4th Div. in reserve passed through the troops in front line, and according to plan captured the village of Fampoux, thus making a great breach in the enemy's third system of defence. In the centre the Canadian Corps stormed the Vimy heights, entrenched itself on the eastern slopes, and sent patrols out along the front. On the left the 4th Canadian Div., 'encountering violent opposition at Hill 145 on the northern extremity of the ridge, was compelled to postpone the attack till the following day.

The operations of April 9 had been eminently successful, in spite of heavy squalls of snow and rain; and large numbers of the enemy's troops and guns had been captured.

During the night of the 9th to 10th the 37th Div. made progress through the break in the German third line S. of the Scarpe, advancing to the northern slopes of Orange Hill; and on the morning of the 10th about noon the advance became general, the whole of the enemy's third line S. of the Scarpe being reduced, and the 37th Div. reached the north-western edge of Monchy-le-Preux. A great struggle then centred round this village, and all efforts of the infantry to seize it directly, and of the cavalry to pass around either flank of it, failed, chiefly owing to the lack of effective artillery support due to the long range and the rapidity of the advance. On the morning of the 11th, however, assisted by tanks, the fight was resumed, and by 9 A.M. the village was captured, and subsequently many counterattacks repulsed.

Meanwhile the Germans had been stubbornly defending the Cojeul valley and the Hindenburg defences at their junction with the old third line, a vital part of the front, where the open forward slopes, swept from end to end by the enemy's machineguns, rendered any advance extremely difficult. In this area an operation of a bold and hazardous character was undertaken on the morning of the 11th, which was nearly successful. At 4: 3 o A.M., in conjunction with an attack by the right of the III. Army on Hemnil and Wancourt, the V. Army (4th Australian and 62nd Div.), assisted by tanks, made a gallant effort to breach the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt. The execution of the attack, being over a wide extent of open country, was exceedingly difficult;. Australian troops, however, penetrated as far as Riencourt-lez-Cagnicourt and the 62nd Div. reached Bullecourt, but owing to determined opposition and the failure of the attacks by the right of the III. Army these positions could not be maintained. Had both attacks been successful and the two armies joined hands forward, a very wide breach in the enemy's defences in an important area of the battlefield would have been effected with far-reaching results. It was not till the morning of April 12 that the 21st and 56th Divs. succeeded in capturing Hemnil and Wancourt.

North of the Scarpe much fighting of an indeterminate nature took place at Roeux and the neighbourhood on this day, but at the extreme northern extremity of the battlefield the 4th Canadian Div. and 24th Div. secured the whole of the important positions on the flank of the Vimy ridge and astride the Souchez river at the " Pimple " and " Bois en hache." The Germans now began to withdraw from the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge, and British and Canadian patrols moved forward until by the evening of April 14 a line had been reached N. of the river Scarpe from Roeux to E. of Bailleul-Hirondelle Wood and Lievin to the old front line at the Double Crassier.

On the right by the evening of the 14th the attacking troops had fought their way forward with great difficulty along the Hindenburg Line as far as Fontaine-les-Croisilles and Wancourt Tower, while farther N. many counter-attacks on Monchy-lePreux were repulsed.

The main offensive by the III. and V. Armies terminated on the 14th; the artillery support was becoming inadequate, and the troops in front line required relief. A remarkable success had been gained; the British front line had been moved forward some 4 m., and some 13,000 prisoners and 200 guns had been captured. It was not possible, however, to break off the battle, seeing that the French offensive was on the point of being launched, and it was important that the full pressure of the British operations should be maintained in order to assist it. Much had already been accomplished; the enemy had been compelled to pour men and guns into the breach, and a large hostile concentration in the battlefield was in process of being effected.

The only offensive action taken by the Germans during this period in this area occurred on April 15, when they attacked the British position from Hermies to Noreuil with 16 battalions. An initial success, in which some of the British battery positions were overrun, was at once neutralized by a counterstroke which restored the line.

On April 16 the French launched their main offensive on the Aisne. The decisive results which had been looked for were not achieved; there was no rapid break through or exploitation by a reserve army of manoeuvre. On the contrary, ragged fighting took place which continued until May 5, and the French armies, worn out by more than two years of heavy fighting, were in no condition to sustain an exhausting offensive. The unified command was in the hands of a French general who had planned and conducted operations which proved to be unsuccessful. From April 15 to May 5 the British continued their operations on the Arras - Vimy front at the request of the French and in order to carry out the role of absorbing the enemy's reserves. During this period attacks were executed by the British on April 23 and 28 and on May 3 and 5, with the result that the line was pushed forward to include Quemappe-Gavrelle and Arleux, and some 6,000 additional prisoners and 50 guns were taken. On May 5 the great offensive operations on the Aisne and Scarpe were brought to a close, and on May 15 Gen. Nivelle was relieved of his command. This brought to naught the effort to obtain unity of command, and the operations provided a warning as to the dangers involved where armies of different nationalities are concerned.

Such was the story of a great and successful British effort under conditions of abnormal difficulty. The Russian Revolution had declared itself, the French armies had broken down, the enemy was recovering his reserve power, and the period of the year was getting late for the transference of operations elsewhere. The British field-marshal commander-in-chief then decided immediately that it was necessary to continue on the offensive and to transfer the theatre of operations to the north.

THE Relief Offensive In Front Of Lens. - The great British offensive in Flanders was launched on July 31 1917 and continued to be pressed throughout the autumn. Towards the middle of Aug. a slight improvement took place in the weather, and advantage was taken of this to deliver the second attack E. of Ypres. As it was desirable to prevent the enemy from weakening the remainder of the front so as to effect a greater concentration in Flanders, it was desirable and even necessary to threaten and undertake operations of a minor character at various points to pin the enemy's reserves. A highly successful operation was carried out in the neighbourhood of Lens, and the threat to this town undoubtedly had the effect of preventing the enemy from concentrating the whole of his attention and resources on the main battle-front.

At 4:25 A.M. on Aug. 15 the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divs. attacked on a front of 4,000 yd. S.E. and E. of Loos. The objectives consisted of the strongly fortified Hill 70, which had been reached, but not held, in the battle of Loos in Sept. 1915, and the mining suburbs of Cite Ste. Elisabeth, Cite St. Emile, and Cite St. Laurent together with Bois Rase and half Bois Hugo. The observation from Hill 70 had been very useful to the enemy, and in the possession of the British, would materially increase their command over the defences of Lens. Practically the whole of these objectives were gained rapidly at light cost, and in exact accordance with plan. Only at the farthest limit of the advance a short length of German trench W. of Cite St. Auguste resisted the first assault. This position was again attacked on the afternoon of the following day and captured after a fierce struggle lasting far into the night. A number of local counter-attacks on the morning of Aug. 15 were repulsed, and in the evening a powerful attack delivered across the open by a German reserve division was broken up with heavy loss. In addition to the enemy's other casualties, 1,120 from three German divisions were captured by the British. Thus not only was the British position improved but three German divisions, which might have been used in roulement on the Flanders front, were severely handled, and the enemy received a lesson which would prevent him from unduly weakening the defensive fronts.

THE Battle Of Cambrai (Nov. - Dec., 1917). - The repeated attacks delivered by the British in Flanders over a period of more than three months had brought about a large concentration of the enemy's forces in that area, with a consequent reduction of his strength and garrisons in other sectors of his front. The British object in the operations at Cambrai, which took place on Nov. 20 1917, was to gain a local success by a surprise attack at a point where the enemy did not expect it, and on a front which had already been weakened, and thus disarrange the enemy's plans of withdrawing troops from France to operate in Italy. The sector opposite Carnbrai had been carefully selected as the most suitable. The ground there was, on the whole, favourable for the employment of tanks which were to play an important part in the enterprise. If, after breaking through the German defence systems on this front, the high ground at Bourlon could be secured and a defensive flank established facing E., and opportunity should be created of exploiting the situation towards the N.W., the capture of Cambrai itself was subsidiary.

As a result of the pressure in Flanders and the Russian Revolution, large German forces had already been brought from the Russian front, partly in exchange for exhausted divisions and partly as additional reinforcements. Moreover, it was certain that heavy German reinforcements would continue to be railed to the western front during the winter. These troops would be largely utilized to strengthen the weakened sector, and if the opportunity, which existed, to deliver a surprise attack at an early date under favourable conditions were not taken advantage of, it would certainly lapse. Against this argument in favour of immediate action must be weighed the fact that the conditions of the Flanders struggle had severely taxed the strength of the British forces, and that the losses, which had not yet been made good, had been heavy.

On the other hand the resources required for the operation were not great, seeing that the force to be employed must be small, for, owing to the requirements of surprise and secrecy, any considerable concentration of troops would be impossible to maintain. The success of the enemy's operations in Italy, too, added force to the arguments in favour of undertaking the operation; although the means available had been reduced by the despatch of troops to the Italian front, the situation on that front was critical, the Italians having been driven back between Oct. 24 and Nov. io from the Isonzo to the Piave.

After consideration of these factors, it was decided, by the British command, to undertake the operation, and the execution was entrusted to the III. Army. The general plan of attack was to dispense with previous artillery preparation, and to depend on tanks, of which there would be nearly 500 available, to break down the enemy's wire and cover the infantry advance. No previous abnormal artillery fire was to take place and no registration of guns or any action which might indicate to the enemy that an attack was impending. The infantry was specially trained to work in combination with tanks, and the whole operation depended for success on secrecy and on bold, determined and rapid action.

The German defences on the selected front between Vendhuille on the Scheldt canal and the river Sensee comprised the three systems constituting the Hindenburg Line (greatly improved during the course of the year) with fortified posts in advance, such for example as La Vacquerie and the north-eastern corner of Havrincourt Wood. Behind this again were two other defensive lines known as the Hindenburg Reserve Line and the Beaurevoir - Masnieres Line. That portion of this front which lies between the Scheldt canal and the Canal du Nord offered an opportunity for a tank drive to the N. which would include the capture of the important position about Bourlon. The full force of tanks together with five divisions (12th, loth, 6th, 51st, 62nd) and a portion of another (36th) were allotted to this front extending from Gonnelieu on the right to Havrincourt Wood on the left. Two divisions were, moreover, to be held in reserve behind this front ready to move forward, and the cavalry was to be at hand ready to exploit a success towards the N. and turn the enemy's defences from the rear. In order to make the front of attack more imposing, to deceive and hold the enemy, gas and smoke attacks, dummy attacks with dummy tanks, artillery fire, raids and subsidiary attacks were to be carried out on an extensive scale both on southern and northern flanks.

All preparations were carried out with the greatest secrecy, and during the evening prior to the battle troops and tanks were moved forward into positions of assembly, great care being taken to muffle the noise to the utmost. This was rendered particularly difficult owing to the hard and frosty weather. Each tank was provided with a compressed brushwood fascine some 8 ft. in depth, for the purpose of assisting it in crossing the main Hindenburg trench, which was of abnormal dimensions.

At 6:20 A.M. on the morning of Nov. 20 1917 the tanks and troops moved forward to the attack on a front of about 6 m. from E. of Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord opposite Hermies. At the same hour the subsidiary and feint attacks took place. On the principal front of attack the tanks rolled on, protected by a smoke barrage from the enemy's artillery. The Hindenburg Line was rapidly overrun. The 12th Div. after severe fighting at Lateau Wood captured the Bonavis spur. The 10th Div. captured La Vacquerie and stormed Welsh ridge, while the 6th Div. entered Ribecourt. The surprise was complete, and the enemy surrendered in considerable numbers. The 29th Div. which had been in reserve moved forward and, passing through the 6th and 10th Divs., entered Masnieres and captured Marcoing and Neuf Wood, securing the passages of the canal at both villages and the bridge intact at the latter. In this neighbourhood it was not possible to enlarge the footing gained on the E. bank of the canal, owing to the arrival of hostile reinforcements in the neighbourhood of Rumilly where severe fighting took place.

Meanwhile the 62nd and 51st Divs. attacked the Flesquieres ridge, the latter being stubbornly opposed and seriously delayed by the defence of that place. The 62nd Div. however pressed forward and captured Graincourt, its advanced troops entering Anneux. Flesquieres continued to hold out throughout the day against the 51st Div., but troops of the 6th Div. entered Noyelles before nightfall. But for the delay at Flesquieres and the destruction of the bridge at Masnieres the operations would have been completely successful, and would have opened up a great field for exploitation on the following day.

On the morning of the 21st the attack was resumed. But little progress was made on the 1lasnieres - Rumilly front. Farther W. the village of Flesquieres, turned from the N., fell at 8 A.M., and the 51st and 62nd Divs. with tanks and cavalry moving rapidly forward captured Cantaing and FontaineNotre-Dame, and reached the southern edge of Bourlon Wood. Throughout the day infantry and cavalry were heavily engaged at Noyelles. On the extreme left the 36th Div. cleared the Hindenburg Line as far N. as Moeuvres.

By the evening of the 2 st the British had gained possession of the Bonavis spur, a bridgehead E. of the Canal de l'Escaut including Masnieres and Noyelles, the whole of the Flesquieres ridge and the ground to the N. as far as the southern edge of Bourlon Wood including Cantaing and Fontaine-Notre-Dame.

It was now nearly 48 hours after the commencement of the attack, and hostile reinforcements might be expected; at the same time it was necessary from the lie of the ground to decide whether to go on and attack the heights of Bourlon or to withdraw to the Flesquieres ridge. Owing to the importance of the possession of the Bourlon heights and the visible signs of withdrawal of the enemy, having regard also to the situation in Italy, it was decided to proceed with the attack.

On the 22nd, while the British were carrying out reliefs with a view to the prosecution of the attack, the enemy recaptured Fontaine. On the 23rd the 40th Div. with tanks attacked and captured the whole of Bourlon Wood, but the attempts to secure Bourlon and Fontaine, after a severe struggle, failed.

The struggle for Bourlon resulted in several days of fierce fighting. On the morning of the 24th the Germans counterattacked and were repulsed; in the afternoon the British attacked, captured the village and beat off a counter-attack, but the resistance on the Fontaine - Bourlon - Moeuvres front was very considerable. On the 25th and 26th the enemy again counterattacked in force and succeeded in recapturing Bourlon and the wooded spur between that place and Fontaine. The situation in the wood was now somewhat difficult; on the 27th an organized British attack succeeded in improving the position in the wood, but the troops which at one time had entered Bourlon and Fontaine were obliged to fall back again.

During the 28th and 29th no attacks took place, the troops which had been heavily engaged were relieved, and on the whole front efforts were made to strengthen the position gained. During the ten days' fighting io,50o prisoners and 142 guns were taken, but the main objective, the Bourlon locality, which would turn the whole of the enemy's positions S. of the Sensee canal and river Scarpe, had not been secured. This was primarily due to the initial failure at Flesquieres village.

In the last days of Nov. signs were not lacking on the whole of the front between Vendhuille and Bourlon that the Germans intended to regain the positions which they had lost. On the whole of this front they had carried out artillery registration, but the importance of Bourlon to them and the massing of their troops indicated that their main attack would be delivered on the Bourlon front.

Measures were taken accordingly by the British command; this front was strengthened, while five divisions were disposed on the right flank from Cantaing to the Bauteux ravine. Farther S. the original front was held as before, the frontage being wide for the number of troops available. The Guards were in reserve about Villers Guislan, the 62nd Div. on the Bapaume - Cambrai road and the first Div. assembling in rear, while four cavalry divisions were available in the neighbourhood. Practically all these troops had already been heavily engaged. All troops were warned to expect an attack.

On Nov. 30 the Germans attacked about 8 A.M., delivering their main assault, as anticipated, on the Bourlon front, and a subsidiary attack on the Cantaing - Vendhuille front. The former was successfully repulsed after the most severe fighting. but on the Bonavis spur and in the direction of Villers Guislan the Germans made rapid progress. On this latter front their attack was in the nature of a surprise assault, without any previous bombardment, but accompanied by a hail of gas and smoke shells and bombs. Villers Guislan, Bonavis, Gonnelieu and Gouzeaucourt rapidly fell into their hands, but their advance was stayed by the resolute action of the Guards, assisted by tanks, which resulted in the recapture of Gouzeaucourt and part of the ridge between that place and Gonnelieu, while the troops holding La Vacquerie succeeded in keeping their opponents at bay. Meanwhile on the N., from Fontaine to Moeuvres, the enemy's main assault, delivered between 9 and io A.M., and preceded by a heavy bombardment, was repulsed with heavy losses and at close quarters. This assault was repeated during the morning and afternoon, but all attempts of the Germans to gain any important success either on this front or about Masnieres failed completely. On the following days, Dec. i, 2 and 3, there was severe fighting in the open in the Gonnelieu neighbourhood, with the result that the Germans progressed in the direction of Villers Plouich, capturing the hamlet of La Vacquerie and thus rendering the position of the British troops defending Masnieres and Marcoing extremely precarious. Further fighting continued during the next few days, but the Germans' strength was exhausted and their losses had been severe.

It now became necessary for the British command to decide whether to embark on another offensive battle on a large scale, or to withdraw to a more compact line on the Flesquieres ridge. Although this decision involved giving up important positions won with great gallantry, withdrawal was undoubtedly the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly on the night of Dec. 4-5 the evacuation of the positions N. of the Flesquieres ridge was commenced, and on the morning of the 7th the withdrawal was completed successfully without interference from the enemy. Captured guns and material which could not be removed were destroyed.

The new line taken up corresponded roughly with the old Hindenburg Line from N.E. of La Vacquerie, N. of Ribecourt and Flesquiêres to the Canal du Nord 1 m. N. of Havrincourt, i.e. about 2 to 22 m. in front of the line held on Nov. 20 at the commencement of the operations.

These operations undoubtedly had a direct influence on the Italian campaign, by diverting reinforcements and suspending operations at a critical moment when the Allies were making their first stand on the line of the river Piave.

In the offensive it had ben hoped by a powerful tank attack and surprise to break and :urn the enemy's defences where he was least prepared, and hus created a favourable tactical situation which would p1a° him at a great disadvantage. The failure to secure immediatel) the Bourion locality was responsible for the inability to create sich a situation, and this was due to the accident at Flesquieres,where one German officer handling a field gun put a number of he attacking tanks out of action by direct hits. Success had bees very nearly complete.

During the whole of these Operations the French were prepared to cooperate with a special force which had been brought forward in readiness, shoull an opportunity have occurred for exploitation. These troops, with :he exception of a few guns which were utilized for defensive purposes subsequent to the German counter-offensive, ware notbrought into action and were eventually withdrawn.

These operations in the neghbouhood of Cambrai should be regarded as an incident in,the gnat four and a half years' battle - a surprise stroke folbwed b: a rapid counterstroke - in which although the British did not achieve their tactical object, the balance of advantage remained to a large extent in their hands. The Germans, tiough successful in their counteroffensive, were apparently not so successful as they had hoped to be.

The main objects of the attack had been attained. The initiative was retained ad the enemy's plans deranged. German reinforcements were prevented from being despatched to the Italian front. TheenenT had also been prevented from delivering an attack on the bench front, which would undoubtedly have produced disastrot results. (J. H. D.) lee 2.700). - As the " Arts and Crafts " movement grew out of impulses deeper than were, perhaps, apparent in its first art tic issues, it has continued to react in other directions. In th domain of general education its enlivening influence has llped to insure the full recognition of handwork, an education) medium that was in some quarters tending to lapse into a nechanical exercise, as a most fruitful means of artistic expression. This most important development was a reflection he art workers' direct efforts in education, which aimed at acomplete reorganization of the technical and artistic training c young artisans on lines that were, in effect, a revival, so fa: as was compatible with modern conditions, of the ancient, vii tried system of master-craftsman and apprentice. Although actually the first to put these principles into practice the 'echnical Education Board of the L.C.C.

(whose functions are now absorbed by the London Education Committee) was the first public body in England to establish a school solely for this purpose. The Central School of Arts and Crafts, opened by the L.C.C. in 1896, at first under the joint direction of Sir George Frampton and Prof. W. R. Lethaby, afterwards under the latter alone, began the combined teaching of designing and making, of craftsmanship in the fullest sense of the word, in workshops specially equipped for the production of finished work of the finest type. The methods originated in the Central School were soon adopted in other places; new schools and classes rapidly sprang up in London and elsewhere, and students from the colonies, from almost every European country, from the United States and Japan, carried its influence abroad. In 1900, when the Board of Education reorganized the training of teachers for State-aided schools of art, the courses for the diplomas in design and handicrafts at the Royal College of Art, South Kensington, had been taken over, in addition to his other responsibilities, by Prof. W. R. Lethaby. The students of the college, now trained in the practice of various crafts, have, as principals or teachers of provincial schools, infused a new spirit into the study of design wherever they have gone. In the field of art education the genius, knowledge and enthusiasm of Prof. W. R. Lethaby, follower of Morris, and one of the most prominent figures in the arts and crafts movement, have been factors of far-reaching influence.

Organization

Although the activities of craftsmen were necessarily restricted, or diverted into unusual channels, during the greater part of the ten years from 1910-20, the period as a whole showed progress in many directions. Local organizations held exhibitions in most of the great cities of the United Kingdom and Ireland, and in many smaller centres. These, together with the steady growth of groups of workers associated together in the practice of some particular craft, or crafts, and the ever-increasing number of skilled individuals, greatly multiplied facilities for the exhibition, sale and purchase of attractive, serviceable goods. Much new work came to the Arts and Crafts Exhibition Society, the parent body, whose periodic shows fulfil a useful purpose in maintaining a high standard of current effort - their main object. The exhibitions of the Home Arts and Industries Association, an amateur forerunner of the arts and crafts movement, whose voluntary workers organize classes in village crafts; of the Women's Guild of Arts; and those of the more recently established National Federation of Women's Institutes, amongst others, have done useful work within their various, more restricted spheres of action.

The tenth exhibition of the Arts and Crafts Society, held in the New Grosvenor Gallery in 1912, continued in the form made familiar in previous years, gathering together into convenient focus a varied assortment of the best achievement of the day. This in some measure prepared the way for a new and important departure. In 1913 the then recently established Exhibitions Branch of the Board of Trade included arts and crafts in the British section of a foreign international exhibition for the first time. The section organized by the Board at Ghent may be said to have recognized the value of the movement as a national asset, and to have introduced officially. work of the kind usually seen in London to a European public. Here an attempt was made to unite the various exhibits into a concerted scheme, and to place different groups of crafts in definite relationship to each other. A temporary building, of striking design, the work of Henry Wilson, the distinguished architect and metal worker, contained part of the exhibits. These changes showed the way to new methods of arrangement, and a more interesting form of setting, which were developed still further in future exhibitions. So great was the success of this venture that in the following year a great part of the collection, the best and most extensive that had yet been brought together, was, on the invitation of the directors of the Louvre, transferred to Paris. The special exhibition of British arts and crafts opened by the Board of Trade in the spring of 1914, in the Pavilion de Marsan of the Palais de Louvre, the home of the Musee des Arts Decoratifs, was a second edition of the Ghent display, set out in a way that added much to its interest and value. Historic masterpieces of the great pioneers of the 19th century, fine examples from former London exhibitions, and new work that had not previously been shown combined to give a review of the growth of the British arts and crafts movement that was of unparalleled interest. The architectural setting, again due to Henry Wilson, adapted the magnificent galleries to their new purpose with complete success. The attainments of British craftsmen, the directness and novelty of their designs and the quality of their workmanship, shown to a public that had not yet seen any considerable collection of British work of this kind, gained enthusiastic appreciation.' In Aug. 1914 the exhibition was hurriedly dismantled, and, as it was impossible to return the exhibits to England, the collection remained buried in the cellars of the Louvre until the end of the World War.

In the autumn of 1916 the Arts and Crafts Society held an exhibition at Burlington House by the courtesy of the Royal Academy, and this helpful interest brought the two bodies together most happily for the first time. A room devoted to a small but representative assemblage of earlier work continued an inspiring feature of the Ghent and Paris shows, including much, now in private hands, that, although well enough known in certain circles, had not been seen by a younger generation. These examples included some of the varied productions of Walter Crane (1545-1915), the first president of the Society, and of William Morris, D. G. Rossetti, Ford Madox Brown, Edward Burne-Jones, and others of the same school, and bore witness to the remarkably versatile genius of those times. Innovations in the arrangement of the exhibits, inherited from the European ventures, and daring developments of the decorative setting of the exhibition that displayed the enterprise of the designer, the neW president, Henry Wilson, and the skill of the constructor, Francis W. Throup, brought an unwonted liveliness into the Academic precincts. A series of large paintings in temporary architectural surroundings completely masked the walls of several galleries. Conspicuous in this practical expression of the revived interest in mural decoration were adventures in work of unusual scale by Augustus John, William Rothenstein, Charles Sims, George Clausen and Maurice Greiffenhagen, to mention but a few of the many wellknown painters who took part in the most imposing experiment of the kind yet attempted. A series of rooms were erected, decorated and completely furnished by groups of craftsmen, and appropriate collections were brought together in illustration of " University," " Ecclesiastic " and other types of work.

A particularly encouraging feature was the number and quality of exhibits by young workers, for the most part students in schools of arts and crafts. Groups of students working under the direction of their masters also took part in the decoration of the galleries, a new departure in collective education that should bear good fruit in the future.E.

Relation to Industries

In this exhibition a room was set apart for a small display of articles of everyday use of a kind hitherto unrepresented in the Society's shows, arranged by the Design and Industries Association, a body that had been recently formed to better the quality and fitness of goods on sale to the general public through the usual channels of supply. This Association pays but little regard to the long-standing feud between handwork on the one side, and machine and scientific production on the other, but aims at securing an increased output and sale of all kinds of products of the best possible quality. By means of its well produced publications, able lectures, and instructive exhibitions the Association has gained considerable influence all over the United Kingdom, and has succeeded in banding together in close cooperation a number of designers, craftsmen, manufacturers and distributors. It was becoming more and more apparent that continental manufacturers were gaining great advantage from the ideas of British designers - indeed in some cases more than were the British themselves. The British manufacturer and designer had come to regard each other with a certain amount of suspicion; the one had no use for the " longhaired artist," who in his turn mistrusted the standards of design of the other. Foreign observers, especially in Germany, were taking deep interest in the British arts and crafts movement, and reaping very practical results from the knowledge they had gained. So thoroughly were these investigations being carried out that at least one German university had established a professorial chair for the special study of the economics of arts and crafts. Foreign goods that embodied the designs and ideas of British craftsmen were securing an ever widening market, not only abroad, but also in England. As a case in point the history of English influence on German printing is interesting. Several German type founders cut " punches " based on the calligraphy of Edward Johnston and sold " strikes " (i.e. matrices) to English letter founders, who gave the type English names in blissful ignorance that the designs were of English origin. The Design and Industries Association deals with the whole question of production and distribution and endeavours to bring together all concerned in an attempt to attain high standards of work and to promote their common interests. Its small exhibit at the Royal Academy, which illustrated a new point of view in artistic design and manufacture, aroused an interest which has been maintained by other exhibitions of the same character. Another " side show " included pottery, printed fabrics and other things made at the Omega workshops. This small selection of the work of Roger F. Fry gave an illustration of his very novel designs, and was a piquant demonstration of the catholicism of the selection committee of the Society.

Encouraged by its success in introducing the products of British craftsmanship to foreign buyers, the Board of Trade determined to extend its efforts so as to include all possible markets, at home as well as abroad. In conjunction with the Board of Education it founded, in 1920, the British Institute of Industrial Art, with Sir Hubert Llewell y n Smith as chairman. One cf the chief means by which this new body proposed to further its oLjects was the establishment in London of a current exhibition of mcdern British work, representative of a high standard of quality, and of the latest developments in industrial art. It also undertook the organization in the provinces and abroad, of special temporary and travelling exhibitions of the same character, either independentl3 or in cooperation with the Board of Trade, or other bodies. In addition to these activities it has established a bureau of informati.n on all questions relating to industrial art and to British and fortign markets. It proposed to establish a purchase fund with the olject of securing for the State selected modern work of outstanding merit. All work intended for exhibition comes before a selection conmittee, of which one section is devoted to manufactures, i.e. nmliple production by hand or machine, and another to the work of ndividual craftsmen. A number of experts in the various mattersthat form the business of the Institute were elected fellows, and s&eral exhibitions were held at the galleries of the Institute in Londm.

This brief summary of the chief recent developments in the organization of craftsmen shows an extension of the scope of the arts and crafts movement far beyon(that accepted by the original workers. It is perhaps doubtful wlether the pioneers of the last century, with their instinctive mistrust of machinery and commercial production, would have welconed all these modern innovations with enthusiasm. But however commercial the tendencies of " industrial art " may appear, they rave been brought about by the inevitable force of economic responsibilities - responsibilities that are in a measure the heritage of siccess. The new organizations are broad and elastic; they necessarily included all sincere workers who set themselves high ideals of design and workmanship. The labours of these are, indeed, the b<sis of their operations, which tend, not to supplant handwork or eliminate the artist, but to widen his sphere of action by giving hm his proper place in the control of machine-made things.

Calligraphy and Illumination

The p resent renaissance of writing is due entirely to the perfectly equippel efforts of Edward Johnston, who, in the latter years of the last certury, took up with rare persistence the study of the materials and methods of the great scribes of the past, and produced a number of 1V.SS. written in a hand based on traditional usage, but quite suited to rzodern needs. As a teacher he gathered around him a band of student:, of whom several specialized in writing, and as calligraphists, and, in their turn, teachers, spread his methods far and wide. Fron this beginning arose the remarkable revival of fine formal writing, inscriptions, and lettering that is one of the most interesting signs (f the times. Since 1910, J ohnston's work has been frequently exhiiited in many places; he stands without rival as a really great scrie. His MSS., addresses, and inscriptions, decorated with initials ad ornaments in gold and colour, are highly prized. Grady Hewit: a distinguished pupil of Johnston's, follows closely in his footsteawith work that is widely appreciated. He is also a teacher of authrity and has given attention to the training of children, for 'whose nstruction he has written some attractive copybooks. H. Lawrence Christie is a calligraphist whose inscriptions and MSS. show fine;y1e, and A. E. R. Gill is the most distinguished figure in the longieglected field of lapidary inscriptions. In the illumination of MSS.and printed books no finer work has been done in recent times tiat that of Mrs. Sydney Cockerell. Her designs show a vivid pceti imagination; they are, quite modern in character, absolutely withut trace of the archaic mannerisms that many workers in this nt affect Exquisite in drawing and colour, her decorations uniteuarmoniously, not only with the written or printed page, but also 'th the spirit of the author whose work she decorates. Mrs. Lase Lessore Powell has enriched a number of MSS. with great dccacy and charm. The accomplished illuminations of Allan F. Vers, based on a most watchful study of birds and flowers, have a delightful brightness of colour and design. His ornaments for the Cape Town memorial of the South African War, written by Graily Hewitt, were interesting examples of his work in another vein.

Printing

During the earlier years of the century book production made remarkable advances. The books issued by the Doves Press, founded in 1900 by T. J. Cobden-Sanderson and Emery Walker, were rapidly taking a place as the sole possible rivals of the classic products of the Kelmscott Press, to the excellence of which the expert knowledge of Emery Walker had paid its contribution. The Ashendene Press books, printed by C. H. St. John Hornby, and those of Charles Ricketts's Vale Press, were also increasing the reputation of British printing. In the trade generally a new activity was apparent; fine examples of books, and type of good design were closely studied by publishers and others, who had formerly paid but little attention to matters of this kind. The best British work gained the highest esteem wherever good printing found favour. In Germany, books based upon British models, or even produced under the supervision of authorities such as Emery Walker and Douglas Cockerell, showed how the genius of British printers and binders was growing in foreign appreciation. No trade, however, felt more severely the stress of the years of war; no new press of outstanding merit arose to range its products with the earlier triumphs of the century. An edition of the Odyssey was issued by the Oxford University Press, printed in the Greek type designed by Robert Proctor (1868-1903); and a new fount, designed by Herbert P. Horne (b. 1864), was used by the Riccardi Press. The old-established Chiswick Press maintained, under Charles T. Jacobi, the reputation that earned for it a worthy place in the revival of fine book work. Technical education in book production was developed in a special department of the Central School of Arts and Crafts under the supervision of the leading members of the trade. Under the instruction of J. H. Mason, an authority on printing, and of a binder, Peter McLeish, the students produced books of quite extraordinary merit, and gained in a few years a very complete introduction to the whole field of book production, passing on, after specializing for a period as either printers or binders, into printing offices and workshops with a foundation of craftsmanship and design of most satisfactory breadth.

Bookbinding

An ever-increasing number of well-bound books, plainly or elaborately finished, bore witness to the improved taste and high standard of craftsmanship to which bookbinding had been brought. In Paris were shown some of the rarely exhibited volumes of T. J. Cobden-Sanderson, the first of the modern binders to bring back into use so much of the tradition of sound workmanship that was giving place to untrustworthy expedients. Practical qualities resulting from good craftsmanship, combined with brilliant richness of design, made all his books specially remarkable. His pupil, Douglas Cockerell, exhibited much admirable work, with decoration of distinction. As a teacher he had, perhaps, more direct influence upon the bookbinding trade than any other worker. Sound methods fortified by much original research into the qualities of materials were, through his teaching, handed on to many skilful pupils, amongst whom may be named F. Sangorski (1875-1912) and his partner G. Sutcliffe, and Charles McLeish, the younger, who inherited much of his father's skill. Cockerell's careful study of " library " binding, suitable for everyday use, was specially serviceable to collectors of books. In the conservative restoration of ancient books his patient craftsmanship and wide experience gave a new lease of life to many priceless volumes in public and private libraries. Queen Mary lent for exhibition in Paris a beautifully bound copy of the reproduction of the Psalter of Queen Mary Tudor printed by C. H. St. John Hornby at the Ashendene Press. This binding, designed and executed by Katharine Adams, together with others from the same hand, showed the delicate tooling and clear, restrained designs of this gifted worker, who takes a unique place amongst modern binders. A further selection of her work, including a magnificent volume lent by King George, was shown at the Royal Academy in 1916.

Furniture

The almost universal tendency in cabinet-making towards the reproduction of antique models implies a certain regard for traditional forms, but gravely obstructs the development of furniture really suited to present day needs. Overpowered by the craze for " old things," modern designers but seldom attempted to meet practical requirements in a straightforward, logical spirit. The absurdities of Tudor bathrooms, or Adams' kitchen ranges, would not be tolerated nowadays; but, whilst up-to-date domestic engineering is admitted into historic mansions as a matter of course, " period " furniture is still thought fitting for houses of frankly modern design. Some few makers have built up reputations with work of utility and originality. The death of Ernest W. Gimson (1864-1919) removed the most distinguished cabinet-maker of the time. His work of all kinds, and he was a master of many arts, had a pleasant English stamp, aad was always his own beautiful solution of some practical problem of use or comfort. No work more soundly made, or directly designed, than his has been produced; wherever it went it raised new standards of taste. Cabinets designed by Prof.

W. R. Lethaby, now too rarely seen, had the distinction that marks all his work. Sidney and Ernest Barnsley produced attractive furniture of practical design and sound make. Charles Spooner, and A. Romney Green, whose cabinet work was often exhibited, were both interesting designers and makers whose work showed individuality and charm. Ambrose Heal gave the name of Tottenham Court Road a new sound to buyers of simply designed, well made things. George Jack became known both as the designer of many rich pieces of furniture and as a most gifted wood carver. He and Frederic Stuttig have brought new life into the decaying traditions of carved and gilded picture and mirror frames; they also did admirable gesso work, decorated with gold and colours. Many chairs, of new and serviceable design, were exhibited, including good basket-work seats made by Harry H. Peach. Examples of good upholstered furniture, however, were strangely lacking. Few workers appear to have studied closely the essentially comfortable art of upholstery, in which British craftsmen excelled in by-gone times. A wealth of those small articles in which the woodworker always revels - stationery and music cabinets, work boxes, caskets and so on - appeared at all exhibitions. These, with all their many delightful kinds of decoration by means of gesso, inlay, veneers or painting, had much pleasing ingenuity. A good deal of cabinet work enriched with patterns skilfully painted in colours was produced by several workers, Alfred H. Powell amongst others. In J. D. Crace (1838-1919) was combined a designer of furniture and a decorator whose scholarly and refined work was full of sound traditional knowledge.

Ceramics

The death of William de Morgan (1839-1917), the famous potter who made a new reputation as a novelist at an age when most men retire from active work, removed a great figure from the scene. The wonderful display of his work brought together in Paris in 1914 rivalled the glories of early Persian wares, with its fine technique, noble, vigorously drawn decoration, and splendid play of lustre and colour. Bowls and vases of fine character, by Thackeray Turner, were exhibited in Paris and at the Royal Acad- .emy, together with specimens of the interesting " Ruskin " ware of W. Howson Taylor, and some of the attractive work of W. Harrison Cowlishaw. A number of excellent vases, some modelled in the forms of amusingly serious birds, by the skilful brothers Martin, were also exhibited in Paris and other places. Alfred H. Powell and his wife, Louise Lessore Powell, decorated many pieces, and sets, of Wedgwood ware, with exquisite designs painted in their sure, clear style. Exhibits by Doulton & Co. must be mentioned, and also the charming little modelled figures of Mrs. Phoebe Stabler.

Textiles and Wallpapers

The simplicity of house decoration of the present day is in marked contrast to the lavish use of patterns customary in the latter half of the 19th century. It would appear, perhaps, that William Morris, the greatest pattern designer of our age, was himself an adventurer in the tvo extremes of taste; his own use of the splendid woven and printe1 textiles and wallpapers that he designed with such apparent ease, set the fashion in one direction, whilst the ascetic cult of whitewash and plain linen seems also to derive from him. The extensive collection of Morris' textiles and wallpapers brought together at Paris included a number of his precious original drawings for these. Ther beautiful drawing and colour and noble sense of design, made distressingly apparent the ignorant carelessness of what now passes for pattern designing in so many quarters. A number of designers of fabrics and wallpapers founded their work on well-tried principles. H. Dearle followed closely the tradition of Morris. The designs of C. F. A. Voysey showed pleasing originality, and those of Heywood Sumner the stamp of sound style. Metford Warner, first n the production of fine wallpapers, had also the distinction of beng the first manufacturer to attach to his wares the names of thenany distinguished designers whom his taste discovered and enployed. Allan F. Vigers was a careful observer of natural forms which he treated with well-considered formality. Sidney Mawson is a bold and vigorous draughtsman who leaned towards realism. Joseph M. Doran produced many well-planned, dignified designs. li sumptuous silks and velvets Sir Frank Varner worthily maintained the traditions of the " grand style " of the Venetians and Genoese. Luther Hooper, the historian of weaving, and a master of the intricate contrivances of the loom, was also a brilliant designer. Edmund Hunter produced a great number of distinctive stuffs, of his own design. E. W. Tristram, an excellent designer and draughtsman, and J. F. Flanagan wove interesting fabrics for hangings and upholstery purposes. The beautiful handwoven linens of Annie Garnett tecame well known; and Katherine Grasett wove fine stuffs of man, kinds. Some tapestries were produced at the workshop started bMorris at Merton, and new adventures in this art were undertsen elsewhere. In Paris and at the Royal Academy were seen the ast work in pattern designing of Walter Crane, whose peculiar geniis gave such charm to so many fabrics and wallpapers. In Louis Freman Day (1845-1910) was lost another designer whose work vas well known to the last generation of decorators. His text boks on various arts and crafts were the first of their kind, and ran though many editions. Embroidery. - In the particularly feminine art of embroidery many workers experimented in new directions. .n one vein the embroideries of May Morris and her fellow workers Lnd pupils, recalling the designs of, or actually designed by, Wiliam Morris, Philip Webb (1831-1915) and others of a school that vas preeminent in flowing patterns of large scale, have added spledour to many exhibitions during the decade 1910-20. Mrs. Nevall, of Fisherton de la Mere, an embroiderer whose work is of anothr type, produced a number of large hangings and other pieces of quite modern character. Her enthusiasm and knowledge trained a large following of pupils. Mrs. Archibald Christie's bed spreads, curtains, and household linens of various kinds, ranging from heavy applique work to things of gossamer-like substance, showed a break in yet another direction. They had an attractive touch of the past, springing from a new use of half-forgotten technical methods, rather than from archaic turns of design. The collection of very original samplers and other specimens, by Mrs. Christie and her pupils, illustrating a wide range of stitches, was a novel feature of the Royal Academy exhibition. Mary J. Newill, another distinguished embroiderer, carried out at the Birmingham School of Art some interesting experiments in directly stitched embroidery, that, for its effect, relies more upon interest of subject and colour scheme, than upon diversity of texture. Louisa F. Pesel followed Eastern models, in the intricate workings of which she is an expert exponent.

Metal Work. - Amongst metal workers Henry Wilson occupied a most prominent place. Equally successful in a great door of bronze, a silver cup or a minute piece of enamelled jewellery, his many-sided genius recalled the versatile masters of the greatest ages of craftsmanship. His bracelets, tiaras, brooches, and other beautiful jewellery, with their delicately modelled figures and rich ornaments, chased, or enamelled in glowing colours, had wonderful brilliance and character. His ecclesiastical work broke entirely with hackneyed fashions, but maintained the great spirit of significant magnificence. The collection of Wilson's work shown in Paris will long be remembered. R. Catterson Smith, another metal worker, silversmith and jeweller, with a wide range of other activities, was an inspiring teacher; he made famous the Birmingham School of Art, of which he was principal. Amongst other silversmiths and j ewellers whose work combined sound craftsmanship and distinctive design, J. Paul Cooper and Arthur Gaskin claim special attention.

W. Bainbridge Reynolds's varied work showed great individuality and skill. As a designer and maker of fine serviceable things for domestic use W. A. S. Benson became well known. Amongst the remarkable metal work shown in Paris in 1914, the crown, sceptre, ring and sword worn by H. R. H. the Prince of Wales at his investiture at Carnarvon in 1911, had a romantic interest. These, designed and modelled by Sir W. Goscombe John, were made by Messrs. Garrard & Co. The death of Henry Longden (1831-1920) removed a master metal worker of sound taste and wide knowledge, who was one of the pioneers of the arts and crafts movement.

Stained Glass and Mosaic Work. - The stained glass of Christopher W. Whall showed a perfect combination of artist and master craftsman. Beautiful drawing, mastery of colour and design, united with sure technical knowledge in work of the highest rank. His rare capacity in training others surrounded him with a group of brilliant pupils, amongst whom Karl Parsons was prominent. Louis Davis was another glass painter who was a thorough master of his craft. Prof. Selwyn Image's glass was dignified in design and fine in drawing. In mosaic the most impressive modern work decorates the vault of the chapel of St. Andrew, designed by Robert W. S. Weir, in the cathedral at Westminster. This chapel, opened in 1915, is remarkable for the skilful arrangement of the rich marbles of its wall decoration, the slender dignity of its exquisite metal screen, its inlaid choir stalls (the work of the late Ernest W. Gimson), and the glitter of its romantic mosaics. It is the most perfect expression of the particular style of decoration adopted in the cathedral that has yet been achieved. The excellence of the mosaics is due to the technical knowledge of Gaetano Meo, and the fine decorative sense of their designer, George Jack.

Other Crafts that claim attention include the art of the poster, which may be deemed a temporary form of mural decoration. This became, at the hands of F. Ernest Jackson and his collaborators, a thing of such interest that its evanescent nature is a matter of regret, rather than of satisfaction, as is too often the case. George Kruger Gray designed heraldic work of many kinds, in the finest tradition of an art in which tradition is an essential quality. Cecil Thomas's engraved and sculptured gems and seals were worthy examples of an ancient craft. The modelled plaster work of Ernest W. Gimson, Laurerce Turner, Norman Jewson and others was a lively rebirth of whit had become a mechanical form of ornament. Several workers in architectural leadwork rainwater pipe heads, sundials and other things, derived inspiration from Prof. W. R. Lethaby, and techiical knowledge from the researches of Francis W. Troup. Prof. Tiomas Okey added to his many claims to fame the distinction of bang the best modern basket-maker. The beautiful table glass desia ed by Philip Webb for William Morris in 1869 and made by James Powell & Sons, which was exhibited in Paris in 1914, showed modrn design and workmanship, equalling, if not excelling, anything rf the kind produced in the past. The death of Philip Webb, than ,hom none was more distinguished amongst that small band of greatarchitects that made the latter half of the 19th century a period so emarkable in the annals of domestic architecture, was also a loss to tie many lesser crafts in which his commanding genius found expreson. Everything he touched, church or mansion, table glass or embrcdery, showed the completeness of his knowledge and the stamp of h; individuality.

Art Workers' Gild

From its foundation, in 1884, the Art Workers' Guild ha; been the inspiring and directing force of the arts and crafts movement in England. At the meetings of this close, but eminently hospitable body, the far-reaching activities of the world of art have been discussed, with the insight peculiar to practical minds, by the most notable workers of the past 30 years, and influenced in a remarkable way. Perhaps the most striking quality of craftsmen is their versatility. They turn readily from one kind of work to another with an ease and certainty bewildering to the spectator. Norman Shaw (1831-1912) and Philip Webb, typical giants of the last generation, were great in several arts, any one of which might have occupied an individual for the whole term of life, and they added to these preeminence in architecture. William Morris himself was not only master of a score of arts, but preeminent in all.

Bibliography

J. W. Mackail, The Life of William Morris; Arts and Crafts Essays by Members of the Arts and Crafts Exhibition Society; Arts De. coratifs de Grande Bretagne et d'Mande Exposition, Palais du Louvre (1914); Edward Johnston, Writing and Illuminating, and Lettering; Charles T. Jacobi, Printing; Douglas Cockerell, Bookbinding and the Care of Books; Herbert P. Horne, The Binding of Books; George Jack, Wood Carving; Luther Hooper, Hand-loom Weaving; William Morris, Some Hints on Pattern Designing; Mrs. Archibald Christie, Embroidery and Tapestry Weaving; Mrs. Archibald Christie, Samplers and Stitches. A Handbook of Embroidery; Henry Wilson, Silverwork and Jewellery; J. Starkie Gardner, Ironwork; W. R. Lethaby, Leadwork; Christopher W. Whall, Stained Glass. (A. H. C.*) United States The first American arts and crafts society was instituted in 1897 at Hull House, Chicago. The Boston Society of Arts and Crafts was formed a few months later. Following these, societies multiplied rapidly until there was no large city and scarcely a town or village which had not its local group. New York's society dates from 1904, and was for some years affiliated with the National Arts Club and called the National Society of Craftsmen, numbering shortly after its founding between four and five hundred members. Later, ending this affiliation, it took the name of the New York Society of Craftsmen. At Philadelphia a house was fitted up, with individual studios in connexion with the salesroom. Detroit and Milwaukee early developed active art centres, each with its own building, exhibition rooms and classes. Besides these regular arts and crafts societies there grew up many so-called " gift-shops," with or without tea-rooms.

Industries like those of England were instituted from time to time, but did not flourish as well as the cooperative groups. That of the Abnake Rug, at Pequaket, N.H., one of the early and most successful, was conducted by Mrs. Albee who originated the patterns from Indian designs, the name being that of a tribe of Indians formerly inhabiting the region. These rugs, made as were the old hooked rugs, were worked by the country women of the neighbourhood in their own homes and paid for by the square foot. As they suited well the " craftsman " style of furniture, they were in great demand, but the undertaking proved too burdensome, and was given up. Similar industries were conducted in Cranberry I., Me., and in the mountains of the south. Industrial and experimental groups were conducted in connexion with colleges, that of Alfred, N.Y., and of Sophie Newcomb College, New Orleans, being successful examples. At the latter a style of pottery was developed, produced by graduate students and sold by the college for them, in which the motifs were taken from the native flora. A similar group in embroidery created some beautiful things in stitchery and applique. Semi-commercial enterprises also sprung up which were varied in their plan and output. The earliest and best known is that of the Rookwood Pottery at Cincinnati, Ohio. The Grueby Pottery, although for financial reasons short-lived, was most distinctive, as was the Dedham ware. Both of these came from the neighbourhood of Boston, where too was the Paul Revere Pottery, made under the steeple of the very church from which hung the historic lantern. From here came also a heavy ware, suitable for children's use, the decoration of which was done by girls of high-school age, under careful direction, the industry having developed from classes in a girls' club. In New York the Tiffany stained glass and opalescent ware were celebrated. The Herter looms, also in New York, produced beautiful tapestries and hangings. From Doylestown, Pa., came the Mercer tiles of unusually artistic design and workmanship. The original patterns were taken from the doors of porcelain stoves brought over by the " Pennsylvania Dutch " settlers of that region. These are a few of the most prominent of the many art industries through the United States. The craftsman furniture paved the way for other styles more or less modelled upon it, the furniture of the Erskine-Danforth Co., New York, being perhaps most nearly in line with the spirit of simplicity associated with the arts and crafts idea.

Individual societies, as has been said, sprung up spontaneously, and although there was a kind of freemasonry among them each remained independent and unattached. To bring them together and to unify the movement there was formed in Boston 1907, just Io years after the founding of the first society, a league of handicraft societies, 20 coming together as charter members. In 1912 the National League of Handicraft Societies represented about 40 arts and crafts societies, of which many had a membership well into the hundreds. Its aim was to form a clearing house for the movement and to do statistical and educational work not within the scope of any one society. It supported a travelling exhibition of handicraft which was sent on request to places in which excellent work of this kind could not be seen, and a travelling library of technical works and other appropriate books not so well selected or easily obtainable outside of the great cities. The founding of this league, of itself, indicates the existence of strong and enterprising societies and the strength of the handicraft idea. When in 1909 the American Federation of Arts was formed at Washington, it included the handicrafts as well as the so-called fine arts, and as the handicraft department covered much of the work of the league, the latter was merged, in 1912, into the arts and crafts department of the federation The American Federation of Arts aimed to organize a federation of all institutions, societies, city and village improvement associations, and school and other organizations in the United States, whose purpose was to promote the study and application of art, and to cultivate public taste. The educational work was along three lines: it sent out travelling exhibitions of work of a high standard; it circulated typewritten lectures pertaining to the arts and crafts; and it published a monthly magazine.

Early in its history the Boston society issued each month a booklet containing an essay upon some craft with other appropriate matter. This was taken over by the National League of Handicraft Societies and published, with a few changes, as the monthly magazine Handicraft. In 1909 the National Society of Craftsmen, N.Y., brought out an eight-page folder each month called the Arts ee Crafts Bulletin. This flourished for two years and then became The Arts & Crafts Magazine, published independently at Washington's Crossing, N.J. Both this and Handicraft were bought out in 1913 by the Industrial Arts Magazine. Meanwhile there had been published in connexion with the craftsman furniture a distinctive magazine, The Craftsman, which did a great deal to develop taste along these lines. The Philistine, describing the industry at East Aurora, N.Y., helped to spread the Morris idea as a practical one. In 1921 the handicraft idea had no organ of its own except as represented in the American Magazine of Art of the Federation.

In 1914 the Art Alliance was formed with the express purpose of bringing together the artist and the manufacturer. Difficult as this appeared at the time it proved its value. The alliance numbered in 1920 ',coo members in the United States and Canada with others in England, France, Germany and in Manila. Manufacturers pay a membership fee of $50 a year, artist members $5, on the theory that the former receive the greater benefits. In Dec. 1920 the fifth annual exhibition of the alliance was held in the Bush Terminal Building, New York City, at which 3,500 designs from 34 states were shown; $2,000 was distributed in prizes by the manufacturers for designs to be used commercially. In accordance with the tendency to amalgamation, four societies - the Art Alliance, the New York Society of Craftsmen, the Pictorial Photographers of America and the Society of Illustrators - united in the spring of 1920 to secure a local Art Centre, or Home of the Arts, in New York City, in which societies, hitherto unrelated, might have common offices, exhibition rooms, meeting rooms, etc., with a dining hall and a certain number of studios. Stock was issued at $10 a share and in a short time enough subscribed to permit of the purchase of two houses at 65-67 East 56th Street. The Art Centre was formally opened Nov. 1921.

Another evidence of the interest taken in industrial art is the formation of the Industrial Arts Survey, backed by the state of New York, with an office in Cooper Union, New York City. The aim is to investigate the development of the arts in America, especially as compared with those of Europe, in order to stimulate their development. In this the public schools and the School Arts League have aided. Also in this work and especially in the general education of the public the museums all over the country have successfully cooperated. At the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, there was held in Jan. 1921 a remarkable and beautiful display of industrial art, the Fifth Exhibition of Current Work by Manufacturers and Designers. (M. B. E.)

Categories: ARO-ASH | Biography